Between 1745 and 1776 Europe had its first experience with an
inconvertible paper standard. Sweden had been the first European country to
introduce bank notes early in the seventeenth century, but by the mid-eighteenth
century England and France had both made use of bank notes, and France had
furnished Europe with its first example of a paper money debacle. Neither
England nor France had officially adopted a paper standard when the Swedish
government put Sweden on an inconvertible paper standard.
In the eighteenth century Sweden had a parliamentary government, in which two
parties vied for power. One party, the “Hats,” identified with the exporting
industries, the military, the nobility, and the monarchy, and generally favored
policies of foreign expansion and increased influence abroad. By 1720 Sweden had
lost its Baltic empire, much to the chagrin of the Hats, who wanted to maintain
Sweden as a player in European politics. The other party, the “Caps,”
represented agricultural interests, and what might be called the commoners. The
Caps’ preference for policies of pacifism earned them the nickname Nightcaps,
shortened to Caps, because they supposedly wanted to sleep while the great
powers of Europe passed Sweden by.
Before the adoption of a paper standard, Sweden, home to vast copper
reserves, had functioned on a copper standard. Copper, worth less than gold and
silver per unit of weight, was bulky and awkward to transport in large monetary
values, and Sweden turned to bank notes as a convenience. In the mid-seventeenth
century Sweden saw its first suspension of bank note convertibility and bank
panic. Bank notes fell into disfavor at first, but the Swedish public found bank
notes much more convenient than copper coinage, and bank notes returned to
circulation by popular demand rather than government policy.
The Hats held the upper hand in Parliament from 1739 until 1765 and pursued a
policy of inflationary war finance, a policy opposed by the Caps. Between 1741
and 1743 the financial strain of war with Russia prompted the Swedish government
to look for salvation in the printing press. Because copper was bulky, the sheer
cost of transporting copper enabled the government to vastly increase bank notes
without triggering an export of copper coins. With copper reserves held intact,
the convertibility of bank notes into copper was not immediately threatened.
The issuance of bank notes continued, partly for subsidies to manufacturers,
and by 1745 the Swedish authorities imposed an inconvertible paper standard.
Unlike the suspensions of payments in the seventeenth century, the public did
not panic, but inflation rose to the forefront of economic problems. The Swedish
currency depreciated on foreign exchange markets, making foreign goods much more
expensive in Sweden and Swedish exports cheaper in foreign markets.
The inflationary policy irritated the Caps, who wasted no time kicking the
monetary rudder in the opposite direction when they returned to power in 1765.
The Caps imposed a deflationary policy. As Swedish currency appreciated in
foreign exchange markets, foreign imports became cheaper in Sweden, but Sweden’s
export industries had to slash prices to remain competitive in foreign markets.
Prices in export industries fell faster than wages and raw material prices,
plunging the export industries into a depression.
Political opposition to the Caps’ monetary policy mounted as economic
distress defused throughout Sweden and the Caps fell from power in 1769. The
Caps’ experience with disinflation policies inspired a political drama that
history would see replayed again whenever democratic governments imposed
deflationary policies. Unemployment, bankruptcies, and virtually every other
form of economic discomfort invariably accompanies disinflation and deflationary
policies, and often democratic governments find it difficult to pursue these
policies for extended time periods.
The Hats regained power and reverted to inflationary policies before the Caps
returned briefly to power in 1771 through 1772. The political sphere began to
mirror the turbulence in the economic sphere, and in March 1772 a bloodless coup
d’etat engineered by the Hats displaced Sweden’s parliamentary government with a
constitutional monarchy. Sweden’s parliament survived, shorn of much of its
power, and the parties of the Hats and Caps disappeared. In 1776 Sweden
established a silver standard, completely breaking with the copper standard and
putting an end to inconvertible bank notes.
Sweden’s eighteenth-century episode of monetary disorder demonstrates how a
society, exhausted with war, may find inflationary policies attractive, and how
these policies are associated historically with political instability.
See also:
References:
Chown, John F. 1994. A History of Money.
Heckscher, Eli F. 1954. An Economic History of Sweden.
Samuelsson, Kurt. 1968. From Great Power to Welfare State.