A Comparative Examination of Political Institutions' Effect on Economic Growth

 A Comparative Examination of Political Institutions' Effect on Economic Growth

Political institutions play a pivotal role in shaping the economic trajectory of nations, serving as a key determinant in fostering or hindering growth. The complex interaction between political governance and economic development has been the subject of intense debate among economists, political scientists, and policymakers alike. This article aims to explore the varied effects that different political systems—democracies, authoritarian regimes, and hybrid systems—have on economic performance, drawing on historical case studies and empirical data to provide a comprehensive understanding of this crucial relationship.

Understanding Political Institutions

Political institutions encompass the formal and informal rules, policies, and practices that define the way in which political power is exercised and authority is distributed. These structures range from democratic governments, where power is vested in the hands of elected representatives, to authoritarian regimes, where power is centralized, often in the hands of a single leader or a small group of elites. Hybrid political systems combine elements of both democracy and authoritarianism, leading to a more complex interaction between political control and economic management.

Democracy and Economic Growth

Democratic systems, characterized by free and fair elections, rule of law, and protection of individual rights, are often associated with higher levels of economic growth. One key argument is that democracies provide a stable environment that encourages investment by offering protection for property rights and fostering transparency in government dealings. As governments in democracies are accountable to the electorate, they are more likely to implement policies that promote long-term economic growth rather than engaging in short-term populist measures.

Empirical studies have consistently shown that countries with robust democratic institutions tend to experience higher rates of economic growth. For instance, the advanced economies of Western Europe and North America, such as the United States, Canada, and Germany, have prospered under democratic systems that emphasize the rule of law, a free press, and respect for human rights. These nations have been able to build strong institutions that support market-based economies, attract foreign direct investment, and foster innovation.

However, it is important to note that democracy alone does not guarantee economic success. The effectiveness of democratic institutions depends heavily on the quality of governance and the level of political stability. Countries with weak democratic institutions, such as those struggling with corruption, inefficiency, and political polarization, may fail to leverage the potential benefits of democracy, resulting in slower economic growth.

Authoritarianism and Economic Growth

In contrast to democracies, authoritarian regimes often prioritize political control over individual freedoms, with economic decisions concentrated in the hands of a few powerful individuals or political elites. While many authoritarian regimes have achieved rapid economic growth in the short term, the long-term sustainability of such growth is often questioned. China's rise as an economic powerhouse is a prime example of the potential benefits of authoritarian governance, where the centralization of power allowed for swift decision-making, long-term strategic planning, and large-scale infrastructure projects.

Nevertheless, authoritarian regimes face inherent challenges. The absence of political freedoms, such as the right to protest or free elections, often stifles creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation—key drivers of sustainable economic development. Furthermore, authoritarian systems are prone to corruption, cronyism, and a lack of accountability, which can lead to inefficient allocation of resources, economic mismanagement, and social unrest.

Economic growth in authoritarian regimes may also be unsustainable, as seen in countries like Russia and Venezuela. While these nations have seen periods of economic expansion, the absence of democratic checks and balances often leads to systemic weaknesses, making these economies vulnerable to external shocks, corruption scandals, and poor long-term policy decisions.

Hybrid Systems: A Middle Ground?

Hybrid political systems—those that combine elements of both democracy and authoritarianism—pose an interesting middle ground. These systems, often described as "illiberal democracies" or "competitive authoritarianism," maintain a veneer of democratic processes (e.g., elections and political parties) while limiting the actual power of opposition forces and curbing civil liberties. Countries like Turkey, Hungary, and some Eastern European nations exhibit characteristics of hybrid regimes, where leaders consolidate power through undemocratic means while maintaining some democratic features.

The economic performance of hybrid systems is mixed. On one hand, the centralized decision-making of authoritarianism can lead to rapid economic growth, as seen in some hybrid regimes with strong leadership. On the other hand, the erosion of democratic norms and the suppression of opposition can lead to instability, inefficient governance, and lack of innovation. In these systems, the lack of accountability and transparency can deter foreign investment and inhibit long-term growth prospects.

Conclusion: The Role of Political Institutions in Shaping Economic Outcomes

The relationship between political institutions and economic growth is multifaceted and complex. Democracies generally provide a stable and predictable environment that supports economic growth through the protection of property rights, rule of law, and government accountability. However, the quality of governance within democracies is crucial—without it, democratic institutions may fail to deliver economic benefits.

Authoritarian regimes can foster rapid economic growth in the short term, particularly through centralized decision-making and long-term planning. However, the lack of political freedoms, corruption, and inefficient governance can undermine their long-term economic prospects.

Hybrid systems offer a middle path, combining elements of both democratic and authoritarian governance. While they may achieve short-term economic success, the lack of political freedoms and accountability can lead to systemic issues that hinder sustainable development.

Ultimately, the type of political system matters, but the quality of governance, the rule of law, and the protection of civil liberties are just as important in determining the long-term economic growth of a country. Political institutions shape the environment in which economic policies are formulated and implemented, and their impact on economic growth cannot be overstated.

The Monetary Policy: A Catalyst for Economic Growth

Monetary policy, a cornerstone of macroeconomic management, plays a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of economic growth. It is a tool wielded by central banks to influence the money supply, interest rates, and ultimately, the economy's overall health. In a world where nations grapple with inflation, recessionary pressures, and global market volatility, the nuances of monetary policy have never been more critical.


Understanding Monetary Policy

Monetary policy operates through two primary mechanisms: expansionary and contractionary policies. Expansionary policies, aimed at stimulating economic growth, involve lowering interest rates and increasing money supply to encourage borrowing, investment, and consumption. Conversely, contractionary policies seek to temper inflation by tightening the money supply and raising interest rates.

These mechanisms, while conceptually straightforward, wield a profound influence on economic growth. Their effectiveness, however, is contingent upon factors such as fiscal policy alignment, consumer confidence, and external economic conditions.


The Direct Impacts on Economic Growth

  1. Investment and Borrowing
    Lower interest rates, a hallmark of expansionary monetary policy, reduce the cost of borrowing for businesses and individuals. This encourages investment in capital projects, infrastructure, and technology—critical drivers of economic growth. For instance, during the global financial crisis of 2008, many central banks, including the Federal Reserve, slashed interest rates to near-zero levels, fueling investments to stabilize and stimulate the economy.

  2. Consumption Dynamics
    When borrowing becomes cheaper, consumer spending typically rises. Increased demand drives production, creates jobs, and fosters a virtuous cycle of growth. However, if consumer confidence wanes, even low interest rates may fail to achieve the desired stimulus, as observed during pandemic-induced uncertainties in 2020.

  3. Inflation Control
    While monetary policy is vital for growth, unchecked expansionary policies can lead to inflationary spirals, eroding purchasing power. Contractionary policies, by contrast, aim to stabilize prices, ensuring sustainable long-term growth. Striking the right balance between these objectives remains a complex but essential task for central banks.


Transitioning Through Economic Cycles

The relationship between monetary policy and economic growth is particularly evident during economic transitions. In periods of recession, expansionary policies act as lifelines, fostering recovery. During booms, contractionary policies help prevent overheating by controlling inflation and maintaining macroeconomic stability.

Take, for example, the monetary tightening in the United States in 2022–2023. Faced with soaring post-pandemic inflation, the Federal Reserve aggressively raised interest rates to combat price pressures. While this slowed certain sectors, the broader goal was to stabilize the economy and lay the groundwork for sustainable growth.


Challenges and Limitations

Despite its potential, monetary policy is not a panacea. Structural economic issues, geopolitical risks, and global interdependencies can dilute its impact. Emerging markets, for instance, often struggle with the "trilemma"—managing monetary autonomy, exchange rate stability, and capital flows simultaneously.

Moreover, prolonged reliance on monetary tools can lead to asset bubbles, excessive debt, and distorted market dynamics. Central banks must navigate these challenges with precision, often adjusting policies in real-time based on evolving economic indicators.


The Role of Central Banks

Central banks, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) or the Bank of Russia, wield significant power in directing monetary policy. Their independence from political influence is crucial for maintaining credibility and effectiveness. Transparent communication, often in the form of forward guidance, ensures that businesses and consumers can make informed decisions in anticipation of policy shifts.


The Road Ahead

As economies adapt to 21st-century challenges—digital transformation, climate change, and shifting demographics—the role of monetary policy in fostering growth is evolving. Central banks are increasingly incorporating non-traditional tools, such as quantitative easing or green finance initiatives, to address these emerging dynamics.

However, for monetary policy to truly catalyze economic growth, it must operate in tandem with robust fiscal policies, structural reforms, and international cooperation. The interconnectedness of global markets demands coordinated efforts to navigate shared challenges and leverage opportunities for collective prosperity.


