Whenever European societies came into contact with primitive societies guns, particularly rifles, became a favorite article of trade. Guns were a virtual necessity in certain parts of the world, and they were durable, making them serviceable as a medium of exchange and store of value. Guns are sufficiently durable to be passed down from one generation to another, and even in the United States old guns are a favorite of antique collectors.
During the nineteenth century rifles in southwestern Africa served as a medium of exchange, and rich chiefs owned stores of rifles as a conspicuous form of wealth. In South Africa colonists found that rifles rivaled spirits as a preferred medium of trade with the natives. In parts of Mozambique rifles, ammunition, and gunpowder were media of exchange.
In regions of the Congo guns not only were used as a medium of exchange, but a monetary unit of one gun evolved and goods were priced in guns. Even though goods were priced in guns, guns were not involved in every transaction. Instead, goods were often traded for other goods whose value could be equated to the required number of guns. A gun came to represent a certain quantity of cotton cloth, some salt, brass wire, hoop iron, crockery, powder, spirit, and perhaps a big brass pan.
A fictitious rifle monetary unit also arose in Angola. Prices were quoted in rifles but payment was made in a basket of other goods of equivalent value. A basket of goods containing 50 to 60 items was necessary to pay for elephant tusks equaling one rifle in value.
Rubber plantations in Brazil paid Indian agricultural workers in cheap rifles that were only good for 40 to 50 shots. The short life expectancy of these rifles assured that the Indians would return to the plantation to work. An Indian fortunate enough to acquire a good gun would probably never be seen again. Indians in the United States also valued rifles, and eagerly exchanged other goods for rifles.
To a society that lives by hunting a gun is one of the most useful tools to be had. Also, intertribal warfare made the acquisitions of guns a necessity because tribes without guns were doomed to extinction.
Guernsey Island, second largest of the Channel Islands, home to the famous Guernsey dairy cows, boasts of one of the more interesting paper money experiments in monetary history. The parliament of Guernsey Island, called the States, hit upon the scheme of issuing paper money to pay for the construction of public facilities, and in turn reclaiming the paper money in payment for rent on the use of the finished facilities.
In April 1815 the Guernsey States appointed a committee to investigate a proposal for enlarging the Guernsey meat market. The committee recommended the issuance of 1-pound State notes, beginning with a 3,000 pound issue. These one-pound notes were earmarked to pay the costs of material and wages for construction of the enlarged Guernsey meat market. According to the plan, those who used the building would have to pay rent in these one-pound notes. As these notes fell into the hands of the government of Guernsey as payment for rent, they would be destroyed, and therefore canceled. According to the committee report:
Thus at the end of ten years, all the Notes would be cancelled and the States would be in possession of an income of 150 pounds per annum, which would be a return to the 3,000 pounds spent by them. Looked at from all sides, the scheme shows nothing but the greatest advantage for the public and for the States.
(Angell, 1929)
In 1820 and 1821 the Guernsey States issued over 4,000 pounds in 1-pound notes to pay off its public debt. In 1826 the States authorized another paper issue of 1-pound notes to pay for Elizabeth College and parochial schools. This authorization set a limit of 20,000 pounds on notes in circulation.
In 1827 the States authorized another issue of 11,000 pound notes to pay for improvements to Rue de la Fontaine, a street adjoining the market. Again the rents related to the project would reclaim the notes, leading to their cancellation. Other note issues were approved.
In 1828 the States appointed the Finance Committee “to replace the used and worn-out Notes by new Notes, payable at the same time as the destroyed notes would have been.” In 1829 a member of the Finance Committee observed that the volume of notes in circulation had risen to 48,183.
The Guernsey States experiment with paper money is one of the most interesting in history. It was a successful and productive use of a paper money issue that commanded value independent of a gold standard. It never climaxed in an inflationary finale that seemed to be the outcome of a merciless logic inherent in all the early issues of paper money. One important characteristic that distinguished the Guernsey paper money experiment from other early experiments was this: Unlike earlier paper money, often inspired by wartime expenditures, the Guernsey paper money issue went to pay for the production of durable, income-earning wealth. Therefore the nongold wealth of the community kept pace with the growth in paper money even though the amount of gold in the community may have declined.
Gresham’s law is often stated in a simplistic and aphoristic form as “bad money drives out good money.” It means in practice that if two coins are in circulation, perhaps one silver and one gold, the public always wants to hoard the coin that has a face value equal to or less than the market value of the coin’s precious metal value. In turn, the public will use coins with a face value greater than their market value as precious metal to pay off debts and pay for goods and services. Coins with a face value less than the market value as precious metal can always be melted down and sold for a profit, causing these coins to disappear. The “bad money,” sometimes called debased money, is the money with a face value greater than the market value of its precious metal content, and it becomes the medium of circulation. The “good money” is the money whose face value is comparable to the market value of its precious metal content, and holders of good money are reluctant to give it up. In a country with debased money circulating alongside good money, the latter tends to flow into the hands of foreigners, domestic hoards, or goldsmiths’ melting pots, leaving only bad money in circulation, thus the phrase “bad money drives out good money.”
Gresham’s law owes its name to Sir Thomas Gresham, the foremost financial wizard of the Elizabethan era, who acted as a councilor to Elizabeth I and as the royal agent in European financial markets. England was on the silver standard and during the mid-sixteenth century, the silver value of England’s silver coinage had dropped from 75 percent of face value to 25 percent. Only 3 ounces of silver was in a coin that had a face value equivalent to 12 ounces of silver. Elizabeth I inherited the confusion and monetary disorder of the debasement policies of her predecessors, who had practiced debasement to build up England’s military defenses. Sir Thomas Gresham formulated Gresham’s law to explain the difficulty of introducing good money in a monetary environment dominated by bad money, explaining how bad money would drive out the good money. Gresham explained that the government ran the risk of coining full-valued money that would only end up in the hands of foreigners and the goldsmiths while the bad money remained in circulation. Gresham devised a policy based on a quick recall, revaluation, and recoinage of debased money combined with severe legal penalties for melting down or exporting the new coinage.
Although Gresham received the credit for formulating a law still discussed in modern economic textbooks, he was not the first to put the law into words. Aristophanes, the great comedic playwright of ancient Greece, writing in 405 b.c., remarked concerning Athens, “In our Republic bad citizens are preferred to good, just as bad money circulates while good money disappears” (Angell, 1929). A French theologian, Nicholas Oresme (c.1320–1382) wrote a book, A Treatise on the Origin, Nature, Law, and Alterations of Money, in which he explained the operation of Gresham’s law as one of the consequences of debasement.
In the modern world inflation of paper money has replaced debasement of coinage as a means of extracting more revenue for financially strapped governments. Gresham’s law can sometimes be seen in operation in countries where domestic currencies are depreciating from inflation, and United States dollars are hoarded as a preferred currency.
Greenbacks were the fiat money that the United States government issued during the Civil War. Fiat money, or inconvertible paper money, is money that cannot be converted or redeemed into a precious metal such as gold or silver. By the close of the Civil War greenbacks and related U.S. government notes accounted for about 75 percent of the money in circulation, largely displacing bank notes of state banks, the principal currency in circulation before the Civil War.
The United States government was not the first to issue inconvertible paper money during the Civil War, but was preceded by commercial banks. The secretary of the Treasury of the new Lincoln administration, Salmon Portland Chase, who came to that office without financial experience, possessed a naïve faith in “hard money.” The government borrowed heavily from banks to finance the difference between $6 million in tax revenue and $25 million in expenditures. When the government took out bank loans, it demanded payment in specie, and the specie was not redeposited in banks, but was removed from the banking system. Fears about the ultimate success of the war led the public to hoard specie. On 30 December 1860 banks in New York suspended specie payments on bank notes and deposits, and banks in other parts of the country soon followed. The government began issuing “demand notes” and the country was effectively put on an inconvertible paper standard.
On 30 December 1860 Congress entertained the first proposal for issuing legal-tender notes (fiat money) to defray government expenses. Bankers raised a howl about the government issuing fiat money and dispatched a delegation to advise the secretary of the Treasury and Congress on ways to finance the war. This delegation urged a program of heavy taxation and borrowing in long-term capital markets to finance government spending as an alternative to the issuance of fiat money.
Government officials weighed the alternatives: the issuance of legal-tender fiat money, or an issue of long-term government bonds. Given the poor credit reputation of the government, the paper money was bound to depreciate in value, but bonds would have to pay high interest rates to attract buyers. The government chose the issuance of fiat money, and the only remaining question for debate was whether Congress would clothe the fiat money with the legal status of legal-tender money.
On 25 February 1862 Congress adopted an act providing for the issuance of notes that were lawful money and legal tender in payment of all debts public and private. The government issued $150 million of these notes, $50 million of which went to retire demand notes the government had already issued. The new notes were called greenbacks. The legal-tender provision contained two noteworthy exceptions. The government demanded payment of import duties in gold coin, and the government committed itself to paying in gold coin the interest earned from government bonds.
To dampen inflationary pressures the government devised means of diverting greenbacks from the spending stream. The greenbacks could be used to buy Treasury bonds paying 6 percent interest redeemable after 5 years, and maturing after 20 years. Also the Treasury accepted deposits of greenbacks, paying 5 percent interest, and redeemable with 10 days’ notice. The option of converting greenbacks to Treasury bonds was removed in subsequent bills that authorized the issuance of additional greenbacks.
Prices more than doubled during the Civil War. In June 1864 Congress set a limit of $450 million on the issuance of greenbacks, a limit that was never exceeded. After the Civil War various interest groups dreaded the deflation that would likely follow the reduction of the supply of fiat money in circulation.
It was 1879 before the federal government began redeeming greenbacks with specie, and joined the world’s major trading partners on a worldwide gold standard. The greenback experience was prophetic in light of the twentieth century’s widespread adoption of inconvertible paper money.
Between 1914 and 1928 Greece saw annual inflation rates vary from 85 percent to 11 percent, and monetary experiments that rank among the strangest in history.
The seeds of Greece’s monetary disorder were sown in the middle to late nineteenth century, when the National Bank of Greece, founded in 1841, gradually acquired a virtual monopoly on the prerogative to issue bank notes and became the primary creditor of the government of Greece. The bank was founded as a private bank whose principal stockholder was the government and it dominated the monetary affairs of Greece, acting as a central bank until the establishment of a genuine central bank in 1928. The bank also made loans to the private sector.
Originally, the government conferred upon the National Bank the privilege to issue bank notes as long as the bank stood ready to convert its bank notes into gold. The government, however, suspended convertibility on four separate occasions: right after the 1848 revolutions, again from 1868 to 1870, from 1877 to 1884 when the government borrowed heavily, and last from 1885 to 1928.
Inflation reared its head during the prolonged era of suspended convertibility, but never reached the frenzied hyperinflation levels that characterized post–World War I Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Poland. Between 1914 and 1928 the cost of living index rose 868 percent, perhaps reflecting the threat of losing access to foreign capital that may have helped Greece keep a tight rein on its monetary affairs. Between 1895 and 1910 international financial pressure put Greece on a stricter monetary discipline, requiring the government to withdraw and burn 2 million drachmas in bank notes each year. This pressure came from imperialistic powers with vast financial resources, such as Britain, and served some of the same functions now performed by the International Monetary Fund. The Allies lifted these controls during World War I and even granted credits to Greece, allowing Greece to substantially increase the issuance of bank notes. The credits were never realized, further adding to the supply of unsecured bank notes in circulation.
The government budget of Greece was clearly in the surplus column at the opening of World War I, but by 1918 red ink had shown up in the deficit column. The costs of the war in Asia Minor sent the budget deficit soaring, and by 1922 the government was unable to raise additional revenue either from taxation or borrowing from traditional sources.
Under the duress of a deficit-ridden budget, the government of Greece carried out one of the most fantastic pubic finance schemes in history. On 25 March 1922 the government ordered all citizens to physically cut in half bank notes in their possession. One half of each bank note was to be retained by its owner and could continue to circulate at half of its face value. The owner was to surrender the other half to the government and receive in exchange a 20-year loan at 6 1/2 percent interest.
The National Bank of Greece exchanged with the government fresh notes for the canceled halves, making the whole process a means of raising a loan for the government. The government enacted a similar measure again on 23 January 1926, this time putting three-fourths of the value of the note in the hands of the owner, and the remaining one-fourth the government took in exchange for a 20-year loan at 6 1/2 percent interest. Despite, or because of, these unorthodox financing measures inflation, after reaching a peak of 85 percent in 1923, steadily subsided until the end of the decade, even dipping into the negative range in 1930. The establishment of the Bank of Greece, a genuine central bank, began monetary rehabilitation, helping Greece to experience monetary stability during the decade of the Great Depression.