Conclusion

Monetary policy is more than just a mechanism to regulate money supply and interest rates—it is a dynamic and powerful tool that shapes the contours of economic growth. Its success lies in its adaptability, precision, and integration with broader economic strategies.

In an era marked by rapid changes and uncertainties, the ability of central banks to deploy monetary policy effectively will determine not only the resilience of economies but also their capacity for innovation, inclusivity, and sustainable growth. The stakes are high, but so are the opportunities for transformative impact.

How to save money in college.

 College life can be expensive, but with careful planning and smart strategies, students can significantly reduce their financial burden. Here's a comprehensive guide to help you save money while pursuing your education:

Budgeting Basics

  • Track Your Spending: Use budgeting apps or spreadsheets to monitor your income and expenses.
  • Set Realistic Goals: Determine how much you want to save and create a plan to achieve it.
  • Prioritize Needs Over Wants: Focus on essential expenses like tuition, rent, and groceries.
  • Cut Back on Unnecessary Expenses: Limit dining out, streaming services, and other discretionary spending.

Smart Shopping Strategies

  • Generic Brands: Opt for generic or store-brand products, which are often cheaper than brand-name items.
  • Couponing and Cashback Apps: Use coupons and cashback apps to save on groceries, clothing, and other purchases.
  • Buy Used Textbooks: Consider renting textbooks or purchasing used copies to save money.
  • Shop Online: Compare prices online to find the best deals and use online coupons.

Frugal Living Tips

  • Cook at Home: Prepare meals at home instead of eating out to save money.
  • Carpool or Use Public Transportation: Reduce transportation costs by carpooling or using public transportation.
  • Limit Social Spending: Find free or low-cost activities, such as picnics, board games, or hiking.
  • Shop Secondhand: Buy clothes, furniture, and electronics from thrift stores or online marketplaces.

Maximizing Financial Aid

  • Complete the FAFSA: The Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) can help you qualify for grants, scholarships, and work-study programs.
  • Explore Scholarships and Grants: Research scholarships and grants based on your academic achievements, extracurricular activities, or demographics.
  • Work-Study Programs: Consider part-time jobs on campus to earn money and gain work experience.
  • Summer Jobs: Work full-time during the summer to earn extra money for the upcoming academic year.

Additional Tips

  • Live Off-Campus: Renting a room or apartment with roommates can be more affordable than living on campus.
  • Sell Unused Items: Sell textbooks, electronics, and clothing to earn extra cash.
  • Use Student Discounts: Take advantage of student discounts on food, entertainment, and travel.
  • Build Good Credit: Pay bills on time and avoid excessive debt to improve your credit score.

By implementing these strategies, you can significantly reduce your college expenses and build a strong financial foundation for your future.

Never borrow money from friends.

 The age-old adage, "Never a borrower nor a lender be," carries profound wisdom. While borrowing money from friends may seem like a convenient solution in times of financial hardship, it can have far-reaching consequences that can strain relationships and lead to emotional distress.

Financial Implications

One of the most immediate concerns is the potential for financial strain. When money changes hands between friends, it can create a sense of obligation and expectation. If the loan is not repaid on time or in full, it can lead to tension, resentment, and damaged friendships. Moreover, borrowing money from friends can mask underlying financial problems, preventing individuals from addressing the root causes of their financial difficulties.

Social Implications

The social implications of borrowing money from friends can be even more significant. Money can be a sensitive topic, and discussing financial matters can often lead to uncomfortable conversations. When money is involved, it can be easy for emotions to run high, and misunderstandings can arise. If a loan is not repaid, it can damage trust and erode the foundation of the friendship.

Practical Advice for Avoiding Financial Pitfalls

To maintain healthy financial boundaries and avoid the pitfalls of borrowing from friends, consider the following tips:

  1. Prioritize Budgeting:

    • Create a realistic budget to track income and expenses.
    • Identify areas where you can cut back to save money.
    • Set financial goals and work towards them.
  2. Emergency Fund:

    • Build an emergency fund to cover unexpected expenses, such as medical bills or car repairs.
    • Aim to save at least three to six months' worth of living expenses.
  3. Seek Professional Help:

    • Consult with a financial advisor to develop a personalized financial plan.
    • Consider seeking credit counseling or debt management services.
  4. Explore Alternative Financing Options:

    • Consider taking out a personal loan from a bank or credit union.
    • Explore options like peer-to-peer lending or crowdfunding.
  5. Honest Communication:

    • If you must borrow money from a friend, be upfront about the terms of the loan, including the repayment schedule and interest rate.
    • Maintain open and honest communication throughout the process.

By following these guidelines, you can protect your friendships and your financial well-being. Remember, borrowing money from friends can be a risky proposition. It's always best to exhaust other options before turning to friends for financial assistance.

TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM

 The Troubled Asset Relief Program, known as TARP, was the cornerstone of the United States program to address the U.S. financial crisis that began in 2008. It came into being in October 2008 with the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The legislation was commonly billed as a $700 billion bailout for banks.

The TARP plan evolved over time but originally its purpose was to buy bad loans, mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations from banks. These assets went by the term “toxic assets” because they had no market value, and amounted to a severe threat to solvency of the banking system. At first it was thought that the government might be able to recover its investment because it would be purchasing these assets at bargain basement prices, and selling them for a profit later when the financial crisis had passed. Further consideration brought the realization that purchasing these assets at low prices undercut the capitalization of the banking system. Two weeks after the program’s enactment, the secretary of treasury shifted the focus of the program to emphasize the purchase of preferred stock in banks and guaranteeing troubled assets. If a bank recovers with the benefit of the government’s help, and its stock climbs, the government can sell its stake and recover at least some of the taxpayers’ investment.

Citigroup was one of the large banks that benefited from the program. The United States Treasury first purchased $25 billion in preferred stock in Citigroup, and later another $20 billion. The United States government in addition guaranteed troubled loans and securities on Citigroup’s balance sheet on the order of $306 billion. In return for the guarantees, the government received another $7 billion stake in Citigroup (Curran, November 25, 2008). The government forced the top banks to participate in the government bailout. Otherwise, banks that elected not to participate would appear financially stronger, which might give a competitive advantage over the banks that did participate. For smaller banks, participation was voluntary. In the beginning, many smaller banks worried that participation in the program was equivalent to a confession of financial weakness. Once the government let it be known that it would not let banks that were fundamentally unhealthy participate in the program, perceptions changed. Banks began to fear that not applying for participation might be regarded as financial weakness.

TARP drew criticism from the outset.

The government did not seem to be doing enough to track how banks were using the infusions of government capital. Homeowners facing foreclosures received no relief from TARP funds. People wondered why it was more important to bail out Wall Street than to bail out families facing bankruptcy and home foreclosure. None of the TARP funds helped homeowners refinance mortgages that they could not pay. In December 2008, President Bush used his executive authority to make TARP funds available to U.S. automobile manufacturers. Both General Motors and Chrysler received TARP funds. The most controversial beneficiary of TARP funds was American International Group, a large insurance company. In January 2009, the new administration of President Obama vowed to revise the TARP plan to alleviate the rate of home foreclosures.

Bank bailouts became a global phenomenon in 2008. The United Kingdom established a plan similar in strategy and scale to the one in the United States. The Royal Bank of Scotland was the largest beneficiary of government bailout money in the United Kingdom. In 2008, Sweden announced a sweeping bailout plan to save its banking system. Belgium bailed out a large bank in October 2008. Germany and Iceland both bailed out financial institutions. Switzerland, eager to protect its status as global banking center, put together a massive recapitalization of the United Bank of Switzerland.

See also: Savings and Loan Bailout

References

Cimilluca, Dana. “The Financial Crisis: Swiss Move to Back Troubled UBS; Under Plan, as Much as $60 Billion in Toxic Assets to be Taken Off Balance Sheet.” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), October 17, 2008, p. A3.

Curran, Rob. “Large Stock Focus: Citi Jumps on Bailout; B of A, Goldman Follow”, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) November 25, 2008, p. C6.

Kessler, Andy. “What Paulson Is Trying to Do.” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) October 15, 2008, p. A19.

Solomon, Deborah. “U.S. News: Obama Works to Overhaul TARP—Team Tries to Meld Some Paulson Ideas with Aid to Borrowers Facing Foreclosure.” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), December 17, 2008, p. A3.

Williamson, Elizabeth. “U.S. News: Rescue Cash Lures Thousand of Banks.” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), November 3, 2008, p. A3.

UNIVERSAL BANKS

 In addition to the traditional commercial banking activities of holding deposits and extending loans, universal banks offer a full range of financial services, including underwriting, issuing new offerings of stocks and bonds, and brokering stocks and bonds. Some universal banks provide insurance. Banks that only engage in underwriting new securities, floating new offers of securities, and brokering securities are called “investment banks.” Universal banks combine deposit banking of traditional commercial banking with investment banking.

In the 1800s, banks in continental Europe and Germany in particular developed along the lines of universal banks, whereas in Britain deposit banking and investment banking tended to remain separate. In the United States, financier moguls such as J. P. Morgan introduced universal banking in the United States in the last decades leading up to World War I. Congress cut short the development of universal banking in the United States with the enactment of the Glass–Steagall Banking Act of 1933. Aimed at restoring public confidence in banks, this act prohibited commercial banks from investing in the stock market or providing investment bank services. In the German model of the 19th century, universal banks purchased corporate stock for customers. In exchange, customers yielded to banks proxies entitling banks to vote the customers’ shares in shareholder votes. The banks also purchased corporate stock on their own accounts. The control of a large piece of shareholder power ensured that the banks held positions on corporate boards of directors. The universal banks were also lenders to corporations. By holding seats on boards of directors, the banks had a voice in the management of companies that owed them money. In addition, they had an incentive to watch out for mismanagement at the expense of stockholders and creditors. It was an arrangement that put a large amount of power in the hands of banks.

In the post–World War II era, universal banks enjoyed the greatest legal acceptance and experienced the fullest development in Germany. German universal banks hold large equity positions in corporations, have representatives on their boards, and exercise proxy votes for customer shareholders. Japan and Switzerland also followed the universal banking model. The economic success of these countries, and particularly the rapid economic growth in Germany and Japan, began to restore confidence in universal banking. Banks in these countries help to minimize conflicts between debt and equity holders and keep corporate management under tighter rein. By ensuring access to long-term financing, universal banks shield corporate managers from short pressures from fluctuations in stock market prices.

Particularly in Germany, critics raised the issue of universal banks dominating the German stock market. It is said that rather than earning high dividends, banks were more interested in making loans to corporations on whose boards they had representation. In the 1990s, Germany experienced several corporate failures. In 1998, the German government enacted the Control and Transparency in Corporate Field Act. This act prohibits a bank holding more than 5 percent of a company’s shares from controlling the proxy voting rights for its bank customers who also own shares in the company.

In the 1990s, momentum began to build to approve universal banking in the United States. Critics worried that universal banks would choose riskier investments because under a system of FDIC insurance the cost of funds to a bank does not vary with the riskiness of its investments.

In 1999, the U.S. Congress lifted the ban on universal banking with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. Replacing the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, this act allowed the integration of banking, insurance, and stock-trading. By 2007, the United States boasted three large universal banks, Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Bank of America Corp (Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2007). As the subprime financial crisis of 2008 unfolded in the United States, some observers felt the financial woes stemmed directly from dismantling the wall between deposit banking and investment banking. They were referring to the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act. At first, the universal banks seemed to fare better than the investment banks. The financial crisis could be interpreted as a symptom of the shake-out and consolidation that analysts expected from the enactment of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. As the financial crisis widened, however, the stock values of Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America crashed, and the future of the institutions was very much in doubt. All three of the banks received large infusions of preferred stock investments from the United States Treasury.

See also: Glass–Steagall Banking Act of 1933, Troubled Asset Relief Program

References

Esen, Rita. “The Transition of German Universal Banks.” Journal of International Banking Regulation, vol. 2, no. 4 (2001): 50–57.

Fohlin, Caroline. “Relationship Banking, Liquidity, and Investment in the German Industrialization.” Journal of Finance, vol. 53, no. 5 (October 1998): 1737–1758.

Sidel, Robin. “Do-It-All Banks’ Big Test; Universal Model So Far Weathers Credit Crunch, Remains Controversial.”

Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition, New York) September 6, 2007, p. C1. Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition). “Glass and Steagall Had a Point.” May 31, 2008, p. A10.


FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE (FOMC)

 The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the chief policy-making group within the Federal Reserve System. It makes the key decisions for monetary policy in the United States. Monetary policy has to do with interest rates, credit conditions, and growth in the money supply.

The FOMC consists of 12 members. All seven members of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System serve on the FOMC. The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is also a permanent member of the FOMC.

The presidents of the 11 other regional Federal Reserve Banks hold the remaining four seats on a rotating basis. The seven presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks who do not hold a seat attend meetings of the FOMC as nonvoting members. The chair of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System also serves as chair of the FOMC. The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York serves as vice-chair. The seven members of the board of governors wield a powerful sway over monetary policy. They hold the majority of the voting seats on the FOMC and are permanent members. FOMC decisions are made either by consensus or near consensus. The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York owes his precedence over the other presidents to the special role played by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Trading Desk at this bank carries out the day-to-day operations required to implement the policies decided by the FOMC. The account manager for the FOMC is the chief supervisor of the New York bank’s Trading Desk. That person is in daily contact with members of FOMC subcommittees. Normally, the FOMC meets eight times per year to assess monetary policy and make adjustments. If developments in the economy warrant quicker action, the FOMC holds additional meetings either in person or by conference call. Immediately after a meeting, the FOMC announces its decisions to an eagerly awaiting Wall Street and financial media. Financial markets often react within minutes of an announcement from the FOMC. Financial markets may react right before a meeting as speculators try to make money by betting on what action the FOMC will take.

The wording of the formal instructions to the New York Trading Desk is decided at the FOMC meeting. Once the FOMC decides to change policy, the new policy is implemented immediately. The policies are implemented through the purchase and sale of U. S government securities. The Federal Reserve’s trading in U.S. government securities are called “open-market operations.” The New York Trading Desk decides the amount of securities to buy or sell to carry out the instructions handed down by the FOMC.

The main interest rate the FOMC aims to influence is the Federal Funds Rate, which is the rate of interest commercial banks charge each other for overnight loans. The FOMC decides on a target for the Federal Funds Rate and instructs the New York Trading Desk to conduct the open-market operations necessary to maintain the targeted rate. To ease monetary policy, the FOMC lowers the targeted rate, and to tighten monetary policy, the FOMC raises the targeted rate.

See also: Announcement Effect, Open Market Operations

References

Meade, Ellen E. “The FOMC: Preferences, Voting, and Consensus.” Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, March 2005, pp. 93–101.

Thornton, Daniel L. “When Did the FOMC Begin Targeting the Federal Funds Rate? What the Verbatim Transcript Tells Us.” Working Papers, 2004-015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2005.

ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT

 Central banks publically announce intentions of maintaining a key policy interest rate at a certain level called the “target rate.” The practice of announcing targets is relatively recent, and represents a sharp departure from the confidentiality and secretiveness that was once thought to be a necessary part of monetary policy and open market operations. The “announcement effect” refers to a central bank’s ability to control a key interest rate merely by announcing its intentions.

In the United States, the key policy interest rate targeted by the central bank is the federal funds rate, and the central bank is the Federal Reserve System. The federal funds rate is the interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow funds from each other overnight. The federal funds rate reflects the market tightness for these funds. The Federal Reserve can ease tightness in this market by purchasing U.S. government bonds, and can tighten this market by selling U.S. government securities. Buying U.S. government securities injects additional funds into the banking system, allowing banks to increase lending and enlarge the money supply in the process. Central bank purchases and sales of government securities are called “open market operations.” In the Federal Reserve System, a policy-making group called the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) formulates the policy for open market operations.

Until 1994, the Federal Reserve kept directives involving open market operations a secret until 45 days after an FOMC meeting, keeping current financial market participants unaware of the Federal Reserve’s policy stance at a given point in time. In 1976, the Federal Reserve successfully defended itself against an inquiry filed under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain copies of the minutes of FOMC meetings without the 45-day delay. Federal Reserve cited an “announcement effect” that might lead to volatility and uncertainty in financial markets, and maintained that secrecy was a necessary part of monetary policy.

On 4 February 1994, the FOMC, amidst a two-day meeting, announced that it planned to apply slight pressure to commercial bank reserve positions, and that short-term interest rates could be expected to rise, breaking the Federal Reserve’s long stance policy of secrecy in these matters. It was an experiment in clearly communicating policy decisions to financial markets, and using public announcements as a method of communication. The experiment had none of the dire consequences that the Federal Reserve cited in its 1976 defense against a Freedom of Information inquiry. The practice of publically announcing policy decisions and targets became a standard part of central banking in the United States and in numerous other countries. What became known as the “announcement effect” enabled central banks to control a targeted interest rate with fewer interventions in the open market. It gave central banks the ability to control a targeted interest rate merely by announcing its intentions and taking little or no immediate action.