The Great Debasement (1542–1551) refers to the English Crown’s policy of coinage debasement during the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI. Coinage debasement occurred when governments replaced to a significant degree the gold or silver content of coinage with a base metal such as copper. By reducing the value of gold or silver content relative to face value, governments extracted usable revenue from domestic money stocks. This stratagem was called debasement because each coin was worth less in terms of its precious metal content.
Normally, the face value of the coined money exceeded its production cost, including the cost of the precious metals. This difference, which the Crown earned as a profit, was called seigniorage. The Crown of England, like many governments, held an exclusive monopoly on the privilege to coin money from precious metals, and used the profits of seigniorage to help pay for government expenditures.
During the Great Debasement the English crown’s profits from debasement rose to unreasonable levels. In March 1542 the value of the silver content of each English coin averaged 75 percent of each coin’s face value. By March 1545 the value of the silver content had fallen to 50 percent, and by March 1546 to 33.33 percent. The value of each coin in silver content fell to only 25 percent of face value by the time the debasement had run its course in 1551.
During a period of coinage debasement, a mechanism called Gresham’s law comes into play. Gresham’s law is sometimes expressed as bad currency drives out good currency. Households and businesses will hoard the good (or undebased) coinage, and use the debased coinage to pay for goods and services. The result is that only the debased currency remains in circulation, and the good currency goes into hiding or is spent on goods from foreign countries where the debased currency is not legal tender and therefore not acceptable.
In 1551 the English government under Elizabeth I instituted a plan to retire the debased currency and replace it with currency the face value of which corresponded with its precious metal content. Because of Gresham’s law, retiring the debased currency was a tricky affair because households and businesses tend to hoard good coinage and pay debts with debased coinage. To retire the debased currency the government enacted laws forbidding the outflow of good coinage to foreign markets, and ending the legal-tender status of the debased coinage beyond certain date.
During the gold standard era governments achieved the same purpose as debasement by increasing the paper money in circulation relative to the gold bullion held in reserves. Debasement, like printing excess paper money, was a secret form of taxation that monarchs could impose, often without receiving the approval of representative bodies such as Parliament. The secret tax made itself felt by in creasing prices relative to measures of wages and other incomes.
An apologist for the debasement policies of the English Crown might point to the need to build up the English navy, and finance other public defense expenditures. Critics would answer that Henry VIII was fond of building palaces. Whatever the driving force of debasement, the public gradually lost faith in the ability of governments to manage money supplies without oversight from private financial sectors that are affected by monetary mismanagement. In the United States a quasi public-private agency, the Federal Reserve System, regulates the money supply, largely independent of the executive and legislative branches of government. Studies have shown that in the 1970s countries with independent monetary authorities experienced lower inflation rates than countries with monetary authorities dominated by government authority.
Fifteenth-century Europe encountered a severe shortage of precious metals—particularly silver—that scholars have named the Great Bullion Famine. The worst years of the bullion famine lasted from 1457 until 1464. Evidence of price levels are scanty, but E. J. Hamilton, author of a well-known study of the sixteenth-century price revolution, found evidence that prices in Valencia and Aragon dropped as much as 50 percent in gold equivalents, and 25 percent in silver equivalents from 1400 to 1500. Interest rates that ranged between 4 7/8 and 8 3/8 percent during the first half of the fourteenth century in Italy, rose to a range between 6 percent to over 10 percent 100 years later.
The reasons for the bullion famine lay in the depletion of silver mines located in what are now Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and a European trade deficit with countries of the Middle and Far East. Diminished European silver production began with the depopulation caused by the Black Death epidemic of the fourteenth century, and continued into the fifteenth century. A contributing factor to the bullion famine was the strong tendency to hoard precious metals in plate, cups, jewelry, and treasures of coin. Falling prices rendered hoarding precious metal a productive investment and hoarding was also a means of protection against coinage debasement.
A European trade deficit with the Middle and Far East existed because exotic goods from China and India—spices, silks, cotton, and others—were highly prized in Europe, but European products—such as woolens from England—were not valued in Eastern countries. Even falling European prices could not erase the trade deficit. Precious metals, particularly silver, were strongly valued in the Eastern countries, and European precious metals sent to the East in payment for goods never returned in payment for exported European goods. Precious metals were a European export, and Eastern countries became a sinkhole for those metals. The Eastern countries exhibited the same strong propensity to save that now is associated with Japan, causing Japan to export goods to the United States without buying a comparable volume of United States goods.
Mints closed down all across Europe. A lack of bullion forced mints in the Rhineland to close one after another between 1440 and 1443. The English mint at Calais shut down permanently in 1442, and at one point the Tower of London housed the only mint in northwestern Europe that remained active. As early as 1392 the minting of silver in France had dropped to a trickle, and about the same time Sweden ended minting silver for 20 years. At the height of the bullion famine mints closed down in Flanders, Holland, Hainaut (southwestern Belgium), Dordrecht, and Valenciennes.
The bullion famine was one of the not-so-secret causes of the Age of Discovery. Portuguese explorations down the coast of Africa opened up new routes to sub-Saharan gold. Christopher Columbus in his diary of his first voyage mentions gold 65 times. After the mid-sixteenth century, the discovery of silver in Latin America put an end to the bullion famine, Europe entered an era of rising prices, and trade with the Eastern world reached a higher level of intensity.
David Hume (1711–1776), one of the most famous philosophers in Western civilization, was the first to give a thorough and complete explanation of the gold-specie-flow mechanism, which is the automatic adjustment mechanism that balances the inflow and outflow of gold under an international gold standard.
On a gold standard a country’s money supply, including paper money, is directly proportional to domestic gold holdings, including bullion and gold specie. When a country imports goods from abroad, making payment causes gold to flow out of the importing country. When a country receives payment for goods exported abroad, gold flows into the country. In addition, investments in a foreign country cause gold to flow out, destined for the country receiving the investment. When a country attracts foreign investment, gold flows in to pay for the investment.
David Hume addressed the problem of what happens when the outflow of gold, owing to imports and investments in foreign countries, is unequal to the inflow of gold from exports and foreign investment attracted from abroad. He developed the gold-specie-flow mechanism to explain the forces that bring the outflow of gold into balance with the inflow of gold, stabilizing domestic money supplies.