See also: Federal Open Market Committee, Open Market Operations

References

Belongia, Michael T., and Kevin Kliesen. “Effects on Interest Rates of Immediately Releasing FOMC Directives.” Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 12, no. 4: 79–91.

Demiralp, Selva, and Oscar Jorda. “The Response of Term Rates to Fed Announcements.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 36, no. 3 (June 2004, part 1): 387–405.

LIQUIDITY TRAP

 A liquidity trap is a macroeconomic condition in which injecting additional money and liquidity into an economy exerts very little impact on overall price levels, output, or employment. It is a macroeconomic phenomenon, meaning that it applies to the economy as a whole and not to industries individually. Only an economy at a low point in a business cycle is at risk of developing a liquidity trap. During a recession, a liquidity trap can become a major hindrance to economic recovery, considerably complicating the task of designing an effective economic policy.

The liquidity trap at first seems more of a puzzle than a trap. It seems paradoxical that the money stock can grow without commiserate growth in spending. Theories of inflation assume that money stock growth does lead to comparable growth in spending, and the growth in spending drives inflation. Only economies experiencing deflation or near deflation seem to be at risk of developing a liquidity trap.

A liquidity trap becomes possible because money, particularly bank balances, can act as a substitute for stocks and bonds, and may even become an attractive substitute if interest rates drop to very low levels. Money pays little or no interest, but it is the most liquid of all financial assets. Liquidity confers certain advantages. It puts one in a position to exploit speculative opportunities or handle financial emergencies. To offset the advantages of liquidity, stocks and bonds pay dividends and higher interest. The danger of a liquidity trap occurs when interest rates reach very low levels, probably lower than 1 percent. Unusually low interest rates of this order occurred in the United States during the 1930s, and again in Japan in the 1990s. Extremely low interest rates, coupled with fear of deflation, makes bank balances a highly attractive financial asset compared to much less liquid stocks and bonds. Low interest rates involve the expectation that interest rates will be higher in the future. Investors do not want to lock in a low interest rate by purchasing longer term financial assets when interest rates are low.

The practical significance of a liquidity trap is that it leaves the monetary authority powerless to stimulate the economy by increasing the money supply. The main ingredient of a monetary stimulus is the purchase of government bonds with newly printed money. Called “open-market operations,” this action makes the bond market more of a seller’s market, meaning bond sellers can sell bonds at lower expected yields. In other words, interest rates fall. In a liquidity trap, the preference for holding bank balances over bonds becomes so strong that open-market operations can no longer reduce interest rates. Falling interest rates no longer accompany above average growth in the money supply.

As a recession unfolds, the market for used capital goods is likely to see severe deflation, which will undercut the prices of new capital goods. Businesses become hesitant to purchase capital goods if they come to expect that capital goods can be purchased at lower prices in the future. Falling demand for finished goods further undermines the willingness to purchase capital goods. With the liquidity trap acting as a floor under interest rates, openmarket operations cannot push interest rates low enough to stem the tide of falling investment spending. The economy sinks deeper into recession.

The cure for a liquidity trap involves a high level of government deficit spending to compensate for the absence of business investment spending. In the 1990s, the Japanese government baulked at enlarging the public debt on the scale needed to lift Japan out of the liquidity trap. The Japanese economy languished in recession during much of the 1990s.

See also: Open Market Operations

U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008–2009

The U.S. financial crisis of 2008–2009 owed its origins to a failure of institutions to adjust to rapid innovation in the home mortgage industry. The size and importance of the United States in the global economic and financial system left little doubt that the outcome would take on global dimensions.

The roots of the U.S. financial crisis go back to the aftermath of the 1990s economic prosperity. The 1990s saw the longest economic expansion recorded in U.S. history. The long expansion received its thrust from an investment boom in information technology industries. Easy credit fed the investment boom for a time. When the United States started tightening credit, a high-tech stock bubble burst, the investment boom ended, and the United States entered into recession. In a bid to resuscitate the United States economy, the government again turned to easy credit and bargain basement interest rates.

Low interest rates and easy credit between 2002 and 2005 sparked a boom in housing, creating a housing bubble comparable to the high-tech stock bubble of the 1990s. A housing bubble posed special risk to the financial system because houses are one asset that can be purchased with small down payments. Compared to purchasers of corporate stock, purchasers of houses can put in a much smaller share of their own money.

Dodd and Mills (June 2008) lay out every step in the development of the crisis. A long upswing in house prices had put creditors at ease about the risk of home mortgages. A house seemed to be bullet-proof collateral. Lenders began granting riskier loans and being less thorough in verifying the income, jobs, and assets of borrowers. Some mortgage originators went so far as to offer interest-only loans and negative amortization payment options. Negative amortization meant the borrower’s monthly payment was not even covering all the interest charges, much less paying down the principal. Lenders felt that escalation in house prices assured that a house could always be refinanced for larger amounts, or sold to pay off a mortgage. Rising house prices should translate into falling loan-to-value ratios for creditors.

Another weak link in the stability of the financial situation was in the process of packaging home mortgages into financial securities. Investors buying these mortgage-backed securities had to rely on the same credit rating agencies that rated bonds. Well-established and reputable rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s had performed well in rating bonds but had little knowledge or experience in mortgage-backed securities. Since mortgage-backed securities were new, no historical data existed to estimate past performance and risk. These agencies awarded top ratings of AAA to over 90 percent of the mortgage-backed securities based on subprime loans (Dodd and Mills, June 2008).

Investors purchased mortgage-backed securities with borrowed funds and counted on being able to trade out of these investments in a hurry to cut losses. Mortgage-backed securities, however, were sold in an over-thecounter market, and no dealers committed themselves to making a market for them. As the poor quality of the mortgages became evident, no dealers came forward willing to maintain an inventory of these securities. The market for mortgage-backed securities became a market where everybody wanted to sell and nobody wanted to buy.

The magnitude of investor losses from mortgage-backed securities would have been easily manageable if the problem had not had wider implications. Mortgage delinquencies and home foreclosures began to mount in 2006 and 2007 amid an otherwise expanding economy. It became clear that many homeowners could only make their mortgage payments if home prices continued to escalate, allowing them to refinance their homes before the teaser interest rates on their existing home mortgages expired. It was equally obvious that many loan applications had inflated measures of borrowers’ income and house appraisal values. Falling home prices triggered a wave of foreclosures. Upward interest rate adjustments on adjustable-rate mortgages worsened an already bad situation.

A related casualty of the mortgagebacked securities market debacle was investor confidence in the credit ratings agencies such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. These agencies were forced to downgrade the credit ratings of mortgage-backed securities at a much faster pace than had ever been seen for corporate bonds.

The month of July 2007 saw a significant round of ratings downgrades for mortgage-backed securities. Wall Street hedge funds began trying to liquidate large positions in these securities. In August 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas suspended withdrawals from some money market funds that were heavily invested in U.S. mortgage-backed securities. The bank claimed it had no way of putting a value on these assets. Expecting a wave of customer cash withdrawals, other money market fund managers shifted these portfolios from medium- and long-term bank deposits and commercial paper to overnight deposits. The strong demand for liquidity drained the supply of funds for short-term commercial credit instruments. The market for what was called “asset-backed commercial paper” collapsed.

The collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper market brought to the surface the role of the structured investment vehicles that a number of banks sponsored as off-balance sheet entities. Banks sponsored these off-balance sheet entities to skirt banking regulations. They amounted to a hidden banking system. These structured investment vehicles raised funds by selling asset-backed commercial paper and invested the funds in longer-term assets that paid higher interest rates. Part of the arrangement was that the sponsoring banks were obligated to provide credit to the structured investment vehicle when necessary. When the market for asset-backed commercial paper collapsed, sponsoring banks had to meet unwanted and inconvenient loan commitments.

Banks, unable to raise funds by selling loans and fearful of depositor withdrawals, set to hoarding liquidity. They were caught in a squeeze between keeping loans on their books that they had planned on selling, and honoring loan commitments to hedge funds and corporate entities, commitments that they wished they had not made.

In March 2008, the Wall Street firm of Bear Stearns saw a run on its deposits that would have ended in bankruptcy if the Federal Reserve had not assisted in its acquisition by JPMorgan Chase. In September, the United States government announced a takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises concerned exclusively with the home mortgage market. Later in September, the Wall Street firm Lehman Brothers failed. The United States Treasury refused to bail out Lehman Brothers but did encourage other firms to acquire it. When no buyers appeared, Lehman Brothers went into liquidation.

Another important industry found itself drawn in to the mortgage-backed security debacle. Bond insurers usually provided investors with default insurance against municipal and infrastructure bonds. The firms had begun selling default insurance for the mortgagebacked securities. Rising mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures hammered the stocks and credit ratings of bond-insuring companies and left in doubt the ability of these companies to honor default insurance claims in the municipal bond market and the student loan market, making these investments much less attractive.

The outcome of these developments was a banking system less willing and able to make loans and demanding U.S. Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 | 415 Media and pedestrians gather in front of the Lehman Brothers headquarters in New York on September 15, 2008, the day the 158-year-old financial firm filed for bankruptcy. (AP Photo/ Louis Lanzano) tighter criteria of credit worthiness. A seizing of credit markets hobbled private initiative among producers and consumers. The forces of recession gathered strength as firms across industries reported falling earnings. October 2008, stock markets around the world entered a steep slide. The world braced for a global recession. Economic policy makers assumed that the economic situation in the United States was developing along the lines of a liquidity trap. The Federal Reserve System, the central bank of the United States, pushed its policy interest rate to near zero and allowed banks to use a wider range of assets to borrow funds. The U.S. government met the crisis with plans for massive increases in deficit spending. In a liquidity trap, massive government spending is needed to offset the combined effects of strong liquidity preference and pessimistic expectations.

See also: Liquidity Trap

ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES

An adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) provides for varying interest rates over the life of the mortgage. It forces the borrower to shoulder some of the risks that fixed-rate loans place on the lender. Key to the rationale for ARMs is the almost one-to-one relationship between short-term interest rates and inflation rates. Over the life of a 30-year, fixedrate mortgage, inflation ranks among the biggest enemies that a lender faces. Increases in the inflation rate reduce the real (inflation-adjusted) rate of interest that a mortgage pays to a lender. Higher inflation reduces the real purchasing power of each monthly payment while pushing up the real operating cost of a lender. If the inflation rate happens to rise above a mortgage interest rate, the lender ends up earning a negative real interest rate.

The high inflation rates of the 1970s taught lenders the damage that inflation can wreak on the interest income earned from mortgages. Lenders began demanding higher interest rates on 30-year mortgages as insurance against a wave of inflation wiping out the profits and capital of mortgage holders. Adjustable-rate mortgages developed as a way to get home buyers into houses without paying the high interest rates attached to 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages.

Under an ARM, the mortgage interest rate at any given time is linked or indexed to a short-term interest rate. Two short-term, benchmark interest rates commonly used for setting ARM interest rates are the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the one-year, constant maturity treasury bond rate. The interest rate on an ARM is adjusted periodically to reflect changes in a benchmark interest rate. The home buyer benefits because short-term interest rates are usually lower than long-term interest rates, since short-term rates have less inflation risk. The disadvantage to the home buyer lies in the risk that short-term interest rates go up, probably because of rising inflation or anti-inflation policies. If short-term interest rates go up, the monthly payments on ARMs go up. With ARMs, the burden of accelerated inflation is born by the borrower instead of the lender. In turn for bearing the risk of accelerated future inflation, the home buyer stands a chance getting by with lower interest rates. If inflation never drives up short-term interest rates over the life of the loan, the home buyer comes out ahead.

Adjustable-rate mortgages come in several varieties. In some mortgages, the monthly payment can change every month, depending on the benchmark interest rate. Other mortgages allow changes in monthly payments as infrequently as every five years. The time frame between rate changes is called the “adjustment period.” A mortgage with a one-year adjustment period is called a one-year ARM.

Many ARMs put a cap on the amount that a mortgage interest rate can change from one adjustment period to the next. This provision protects home buyers from large jumps in interest rates and monthly payments. Other contracts put a limit on the amount that monthly payments can increase from one adjustment period to the next. If interest rate adjustments call for a 10 percent increase in monthly payments, but the contract only allows monthly payments to go up 5 percent, then the unpaid interest will be added to the balance of the mortgage. By law, nearly all ARMs have a cap on how high interest rates can go over the life of a mortgage.

One version of the ARM allows the home buyer to pay an initial interest rate well below the benchmark interest rate used for setting an ARM interest rate. The home buyer enjoys the low interest rate, often called a teaser rate, for an initial period, such as a year. Then the interest rate is adjusted upward according to the indexing formula tied to the benchmark interest rate. If shortterm interest rates happen to be rising at the same time that a homeowner is transitioning from the teaser rate to the fully indexed, benchmark rate, then the home owner may experience “payment shock.” The large increase in monthly payment may leave a home owner unable to make a house payment. The practice of offering teaser rates contributed to the severity of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. 

See also: U.S. Financial Crisis of 2008–2009

Mexican peso crisis of 1994

The sharp depreciation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 marked one of the swiftest macroeconomic reversals in the history of developing economies and currency crises. President Ernesto Zedillo had barely been in office three weeks when, on December 19, 1994, his administration asked the Banco de Mexico to undertake roughly 15 percent devaluation of the peso, adjusting the pegged exchange rate from 3.45 pesos per dollar to 4.00 pesos per dollar (Sharma, 2001). It was a modest devaluation, but it undercut the confidence of foreign investors and touched off a wild speculative run against the peso. On December 22, 1994, the Banco of Mexico, unable to defend the peso against stampeding, panic-stricken foreign investors, allowed the peso to float. The peso immediately sank another 15 percent (Sharma, 2001). By February 16, 1995, the peso had depreciated 42 percent against the U.S. dollar (Torres, February 1995). The peso reached its nadir at 7.65 pesos per U.S. dollar (Sharma, 2001).

The outgoing President Carlos Salinas and the soon-to-be President Zedillo met on November 20, 1994, to discuss the currency situation. The Friday before, Mexico had lost $1.7 billion in a run on the peso. The two leaders agreed that devaluation on the order of 10 percent was needed, but the outgoing officials refused to devalue the currency on their watch (Wessel, July 1995).

The peso crisis caught many observers and investors by surprise. Mexico had become the darling of Wall Street. Mexico’s economic policy seemed to have all the right ingredients. It emphasized privatization and deregulation of state-owned enterprises, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, and a pegged exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar. The ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in January 1994 opened Mexico’s economy to the largest consumer market in the world. Between 1989 and 1994, Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 3.9 percent (Sharma, 2001). Mexico’s inflation rate, which raged as high as 160 percent in 1987, sank to single-digit territory in 1993 (Sharma, 2001). Government indebtedness as a percent of GDP shrank from 15 percent in 1987 to 1 percent in 1992 and 1993 (Sharma, 2001). Between 1987 and 1994, government spending as a percent of GDP shriveled from 44 percent to 24.6 per cent (Sharma, 2001). In February 1994, Mexico’s foreign exchange reserves stood at $28 billion, well above the $6.3 billion level held in 1989 (Sharma, 2001). With the dawn of NAFTA, Wall Street saw no limits to Mexico’s potential.

In hindsight, one economic statistic signaled trouble. Mexico’s current account deficit steadily climbed from $6 billion in 1989 to $20 billion by the end of 1993 (Sharma, 2001). Mexico’s imports were growing much faster than its exports. Current account deficits reflect either a high level of government deficit spending, high levels of private investment spending relative to savings, or some combination. In 1994, government deficit spending in Mexico was minimal, and the high level of private investment spending seemed to reflect Mexico’s bright future under NAFTA. Foreign portfolio investments in Mexican stocks and short-term bonds made possible the high level of investment spending. It also left Mexico vulnerable to a sudden outflow of foreign capital.

In 1994, foreign investors began to get jittery over the size of Mexico’s current account deficit. Mexico tamed inflation, but did not eradicate it. Under a pegged exchange rate, inflation increases the prices of domestic goods, but does not affect the price of imported foreign goods unless the peg is adjusted. Mexico failed to adjust the pegged exchange rate to compensate for domestic inflation, encouraging Mexico’s consumers to purchase more imported goods at the expense of domestically produced goods. As long as foreigners exhibited a strong appetite for Mexican stocks and bonds, the Mexican government felt no pressure to devalue its currency. The peso appeared to be in high demand at the current exchange rate.

In 1994, the strong foreign demand for portfolio investments in Mexico began to diminish over worries about Mexico’s rising current account deficit. Rising current account deficits often lead to a devaluation of a currency. If a currency depreciates 25 percent, foreign investors immediately see the value of their investment depreciate by 25 percent.