If gold outflows exceed gold inflows, domestic money supplies dwindle, putting downward pressure on domestic prices. As domestic prices fall, domestic goods become cheaper relative to imported goods, decreasing gold outflows from imports. Also, falling domestic prices lower the prices of domestic goods in export markets, increasing gold inflows from exports. Therefore, imports decrease and exports increase, closing the gap between the gold outflows and gold inflows.
If gold inflows exceed gold outflows, domestic money supplies balloon, putting upward pressure on domestic prices. Rising domestic prices render domestic goods less competitive in export markets, decreasing gold inflows from exports. Also, rising domestic goods prices lift the price of domestic goods relative to imported goods, increasing gold outflows from imports. Therefore, imports increase and exports decrease until the gap between gold inflows and gold outflows has closed.
Hume’s theory of the gold-specie-flow-mechanism helped supply the theoretical foundation of the gold standard as a stabilizing force in monetary affairs.
The goldsmiths of seventeenth-century London developed banking in its modern form. The goldsmiths united into one business activity functions such as: maintaining safe storage of gold, silver, and deposits of money; loaning out deposits of money (as well as their own money); transferring money holdings from town to town or person to person; trading in foreign exchange and bullion; and discounting bills of exchange. Before the goldsmith bankers these activities were scattered, often as sidelines or by-products of other trading activities. Around 1633 goldsmith banking arose as an indigenous form of banking in England. Before the goldsmiths banking in London was the province of Italians, Germans, and particularly the Dutch.
The first step in the goldsmith evolution toward banking began when some goldsmiths became dealers in foreign and domestic coins. Goldsmiths who specialized as coin dealers became known as exchanging goldsmiths as opposed to working goldsmiths. The seizure of the mint in 1640 and the outbreak of civil war in 1642 sent people to goldsmiths in search of safety for jewelry, gold, silver, and coins. The civil war interrupted the normal goldsmith business of forging objects from gold and silver. Instead, goldsmiths developed facilities to store gold and silver deposits in safety. The goldsmiths maintained a running account of each depositor’s holdings. They also conducted a profitable business loaning out depositors’ gold, silver, and coins to government and private customers. To meet the demands from borrowers, goldsmiths turned to paying interest on deposits and offering time deposits.
The paperwork and record keeping of these activities laid the foundation for important innovations in banking. The bank note (paper money) evolved out of receipts for deposits at goldsmiths. The depositor got a receipt with the depositor’s name and the amount of the deposit. These receipts soon became negotiable like endorsed bills of exchange. Modern banking began when these receipts were issued not just to those who had deposited money but also to those who borrowed money. Instead of bearing the name of a particular depositor or borrower, soon the receipts were issued to the “bearer.” Thus the modern bank note came to life. The Promissory Notes Act of 1704 ratified the practice of accepting notes in exchange.
The goldsmiths were thus the first to develop checks. The British word “cheque” came from exchequer, the British term for “treasury.” The cheques were named after the Exchequer orders to pay. The first cheques evolved out of bills of exchange and were called notes or bills. The courts confirmed the negotiability of endorsed bills and notes in 1697.
The paper records of credit transactions and transfers of funds evolved into a considerable supplement of the metallic money supply. By the time Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, bank notes in circulation exceeded metallic coins. The money supply of the capitalist economic system was no longer limited to the supply of precious metals.
The Gold Standard Amendment Act of 1931 is a rather euphemistic title for an act that marked the end of the international gold standard. The gold standard had provided the world with a stable monetary system from the 1870s until 1914, and was regarded as the ideal monetary system in the aftermath of World War I. In the pre–World War I era, Britain had been the major proponent and custodian of the gold standard, and the departure of Britain from the gold standard permanently removed the world from the gold standard.
Despite the interruption of World War I the world had by the mid-1920s returned to a gold standard that combined elements of a gold bullion and gold exchange. Countries held international reserves to redeem national currencies at official rates, and these reserves took the form of gold or leading foreign currencies, mainly British pounds and American dollars, which were “as good as gold.” The United States held gold reserves well in excess of what was needed to satisfy foreign claims, but in Britain foreign claims exceeded domestic gold reserves, making Britain vulnerable to an international liquidity crisis.
After World War I Britain not only committed itself to returning to the gold standard, but also sought to fix the pound at its pre–World War I value, which was equivalent to $4.86 in the United States. In 1925 Britain returned to the gold standard with the pound at pre–World War I parity in terms of gold and foreign currencies, leaving the pound overvalued in the new international order. The overvaluation of the pound made British exports more expensive in foreign markets and foreign imported goods less expensive in British markets, increasing the supply of goods in Britain relative to demand. Deflationary effects of overvaluation in Britain caused strikes, unemployment, and recession, and forced on the British government added social spending, leading to larger budget deficits. The Bank of England kept interest rates high to attract foreign capital, and discourage withdrawal of foreign funds, together minimizing pressure to redeem pounds into gold. High interest rates also helped keep the British economy depressed.
With the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s many smaller countries lost export markets and began to draw on reserves of foreign currencies to pay for imports. Bank failures in Austria and Germany weakened confidence in foreign currencies, encouraging redemption of foreign currencies into gold. France, perhaps sensitive to the feeling that the leading powers held reserves in gold and that secondary powers held reserves in foreign currency, took every opportunity to convert its holding of pounds and dollars into gold.
Britain first negotiated loans with the central banks of France and the United States, seeking to bolster its reserves and weather a mounting crisis of confidence in the pound. Later the British government arranged another loan from private sources, but only after restricting government deficit spending, and curbing expenditures on unemployment compensation and wages of government workers. The loans, however, were only stopgap measures, and the drain on Britain’s gold reserves continued.
On Saturday, 19 September 1931, the British government decided to suspend gold payments, effective the following Monday, 21 September. The act was rushed through Parliament on 21 September and read, “Until His Majesty by Proclamation otherwise directs subsection 2 of section one of the Gold Standard Act of 1925 shall cease to have effect.” The Gold Standard Act of 1925 had returned Britain to the gold standard.
Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Peru had already suspended gold payments. Within a few weeks most of the world’s trading partners abandoned the gold standard or restricted foreign currency transactions. By the end of 1932 only the United States, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands remained on the gold standard and maintained freedom of transaction in foreign currencies. The United States abandoned the gold standard in 1933, followed by the remaining European countries in 1936.