Part of the attraction of Mexican stocks and bonds had to do with low interest rates in the United States. Throughout 1993, the U.S. federal funds rate remained at 3 percent. In 1994, the Federal Reserve System started raising the federal funds rate, pushing it up to 5.5 percent by November 1994 (Sharma, 2001). As interest rates rose in the United States, investors became less willing to chase higher interest rates in developing countries and emerging markets. When the Mexican government announced a devaluation of the peso in December 1994, foreign investors decided it was time to get out of Mexico.

After the peso crisis, Mexico’s economy sank into steep recession. Inflation soared as devaluation lifted the prices of imported goods. In the United States, President Bill Clinton put together a nearly $50 billion rescue package (Greenwald and Carney, 1995). Without the rescue package, the Mexican government would have defaulted on a large amount of dollar-denominated government bonds. (In 1994, the Mexican government had started issuing dollar-denomniated bonds to ease investor fears about devaluation of the peso.) The rescue package helped calm markets and limited the damage inflicted on other Latin American countries.

See also: East Asian Financial Crisis, Currency Crises

Current account

The current account summarizes transactions that fall within the categories of imports or exports of good and services, income earned abroad, domestically generated income belonging to foreigners, and unilateral transfers. The common denominator behind all these transactions is the involvement of an inflow or outflow of currency. Unilateral transfers include foreign aid and gifts of money from residents of one country to family members living in another country. Cross-country investments, such as buying and selling foreign stocks and bonds, also involve currency inflows and outflows, but are summarized in another account called the capital account. A third account, the official reserves transactions account, summarizes central bank transactions that involve an inflow or outflow of currency and that change official reserve holdings. A Federal Reserve purchase of gold with dollars is an example of the type of transaction covered by the official reserves transactions account. These three accounts make up the balance of payments.

The current account balance is considered a significant indicator of the economic and monetary health of a country. It is among the handful of indicators that the Economist magazine reports for major countries of the world. The Economist reports the current account balance both in absolute numbers and as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

On the current account, transactions that involve an outflow of currency are a debit item, and transactions that involve an inflow of currency are a credit item. Exports of goods and services are a credit and imports are a debit. The foreign expenditures of a U.S. family visiting Greece count as an export on the U.S. current account. The interest income that a resident earns on a foreign bond counts as a credit. The interest income that a domestic bond pays to a foreign owner is a debit. Money residents send to family members living abroad counts as a debit. If the money value of the debits outweighs the money value of the credits, then the outflow of currency outruns the inflow of currency, and a country has a current account deficit. If the credits exceed the debits, the country has a current account surplus.

Persistent current account deficits is often regarded as an indication that a currency is overvalued and therefore faces a heightened risk of future depreciation. The largest component in the current account balance is net exports (exports minus imports). A current account deficit is nearly always an indication that imports exceed exports. As the value of a country’s currency goes up in foreign exchange markets, foreign imports into that country become less costly while exports from that country become costlier in foreign markets. An excess of imports over exports suggests that a domestic currency is too strong and likely to weaken in the future. A current account deficit indicates that the currency outflow on the current account exceeds the inflow. If the excess outflow of currency from a current account deficit is not offset by an excess inflow on a capital account surplus, a currency will depreciate unless a government is able and willing to take action. Governments usually hold sufficient official reserves to defend domestic currencies against speculative attacks, but not against long-term downward trends driven by market forces.

Currencies can remain strong in foreign exchange markets for extended periods of time in situations where a large current account deficit is offset by a large capital account surplus. A capital account surplus indicates that the inflow of foreign capital exceeds the outflow of domestic capital to foreign countries. A net inflow of capital equates to a net inflow of currency. Countries with persistent current account deficits often maintain elevated interest rates. The high interest rates encourage the inflow of foreign capital, offsetting the tendency of a current account deficit to undermine the value of a currency.

Even with strong capital inflows, a current account deficit is regarded as a risk factor in foreign exchange markets. The components in the current account are not tightly linked to the volatility and varying psychology of financial markets whereas capital flows are tightly linked to conditions in financial markets. Capital flows are much more sensitive than exports and imports to changes in expectations, and can therefore be more volatile. A net capital inflow can quickly change to net capital outflow, leading to almost certain currency depreciation and crashing financial markets for a country with a current account deficit. Currency speculators are always closely watching countries using elevated interest rates to sustain current account deficits offset by capital account surpluses. If these speculators see signs that elevated interest rates are pushing a country with a current account deficit into recession, they will dump the currency of that country. The value of the currency will crash in foreign exchange markets, domestic financial markets will crash, and the country will likely undergo a full-blown economic collapse.

For several years, the United States has been able sustain current account deficits with little difficultly. That is because the United States holds a reputation as a safe haven for foreign capital. United States’ investments are considered among the safest in the world. Over the last 30 years, however, the Japanese yen has gained strength relative to the dollar, reflecting the fact that Japan usually has current account surpluses and the United States usually has current account deficits.

See also: Balance of Payments, Currency Crises, Foreign Exchange Markets

East asian financial crisis

 n 1997, a financial crisis threw the East Asian economies into a financial chaos that threatened to derail the East Asian economic miracle and engulf the global financial system. In the 1990s, East Asia had become the scene of a new group of economic miracles. From the mid1990s until the outbreak of financial crisis, East Asian countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia posted real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in the 8 percent range or higher (International Monetary Fund, 1997).

Until the East Asian financial crisis, currency crises were often the domain of countries suffering from high inflation, slow growth, large government budget deficits, low savings, and political instability. Unlike the usual candidates for currency crises, the East Asian countries had what economists call “sound macroeconomic fundamentals.” They had high savings rates, low public debts, fast growth and low inflation—the very qualities that win the confidence of foreign investors.

One crack in the foundation involved the structure of corporate finance. Enterprises had relied too heavily on debt financing as opposed to stock issuance. Enterprises do not face bankruptcy when the value of company stock plunges, but they do face bankruptcy when they cannot pay debts. An equally important vulnerability stemmed from the balance sheets of East Asian banks. These banks borrowed foreign capital on a short-term basis to underwrite long-term loans. The short-term nature of the foreign capital inflows left these banks open to a sudden and unexpected reversal from a foreign capital inflow to a foreign capital outflow. A sudden reversal of foreign capital flows made these banks and enterprises illiquid. Much of the foreign debt was denominated in dollars. When the exchange rates of local currencies fell, the real value of foreign debt in local currencies skyrocketed.

The East Asian countries practiced an economic policy that pegged the value of their local currencies to a basket of currencies in which the U.S. dollar played a highly dominate role. The rate at which a local currency could be converted into dollars remained almost constant. This policy shared in making East Asia an attractive haven for foreign capital, but it also was the undoing of these economies. In the late 1990s, the value of the U. S dollar went up, probably because of strong global demand for U.S. financial assets. As the value of the dollar climbed, the values of currencies linked to the dollar, such as the East Asian currencies, also climbed. The appreciation of a country’s currency leaves the exports of that country more expensive in foreign markets. It also makes foreign imports into that country less costly. Falling exports and rising imports left the East Asian economies with current account deficits that needed to be financed by an inflow of foreign capital. East Asian companies began to feel the pain as sales fell off in foreign markets, and domestic sales faced greater completion from imports. In addition, East Asian central banks raised interest rates to increase the attraction for foreign capital. The policy of keeping the local currency exchange rates pegged to the dollar required that current account deficits be financed by foreign capital inflows. Otherwise, the value of the local currency relative to the dollar would sink.

The economic and financial situation in Thailand sparked the crisis. Many currency traders believed that the baht, Thailand’s currency, traded too high, higher than the central bank of Thailand could support.

Thailand’s economy was already suffering from double-digit interest rates and depressed stock prices. Currency traders launched billions of dollars of sell contracts on the baht. Fears of currency depreciation excited a broad outflow of foreign capital, putting more pressure on foreign exchange reserves. In a single day, the central bank spent $500 million dollars of its dollar reserves to keep the baht from falling below its pegged level (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999, 441). In 1997, Thailand’s central bank let the baht float, free to depreciate, which it did.

The depreciation of the baht triggered foreign capital outflows from other East Asian economies. By the end of 1997, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea had watched local currencies depreciate about 40 percent relative to the U.S. dollar (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999, 36). 

See also: Currency Crises

Foreign debt crises

 Economies and governments can accumulate debt to external creditors, meaning creditors from other parts of the world. External financing for productive investments can expand opportunities for economic development and accelerate economic growth. Just as households and businesses can sink too deeply into debt, countries and individual economies can accumulate debt to the point that external debt obligations cannot be met. Measures of indebtedness compare the amount of debt with income. A household with a moderate amount of debt can double its debt if its income doubles and remain only moderately in debt. If a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) doubles, it can double its external debt without increasing its debt burden. A country that is able to meet its external debt obligations is said to be able to “service” its debt.

Analysis of an individual country’s debt to the rest of the world takes on a macroeconomic perspective because it involves converting one currency into another currency. In addition to an individual borrower’s ability to repay, in the case of foreign borrowing there are aggregate credit conditions that must be met by the whole economy. Exceeding aggregate credit limitations can lead to sharp adjustments in domestic interest rates or exchange rates. Often a foreign debt is denominated in a foreign currency. In that case, a country must be able earn enough foreign currency in exports and capital inflows to service the debt. If a country’s debt is denominated in its own currency, it still needs to service its debt without upsetting exchange rates. A country can in effect default on its external or foreign debt by suspending convertibility of its domestic currency into foreign currencies. If a country is unable to earn sufficient foreign currency from exports and capital inflows to service its foreign debt, it can increase capital inflows by increasing domestic interest rates. These higher interest rates will be a burden on the economy and can force an economy into recession.

The debt that a sovereign government owes to external creditors is called “sovereign debt.” When a government defaults on obligations to external creditors, it is called a “sovereign debt crisis.” Russia, Ecuador, and Argentina furnish examples of outright debt default. Ukraine, Pakistan, and Uruguay avoided outright default through debt restructuring. Mexico, Brazil, and Turkey averted default with the help of large-scale support from the International Monetary Fund. Some debtor governments are more cooperative than others in resolving default situations. Uncooperative governments can harm the ability of private domestic corporations to access international debt markets. Risk of foreign debt default or restructuring appears to be lowest when total external debt as a percent of GDP is less than 49.7 percent, short-term debt as a percent of foreign currency holdings is less than 130 percent, public external debt is less than 214 percent of fiscal revenue, and the exchange rate not over appreciated above 48 percent (Manasse and Roubini, 2005, p. 40).

Economists have developed indicators to measure a degree of a country’s indebtedness. For poor, debt-laden countries, some type of debt restructuring is likely to occur when net present value of debt exceeds 200 percent of exports. For other, nonindustrial countries, it appears that the risk of debt exposure starts to rise when external debt as a percent of GDP rises above 40 percent (Daseking, December 2002). Countries can sustain higher debt ratios if exports are growing rapidly, or if exports represent a large proportion of GDP, or if a large share of external debt is denominated in domestic currency.

The United States is a debtor nation, but its debt ratios are well below the threshold levels that signal a possible foreign debt crisis. Given the role of the U.S. dollar as a world currency, it is not clear if the same debt–ratio threshold levels apply to the United States. The rise of foreign debt in the United States is worrisome to some observers. Easy access to foreign credit sometimes allows countries to delay painful but inevitable reforms.

Currency crises

A currency crisis occurs when the value of a currency crashes in foreign exchange markets, when holders of a currency stampede to sell it in foreign exchange markets out of fear that the currency is headed for lower values in the future. Foreign exchange markets determine the rate or price at which one currency can be purchased with another currency. An exchange rate of $1 per 10 Mexican pesos tells how many pesos it takes to purchase a dollar and how many dollars it takes to purchase a peso. While exchange rates are subject to market forces, certain groups have vested interests in exchange rate stability. One such group would be U.S. investors who have purchased Mexican peso bonds issued by the Mexican government. Bondholders who purchased Mexican bonds with dollars when the exchange rate stood at 10 pesos per $1 will experience a windfall loss if the Mexican peso depreciates to 20 pesos per $1. When they sell the Mexican bonds and convert the pesos back into dollars, they will receive roughly half as many dollars as they originally invested. Therefore, if holders of Mexican bonds expect the peso to depreciate in the future, they will try to sell their Mexican bonds for pesos, and convert the pesos back into dollars before the depreciation occurs. If large numbers of investors try to sell pesos for dollars all at once, the value of the peso in the foreign exchange market will crash.

Speculators may trigger a currency crisis if they think a currency is vulnerable to a sudden crash. If speculators think the peso may deprecate in the future, they will borrow pesos and sell them for dollars. If speculators borrow pesos to buy dollars when the exchange rate is 10 pesos per $1, then they can repay their loans and reap a profit if the peso depreciates to 20 pesos per $1. Speculative attacks can turn mere expectations that a currency will depreciate into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The common denominator behind all currency crises is a current account deficit. A current account deficit most likely indicates that outflows of domestic currency from imports exceed inflows of domestic currency from exports. As long as outflows of domestic currency approximately balance inflows of domestic currency, the foreign exchange rate tends to remain stable. If the outflow of currency outruns the inflow of currency on the current account, then foreign investors must either be willing to hold financial assets denominated in the domestic currency, or the central bank responsible for the domestic currency must buy back the excess outflow with its holdings of other foreign currencies. Central bank holdings of other foreign currencies are called foreign exchange reserves. The more foreign exchange reserves a central bank holds, the less likely a domestic currency will suffer a currency crisis. A current account deficit and the associated excess outflow of currency lead to currency depreciation if the central bank does not buy back the excess currency outflow and if foreign investors do not find financial assets denominated in the domestic currency attractive. If, for instance, Mexico has a currency account deficit and the Banco de Mexico does not hold sufficient reserves of U.S. dollars to buy back the excess outflow of pesos, then excess supply of pesos will build up in foreign exchange markets and one of two possibilities are left. One possibility is that foreign investors will purchase the excess supply of pesos and use the pesos to purchase bonds and other investments in Mexico. If foreign investors are afraid of investing in Mexico, or find Mexican interest rates too low, then there will be pesos in foreign exchange markets that nobody wants, and the Mexican peso will depreciate.

Countries that run persistent current account deficits tend to run out of foreign exchange reserves. Speculators are prone to launch speculative attacks on countries with current account deficits and low foreign exchange reserves. If the attack is successful, the currency crashes.

A current account deficit usually indicates a large government budget deficit, but it can indicate a high level of domestic investment spending relative to domestic savings. Either way, the country is importing foreign capital. A currency crisis usually occurs when a country that has been experiencing a foreign capital inflow suddenly starts experiencing a foreign capital outflow, perhaps because foreign investors have lost confidence. 

See also: East Asian Financial Crisis, Current Account, Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994

Argentine currency and debt crisis

Between 2001 and 2002, Argentina underwent an episode of currency devaluation and debt default that rocked international financial markets and offered fresh evidence of the varied economic trends that can lead to crises. The Argentine crisis has been the topic of wide discussion, partly because it was born of circumstances not normally regarded as fertile ground for currency crises. In the 1990s, Argentina boasted of one of Latin America’s fastest growing economies and one of its staunches devotees to the gospel of free market reform. Part of the credit for economic prosperity seemed to lie with a successful monetary reform that ended the hyperinflation of the 1980s. This monetary reform established a currency board that fixed the value of the Argentine peso at one peso to a U.S. dollar. One Argentine peso, exchangeable into dollars at any time, equaled one U.S. dollar. Argentine inflation subsided to low single-digit levels, output grew at a fast clip, and the economy seemed resilient to external shocks.

The genesis of the crisis goes back to 1998 when many of Argentina’s trading partners saw their currencies depreciate, perhaps because of fallout to the East Asian Crisis and the retreat of foreign capital. The strong demand for U.S. financial assets keep the U.S. dollar strong, which kept all currencies pegged to the dollar, including the Argentine peso, strong. The strong Argentine peso meant that Argentine exports went at higher prices in foreign markets, while Argentine imports saw falling prices. In summery, Argentina-produced goods grew costlier compared to goods produced by Argentina’s major trading partners. Cheaper imports allowed Argentina to live beyond its means, while its exports were over-priced in foreign markets. To restore balance, Argentina needed to either devalue its currency as its trading partners had done, or undergo domestic deflation. Argentina did experience some deflation, which is a characteristic that distinguishes the Argentine crises from other crises. More often these types of crises occur after government deficits, financed by monetary growth, lead to inflation.

Government’s budget deficits were modest, but were large enough to force a growing reliance on foreign debt financing. A small financial sector may share the blame for a dependence on foreign capital to finance both private sector and public sector spending. The vulnerability of the system arose from the large share of loans and mortgages denominated in dollars while the income generated to service these debts came in the form of pesos. Once deflationary forces surfaced, output shrank, unemployment spiked, government deficits rose, and the government proceeded to pile up foreign debt. In December 2001, the government of Argentina defaulted on its public debt.

After more than three years of recession, in January 2002, the Argentine government, running out of credit, devalued the peso relative to the dollar. At the time, 70 percent of all Argentine bank deposits and 79 percent of all loans were denominated in dollars (Economist, March 8, 2003). To avoid throwing many debtors into bankruptcy, the loans were redenominated into pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar, and the bank deposits were redenominated into pesos at the rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar. (Economist, March 8, 2003). The peso deposits quickly dropped in value as the peso plummeted to about four pesos per dollar. The action de-dollarized the Argentine economy.