The Gold Standard Act of 1925 returned England to the gold standard after the disruption of World War I, signaling the beginning of a new gold standard era that lasted until 1931.
England’s commercial supremacy and financial leadership had secured the gold standard as the international monetary standard between the 1870s and 1914, the years of the classic gold standard. If there was a headquarters for the international gold standard, it was England, and the return of England to gold after World War I was anxiously awaited.
England had not officially gone off the gold standard during World War I, but the risk of transporting gold under wartime conditions effectively put an end to the convertibility of pounds into gold. After April 1919 the export of gold was strictly prohibited except for freshly mined gold imported from other parts of the empire.
To study the financial aspects of postwar reconstruction the British government in 1918 had appointed a committee, soon called the Cunliffe Committee after its chairman, Lord Cunliffe, governor of the Bank of England. Nine of the 12 members of the committee were traditional bankers, perhaps accounting for the deflationary recommendations of the committee. From the outset the Cunliffe Committee assumed that England should return to the gold standard, and that the value of the pound should be fixed at its prewar value. The recommendations of the committee were phased in over a 10-year period, including the return to the gold standard in 1925.
Wartime inflation had continued at the war’s end, lifting the 1920 price level threefold higher than the 1913 price level. In 1920, however, the postwar boom hit the skids, and by 1922 prices were less than twice the 1913 price level. The bout of deflation was temporary but prophetic, and the Cunliffe Committee would have done well to heed the warning.
With the help of loans from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a United States banking syndicate, England returned to the gold standard. The ban on the export of gold was lifted and the Gold Standard Act of 1925 made the pound convertible into gold at prewar parity. Unlike the classic gold standard of the prewar years, gold coins no longer circulated domestically, and the public could only convert Bank of England bank notes into gold bars. To meet the needs of international finance the Bank of England could have gold minted into gold coins, but the English public could not demand the convertibility of bank notes into gold coins.
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Perhaps the fateful mistake of the act was the return of the pound to its prewar value. The pound needed to depreciate to enhance the competitiveness of English exports in foreign markets, and to diminish the competitiveness of imported goods in English markets. England’s industry could not compete with German industry and industry from other parts of the world. England’s economy settled into a sluggish recession, marked by militant labor-management clashes, struggling along until the more devastating collapse occurred in the 1930s.
The Bank of England had to keep domestic interest rates up to make the pound valuable in foreign markets, restricting the desire to convert pounds into gold, and keeping England in possession of its gold reserves. But domestic economic problems limited the ability of the Bank of England to raise domestic interest rates to protect its gold reserves. A conflict between the need to improve domestic economic conditions and the need to support the pound put the Bank of England in a difficult position. In 1931 the conversion of pounds accelerated, causing a drain on England’s gold reserves. The English government suspended its gold standard with the Gold Standard Amendment Act of 1931. England, and the world’s trading partners, never returned to domestic gold standards after the debacle of the 1930s. Later in the 1930s a gold standard for international transactions was established, lasting until 1971.
The Gold Standard Act of 1900 put the United States for the first time explicitly on the gold standard, removing all traces of the bimetallic standard based upon gold and silver. The United States remained on a gold standard until 1933.
The world’s major trading partners had been moving toward the gold standard since England adopted the gold standard in 1821. Portugal adopted gold as its standard in 1854, even making British sovereigns legal tender, and Canada went on the gold standard in 1867. After Germany adopted a gold standard in 1873 silver began to lose ground as a monetized commodity. The United States and France ended free minting of silver soon after Germany acceded to a gold standard. Austria-Hungary adopted a gold standard in 1892 and Russia and Japan did so in 1897.
In 1873 the United States ended free minting of silver in legislation that provoked no controversy at the time, but later social protest and silver interests kept the United States on a limited bimetallic standard. The uproar inspired a book, The Wizard of Oz, a monetary allegory of the advantages of monetized silver. The proponents of silver wanted to return to the free minting of silver, meaning that the Treasury stood ready to buy silver at $1.29 per ounce, above the then-prevailing world market price of silver. A return to a policy of free minting of silver would have increased domestic money supplies and eased the burden of a world trend of deflation that was making itself felt in the United States. At the Democratic Convention in 1896 William Jennings Bryan, referring to the enemies of silver and proponents of a gold standard, exclaimed: “You shall not press down on the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.”
Bryan lost the presidential election to William McKinley, who favored a gold standard but was slow to take action, knowing that feelings ran high on the issue. The Spanish-American War galvanized public support for McKinley and shifted the issues that held the attention of the voting public. On 14 March 1900, five days before the next Democratic Convention, McKinley signed the Gold Standard Act. Bryan, renominated as the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party, launched a vigorous campaign, again favoring free minting of silver, but lost a second time. McKinley’s reelection seemed to ratify the adoption of the gold standard in the United States.
Probably, increased world production of gold, and particularly increased United States gold reserves, accounts for the United States becoming the most powerful convert to the gold standard. Early in the 1890s the United States exported gold to the rest of the world, but late in the 1890s an excess of exports over imports changed the United States to an importer of gold. A substantial increase in tariffs on imported goods may have caused the trade surplus, coupled with a general revival of the world economy. Also, world supplies of gold rose significantly, partly due to new discoveries in Alaska, Africa, and Australia and partly due to a new cyanide process that made lower-grade ores a profitable source of gold. The annual world output of gold grew from 5,749,306 ounces in 1890 to 12,315,135 ounces in 1900, and the United States’ monetary gold stock doubled over the same interval.
The act unequivocally defined the value of the dollar in terms of gold alone, without reference to another metal. The dollar was defined as equal to “twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold nine-tenths fine.” Responsibility for maintaining parity fell to the secretary of the Treasury. No gold certificates were to be issued under $20, and silver remained as a subsidiary coinage and currency, with 90 percent of silver certificates remaining under $10.
The act also set up a system of reserves for national banks and substantially reduced the amount of capital needed to establish a national bank. These measures had the expected effect of increasing the quantity of bank notes in circulation, which rose from $349 million in 1901 to $735 million in 1913. These measures were also intended to make the supply of bank notes more elastic as the needs of trade varied. The elasticity of the currency, or lack thereof, remained a source of economic instability, leading to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.
The United States remained on the gold standard until 1933 when the United States government, facing the debacle of the Great Depression, needed more flexibility in its handling of monetary matters. Like many governments around the world at that time, the United States government felt that a domestic money supply, completely uncoupled from domestic gold supplies, could be adjusted as needed by the Federal Reserve System to meet the needs of trade.
Under a gold standard, the value of a unit of currency, such as a dollar, is defined in terms of a fixed weight of gold and bank notes or other paper money are convertible into gold accordingly. Although the monetary systems of individual countries have been based on the gold standard at times, all the economically advanced countries of the world were on the gold standard for a relatively brief time—roughly from 1870 to 1914, sometimes called the period of the classic gold standard.
The coinage of gold dates back to 700 b.c. in the Mediterranean world, and it continued during the Roman Empire. Gold coinage disappeared from Europe during the Middle Ages, but during the thirteenth century Florence popularized gold coinage among Italian cities. The influence of the Italian cities seems to have brought the practice of gold coinage to England, where it caught on, particularly after the mid-fourteenth century. Charles II introduced a new English gold coin called a guinea in 1663. From England gold coinage then spread to the rest of Western Europe.
At the opening of the nineteenth century, no European country was on a gold standard or had developed a gold standard system. England and other countries coined both gold and silver and set the conversion ratio at which gold could be exchange for silver. England was still officially on a sterling silver standard, but in the eighteenth century the English government overvalued gold relative to silver, causing an outflow of silver and an inflow of gold and lifting gold to a position of preeminence in England’s monetary system.
In normal times banks redeemed paper money out of reserves of specie (precious metal coinage), but during the wars with revolutionary France and Napoleon, the Bank of England suspended the redemption of its bank notes in specie. After Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, Parliament turned its attention to the resumption of specie payments, and passed the Coinage Act of 1816. This act placed England definitely on the gold standard, while the rest of Europe remained on a silver or bimetallic standard. In 1819 Parliament passed the Act for the Resumption of Cash Payments, which provided for the resumption by 1823 of the convertibility of Bank of England bank notes into gold specie. By 1821 the gold standard was in full operation in England. Except for England, most countries operated bimetallic systems until the 1870s. Under a bimetallic system both gold and silver coins circulated as legal-tender mediums.
The English banking system evolved toward the use of Bank of England bank notes as reserves for commercial banks, and the Bank of England became the custodian of the country’s gold reserves. The Bank of England learned to protect its gold reserves by adjustments in interest rates, using its bank rate and open market operations to raise interest rates and stem an outflow of gold. Higher interest rates attracted foreign capital that could be converted into gold, and lower interest rates had the opposite effect. Low interest rates were the natural results of a gold inflow.
By the end of the 1870s France, Germany, Holland, Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Scandinavian countries were on the gold standard. The bimetallic system became awkward because official conversion ratios between gold and silver often differed from the ratio that existed in the precious metals market. Gold discoveries in California and Australia flooded markets for precious metals and gold began to replace silver as the circulating medium in France and other European countries. The wars and revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century again forced governments into issuing inconvertible paper money. Governments often restored convertibility by establishing the gold standard. If the gold standard had a golden age, it was between 1870 and 1914, when it acted as a brake on the issuance of paper money. If prices in Country A rose faster than prices in Country B, residents of A would start buying more goods from Country B. Gold would flow out of Country A into Country B, increasing the money supply in Country B and decreasing it in Country A. These money supply changes lowered prices in Country A and raised prices in Country B. These adjustments restored equilibrium, eliminating the need for further gold flows, and stabilizing prices at an equilibrium level.
World War I brought an end to the gold standard, partly because the export of gold was not feasible after 1914, and partly because governments wanted the freedom to print extra paper money to finance the war effort. The end of World War I set the stage for an international scramble for gold as countries tried to reestablish national gold standards. Britain and France kept their currencies overvalued in terms of gold, hurting the competitiveness of their export industries in foreign markets and causing recessions at home.
The economic debacle of the 1930s spelled the end of the gold standard for domestic economies. Governments wanted the freedom to follow cheap money policies in the face of severe depression. The United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934 authorized the United States Treasury to buy and sell gold at a rate of $35 per ounce of gold in order stabilize the value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets. This legislation laid the foundation for the world to return to the gold standard for international transactions after World War II. The value of the dollar was fixed in gold, and the value of other currencies was fixed in dollars. The system only became fully operational after World War II, when most countries lifted bans on the exportation of gold. This gold exchange standard for international transactions remained in effect until 1971.
In 1971 the United States, after experiments with devaluation, suspended the conversion of dollars into gold as the only means of stemming a major outflow of gold. Abandonment of the gold standard preceded the strong worldwide surge of inflation in the late 1970s, and critics attributed the inflation to the loss of discipline provided by the gold standard. The inflation of the 1970s can be attributed to many factors, such as shortages of important commodities, powerful unions, monopolistic pricing, and undisciplined monetary growth.
Most economists see the gold standard as a relic of history. In the absence of the gold standard, governments and monetary authorities enjoy more flexibility to adjust domestic money stocks to meet the needs of domestic economies. The experience of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that countries can control inflation without the gold standard.
Nineteenth-century gold discoveries sparked gold rushes—manias that rival, if not eclipse, the major speculative crazes that periodically rock financial markets. England adopted the gold standard following the Napoleonic Wars, and the United States was on a de facto gold standard after 1834. The discovery of gold in California in 1848 and in Australia in 1851 increased the world’s monetary gold reserves from 144 million pounds sterling in 1851 to 376 million Page 141pounds sterling in 1861, a increase of 161 percent over a 10-year period. The gold discoveries enabled the United States to become an official gold standard country, and supplied the monetary reserves for the world to adopt the gold standard in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Following the gold discoveries, a silver monetary standard became the mark of a low-income country.
On 4 January 1848 James W. Marshal found gold on land in California owned by a Swiss man named Sutter. The discovery occurred nine days before the United States signed a treaty with Mexico making California, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah part of United States territory. The secret soon leaked out—not in time to prevent the signing of the treaty—and gold fever infected the residents of San Francisco and Monterey, most of whom went straight to the gold mines, leaving their houses empty. Workers left employers and employers decided to join their workers mining for gold. Soldiers deserted and ship captains were afraid to make port for fear that sailors would leave for the gold mines. Some ships lay stranded in harbors, deserted by sailors who took up prospecting. The population of California had increased to 92,560 by June 1850, a sixfold increase. By November 1852 the population stood at 269,000 and by 1856 the population had topped half a million. Wages at unheard-of levels lured immigrants, who were content to leave the actual mining to others and take jobs as cooks or fill other skilled positions. Of course, the price of life’s necessities also soared.