Devaluating the peso reduced the cost of Argentine exports in the world economy, making it possible for Argentina to earn foreign exchange and recover from deep recession. Foreign exchange is necessary to repay foreign debts.

By 2005, the Argentine economy exhibited a strong expansion, helped in part by a worldwide commodity boom, and the government reported budget surpluses. The government offered the holders of defaulted bonds new bonds in a choice of four different currencies. The value of the new bonds equaled about 30 percent of the value of the defaulted bonds (Economist, January 15, 2005). Creditors fumed at the rough treatment and predicted that Argentina would meet with difficulty trying to regain the confidence of foreign investors. 

See also: Currency Crises, Foreign Debt Crises

Yen

The yen is the money of account for Japan, comparable to the dollar for the United States. By the 1990s the Japanese yen had become a major international currency, sharing the stage with the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the ECU as determinants of international monetary values.
The Shinka Jorei (New Currency Regulations) of 1871 established the yen as the monetary unit in Japan. The Japanese derived the word yen from the Chinese word yuan, which meant “round thing,” a reference to the U.S. and Mexican dollars that dominated East Asian trade at the time. The act set the yen equal to 0.05 ounces of gold, making the official Japanese price of an ounce of gold equal to 20 yen. At the time the official United States price of an ounce of gold was $20.67. The yen was intended to be equivalent to the Mexican dollar, the standard unit in Asian trade at the time. The yen began life as a decimalized currency; one-one-hundredth of a yen was called a sen, and one-tenth of a sen was called a rin.
Officially, Japan was on a bimetallic monetary system, but in practice the yen was on a silver standard. In 1877 a civil rebellion forced the government to issue inconvertible paper money to finance military expenditures. Inflation erupted and in 1882 the government established the Bank of Japan, partly to replace inconvertible paper money with bank notes convertible into silver. Following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895, Japanese received in gold a large war reparation payment from China, providing a gold reserve sufficient for Japan to establish a gold standard. In 1887 a new currency law gave the Bank of Japan a monopoly on the privilege to issue bank notes, and put the yen on the gold standard.
At the beginning of World War I most developed countries, including Japan, abandoned the gold standard and prohibited the export of gold. Following World War I Japan, beset by economic turmoil, stumbled in its efforts to return to the gold standard. In 1930, on the eve of the Great Depression, Japan returned to the gold standard, only to have to abandon it again in 1931. The depression dealt a serious blow to the gold standard worldwide, and Japan turned to tight government regulation of its currency, which continued through World War II.
A wave of inflation engulfed Japan following World War II and the occupation authorities instituted a currency reform that withdrew old yen notes and issued new yen notes. In 1949 the exchange rate between the yen and the dollar was set at 360 yen per dollar. Under the Bretton Woods system, exchange rates were fixed at official rates, and the ratio of yen to dollars remained at 360 until 1971. Large trade surpluses enabled Japan to bolster its gold and foreign exchange reserves, paving the way for lifting all restrictions on foreign exchange transactions.

When a system of floating international exchange rates displaced the fixed-rate Bretton Woods system in 1973, the yen began an upward career of currency appreciation. In 1970 it had taken 360 yen to purchase a dollar. By 1973 it took only 272 yen, and by the end of the decade it took only 219 yen to purchase a dollar. As the yen grew stronger, it took more dollars to purchase a yen, but despite that Japanese goods constituted a major competitive threat to U.S. industries. In 1984 the world’s major trading partners agreed to intervene collectively in foreign exchange markets to appreciate the yen even further. Whereas it took 239 yen to purchase a dollar in 1985, by 1988 that number had fallen to 128 yen, a substantial increase in the value of the yen.
In the 1980s Japan took further steps to deregulate its financial system and to allow foreign firms to participate in Japan’s financial markets. Japanese banks had become among the largest and most powerful in the world, and the yen emerged as a major international currency. By 1998 economic depression in Japan put downward pressure on the yen, and the yen traded at around 140 yen per dollar.

See also:

References:
Davies, Glyn. 1994. A History of Money.
Ohkawa, Kazushi, Miyorhei Shinohara and Larry Meissner, eds. 1979. Patterns of Japanese Economic Development: A Quantitative Appraisal. 

Yeltsin’s Monetary Reform in Russia

Russia opened the 1990s in monetary chaos, manifested by soaring inflation, and a currency, the ruble, that had long been shielded from the free-market forces of foreign exchange markets. In foreign exchange markets, currencies are bought and sold with other currencies, as when Japanese yen are purchased with United States dollars.
Under economic reforms, prices, unfettered from state controls, took off, creating a ruble shortage that left some workers unpaid for months. Wages and pensions rose, and the Russian government cranked up the printing presses on a round-the-clock basis. For the month of July 1992 alone, the government printed up more rubles than the Soviet Union government had printed up in its last 30 years. To expedite the process, the government increased the largest denomination of the printed ruble from the 200-ruble note to the 1,000-ruble note. Coins also became available in higher denominations. Inflation reached its peak in 1992 when monthly inflation rates ran 15 percent, and prices increased 200 percent over the year.
In 1993 the government begin to step on the monetary brakes, but in ways that threw the country into deeper confusion. In July the government invalidated all rubles issued before 1993, and gave people only a few days to convert the old rubles into new rubles. It also put a limit on the number of old rubles that foreigners could convert into new rubles. Citizens could convert up to 35,000 old rubles into new rubles, and if they held additional rubles, these had to be put into savings accounts for six months. By the end of 1997 annual inflation had fallen to the 12 percent range, and the government announced a plan to lop off three zeros from the ruble. Effective 1 January 1998, in what was essentially an accounting reform, 1,000 rubles became 1 ruble, and all prices, balance sheets, debts, etc., were adjusted accordingly.
One legacy of the Soviet regime was tight control over the conversion of rubles into foreign currencies. Tourists were able to convert foreign currencies into rubles at a rate close to a black market rate, but set by the Russian Central Bank. Foreign-owned enterprises earning profits in rubles faced a special difficulty. If a foreign-owned company wanted to send profits home to the parent company, those profits had first to be converted from rubles to the home-country currency at a disadvantageous exchange rate set by the Russian government. To attract foreign investment, and integrate the Russian economy into the world economy, Russia had to make the ruble convertible into foreign currencies at free-market rates.

A loan from the International Monetary Fund helped the Russian government marshal the foreign exchange reserves needed to establish a convertible ruble. On 1 July 1992 the Russian government established a single exchange rate between the dollar and the ruble at an initial rate of 126.5 rubles per dollar. The responsibility for adjusting the rate fell to the Russian Central Bank, which planned to set a rate based upon twice-weekly currency auctions. After July 1993 the Russian Central Bank pegged the ruble to the dollar in a crawling peg system that avoided wild fluctuations but allowed the ruble to depreciate over time relative to the dollar. In 1996 Russia further broadened the ruble market by allowing foreigners to buy and sell Russian government bonds in secondary markets. Russian government bonds, paying over 100 percent interest at times, constitute a major demand for rubles. Rubles must be purchased first before bonds can be purchased. The astronomical interest rates on Russian bonds were sometimes necessary to maintain a demand for Russian rubles. Despite high Russian interest rates, the ruble steadily declined relative to the dollar, falling to a rate of 6,200 rubles per dollar at the end of 1997. After three zeros were lopped off, the rate became 6.2 rubles per dollar.
In 1998 the Russian government again turned to the printing press to solve Russia’s problems, putting pressure on the ruble in foreign exchange markets. The value of the ruble fell sharply in august, and to help cope with the crisis the government imposed a moratorium on payments on foreign debt, significantly adding to the severity of a global financial crisis. By the end of the year the ruble was trading at around 20 rubles per dollar.

See also:

References:
Hanke, Steve H. 1998. Is the Ruble Next. Forbes (9 March): 64–65.
Wall Street Journal. 1991. “Soviet Printing of Rubles Soared in 11-Month Period.” 24 December, eastern edition, at A8.
1992. “Russia, Facing Inflation, Plans Bigger Banknotes.” 31 January, eastern edition, at A10.
1992. “Russia Plans to Make Ruble Fully Convertible by August 1.” 6 May, eastern edition, at A3
1993. “Chaos in Russia Mounts.” 26 July, eastern edition, at A8.
1997. “Russia’s Overhaul of Ruble Prompts Unease in Nation.” 31 December, eastern edition, at A7.