The repercussions of the Australian gold discoveries were a bit mild compared to the California experience. An emigrant who had already prospected in California began in 1851 searching for gold in the Northern Bathurst region of Australia, an area geologists believed to contain gold. Gold was discovered, but the mines were scattered, a factor that—coupled with a well-established sheep industry—blunted the demographic effects of the strike.
Something of the effect of these gold discoveries can be gleaned from the words of Karl Marx, who in 1859 mentioned in the preface to his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy that the gold discoveries were a factor encouraging him to continue his studies of capitalism. He wrote:
The enormous material on the history of political economy which is accumulated in the British Museum; the favorable view which London offers for the observation of bourgeois society; finally, the new stage of development upon which the latter seemed to have entered with the discovery of gold in California and Australia, led me to the decision to resume my studies from the very beginning and work up critically new material.
(Vilar, 1976)
The late 1890s saw another round of gold discoveries. America’s monetary gold stock more than doubled between 1890 and 1900, thanks to discoveries in Alaska and northeast Canada, South Africa, and Australia. A new cyanide process for extracting gold from low-grade ores also added to gold production.
In 1896 gold was discovered in the Klondike area of Canada, along the Yukon River, on a scale comparable to the California gold discoveries. Twelve dollars worth of gold could be separated in a dish full of sand. Thirty thousand prospectors, crossing a mountain range in Arctic conditions, arrived after a heroic trial of endurance that could match the hardships of any expedition or human migration in history. Dawson City was born, where miners held out against disease and starvation, and salt fetched its weight in gold. Gold was found in other provinces, and Canada became the world’s third-largest gold producer.
Under the gold standard a shortage of monetary gold stocks led to falling prices between 1875 and 1895, making gold that much more valuable. As prices fell the scramble for gold increased in intensity. Gold discoveries eased monetary tightness, allowing prices to rise, reducing the value of gold and the intensity of the search for gold.
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 nationalized all monetary gold in the United States. Only the Treasury could own gold and buy and sell gold. The act also limited the power of the president to reduce the gold weight equivalent of a dollar, and the day after the passage of the Gold Reserve Act President Roosevelt fixed the gold equivalent of the dollar at $35 per ounce of gold, where it remained until 1971.
The act also established a stabilization fund of $2 billion, put at the disposal of the secretary of the Treasury, to support the purchase and sale of foreign currencies as needed to stabilize the value of the dollar.
The groundwork for the enactment of the Gold Reserve Act began with the banking crisis in March 1933 that led President Roosevelt to suspend banking operations for four days. Before banks were reopened the government required that all commercial banks turn over to the Federal Reserve System all gold and gold certificates and furnish lists of all persons who had withdrawn gold or gold certificates since February 1. The Federal Reserve issued Federal Reserve Notes in exchange for gold and gold certificates. The export of gold and speculation in foreign exchange was banned and one month later individual ownership of gold and gold certificates was likewise banned. The Treasury purchased privately held gold in the United States at a price of $20.67 per ounce, the price that had prevailed with few fluctuations for 100 years. The value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets depreciated 15 percent when the U.S. dollar was no longer redeemable in gold.
The World Economic and Monetary Conference, held in London during June and July 1933, sought to forge an agreement for the stabilization of international currencies and the eventual return to an international gold standard. Even members of the United States delegation could not agree among themselves, and President Roosevelt undermined the conference by announcing that the United States would manage its monetary policy to meet the needs of its domestic economy rather than fulfill conditions set for international monetary cooperation.
Abandonment of the gold standard in the United States aroused fears of inflation, inspiring references to the French Revolution and post–World War I Germany. Nevertheless, there were voices of support. Winston Churchill, responding to the United States’ severance from the gold standard, called the action “noble and heroic sanity.” On 3 July 1933 John Maynard Keynes responded to Roosevelt’s announcement in an article (with the headline “President Roosevelt is magnificently right”), referring to the new law as a challenge to us to decide whether we propose to tread the old unfortunate ways, or to paths new to statesmen and to bankers but not new to thought. For they lead to the managed currency of the future” (Schlesinger, 1959).
Churchill later observed, perhaps overstating the case:
The Roosevelt adventure claims sympathy and admiration from all who are convinced that the fixing of a universal measure of value not based upon rarity or abundance of any commodity but conforming to the advancing powers of mankind, is the supreme achievement which at this time lies before the intellect of man.
(Schlesinger, 1959)
The Treasury began, through the New Deal era Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to purchase gold domestically and later in international markets, driving up the price of gold in dollars, which effectively devalued the dollar in terms of gold. As the price of gold was rising Roosevelt fixed the price officially at $35 per ounce. The increase in the dollar price of gold substantially increased the value of the government’s gold holdings, creating a windfall profit for the government that supplied funds for the Treasury’s stabilization fund and later for the U.S. contribution to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
In the 1970s the United States government stopped selling gold to foreign central banks at $35 per ounce, ending the fixed exchange rate between dollars, gold, and foreign currencies. The price of gold was allowed to fluctuate freely, and the ban on the domestic ownership of gold was lifted.
The gold mark of Imperial Germany, the ancestor to the Deutsche Mark, burst upon the world in 1871 with the adoption of the gold standard in imperial Germany.
Before “iron and blood” (John Maynard Keynes in the Economic Consequences of Peace [1920]) forged the German Reich in 1871 from 30 loosely confederated independent states, Germany was split into seven separate currency areas. Six of the areas were on a silver standard and one was on a gold standard. Soon after the Zollverein, the German customs union, first began to emerge in 1818 pressures arose for a unified German coinage and monetary system. In 1837 southern members of the Zollverein established the gulden or florin, equivalent to 1/24.5 Cologne mark of silver, as a common monetary unit. Northern members in 1838 responded with the adoption of the Prussian thaler, fixed in value at 1/14 Cologne mark of silver, as a common unit of currency. The Dresden convention fixed the exchange ratio at 4 thalers to 7 gulden. In 1857 the members of the Zollverein and Austria formed a coinage union that replaced the Cologne mark of silver with a Zollpfund (customs union pound) of 500 grams. The Zollpfund was equivalent to 30 thalers, 52 1/2 South German florins, or 45 Austrian florins, with each currency unit convertible to the other at the fixed ratio. Austria dropped out in 1866, leaving two rival monetary units, the thaler and the gulden, competing for the monetary hegemony of the members of the Zollverein. German commercial interests continued to push for a unified monetary system based upon one currency rather than multiple currencies trading at fixed exchange rates.
Following the formation of the Reich in 1871 the German government enacted monetary reform that put Germany on the road to the gold standard, and establishment of the mark as the money unit of account. The mark had been a money of account on the Hamburg exchange, equivalent to one-third a Prussian thaler. On 4 December 1871 the German Reichstag enacted monetary legislation, the first three sections of which read:
There shall be coined an imperial gold coin, 139 1/2 pieces of which shall contain one pound of pure gold.
The tenth of this gold coin shall be called a “mark” and shall be divided into one hundred “pfennige.”
Besides the imperial gold coin of 10 marks (Sec. 10) there shall be coined imperial gold coins of 20 marks, of which 69 3/4 pieces shall contain one pound of pure gold.
(Laughlin, 1968)
On 9 July 1873 the Reichstag took action that officially put Germany on a gold standard. The first section of the act read: “Sect. 1. In place of the various local standards now current in Germany, a national gold standard will be established. Its monetary unit is the ‘mark,’ as established in Sec. 2 of the law dated December 4, 1871” (Laughlin, 1968).
A war indemnity that Germany extracted from France after the Franco-Prussian War helped furnish the gold reserves that enabled Germany to adopt the gold standard. Germany also began selling silver to bolster its gold holdings. Either Germany correctly saw the coming of the gold standard, and was only acting in step with the times, or perhaps the commercial success of England had elevated the prestige of the gold standard in the eyes of Germany.
At the time of Germany’s monetary reform, England and Portugal were the only countries on a gold standard, which is why Germany’s action was of an extraordinary nature. The gold standard became virtually universal in Europe between 1875 and 1880. The United States went on a de facto gold standard in 1879, Austria-Hungary adopted the gold standard in 1892, and Russia and Japan in 1897. The era from 1875 until 1914 is regarded as the golden era of the gold standard.
The mark of imperial Germany lasted until the monetary reform that followed Germany’s episode of post–World War I hyperinflation. In 1923 the Rentenmark replaced the mark at a rate of 1 rentenmark to 1,000 million marks. In 1924 Germany enacted another monetary reform that replaced the rentenmark with the Reichmark, and after World War II the reichmark was abolished in favor of the Deutsche Mark. In the post–World War II era the deutsche mark of the Federal Republic of Germany became the strongest currency in Europe. The new European currency, the euro, launched 1 January 1999, will eventually replace the German mark, the French franc, and other major European currencies, if present plans are realized.
Under a gold exchange standard a nation’s unit of money is convertible at an official rate into a unit of money of a pure gold standard nation—that is, a nation that maintains the convertibility of its unit of money into gold at an official rate.
A gold exchange standard became a popular monetary standard after World War I when many nations could not marshal the gold reserves to support a gold standard. In 1922 Britain proposed at a Genoa conference the adoption of an international monetary system organized with major nations holding reserves only in gold and the remaining nations holding reserves in foreign currencies. Governments (or central banks) would hold reserves to redeem domestic currencies at official rates as a means of guaranteeing currency value. Although the adoption of an international monetary system failed to materialize from the Genoa conference, many countries individually went on a gold exchange standard. Nations of the British Commonwealth often defined their currencies in terms of the British pound. Other nations defined their currencies in terms of the currencies of nations they were dependent upon politically. The gold exchange standard of the post–War World I era ended when the world’s major trading partners abandoned the gold standard early in the 1930s.
Critics of the gold exchange standard following World War I and World War II contend that it encouraged dominant nations to incur balance of payments deficits as a method of infusing the rest of the world with additional monetary reserves. Britain ran balance of payments deficits in the post–World War I era and the United States ran balance of payments deficits under the Bretton Woods system. A balance of payments deficit allows a nation to buy goods and investments from the rest of the world with payment in domestic currency never used to claim domestic goods. Historically, the gold exchange standard helped the world maintain the discipline of a gold standard when world supplies of gold were not keeping pace with the need for international monetary reserves.
During the Alaskan gold rush gold dust became a circulating currency in parts of Alaska. Silver coinage and other small coinage was nonexistent, so in its place little packets of gold dust, sealed in writing paper similar to medicine powders, passed as current money. The packets contained a fixed weight of gold dust, and the value of the enclosed gold was written on the outside of each packet. The packets came in popular denominations, such as one-dollar or two-dollar denominations, and some of the packets were known to circulate for two years.
The Alaskan gold dust currency demonstrates how societies will identify a medium of exchange when nothing else is available, but gold dust currency has a long history. In the tenth century the Japanese began circulating bags of gold dust. Later Japanese merchants began wrapping gold dust in small paper packets. The units were the ryo, the bu, and the shu. The bags of gold dust equaled about 10 ryo. After learning that a certain amount of gold dust seeped from the opened end of the bag, the Japanese began melting down the gold dust into gold bars. In the nineteenth century the people of Tibet used as currency gold dust by weight.
For part of the nineteenth century gold dust was virtually the only metallic money in Ghana. A farthing’s worth of gold could be scooped up on the tip of a knife, and an ounce of gold dust equaled three to four British pounds. The government received taxes in gold dust and employed special weighing scales that gave an advantage to the government.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gold dust by weight circulated as money in the islands in and around the Indonesian Archipelago. As early as the sixteenth century gold dust acted as currency in the Philippines. The gold-producing districts of Siam made use of gold dust as currency into the twentieth century. In nineteenth-century Siam, a tube of gold dust, 10 centimeters long and the diameter of a thumb, could purchase a buffalo. Some Malayan tribes packed gold dust of uniform weight in pieces of cloth, and circulated these cloth packets as coins.
Africa also furnished examples of gold dust by weight circulating as currency. In Arguin of Spanish Sahara, on the west coast of Africa, an ancient Arabic unit of weight, the mitkhal, survived as a unit of weight of gold dust. The mitkhal was a monetary unit of account, but it does not appear that gold dust circulated as money on a significant scale. For a while gold dust by weight was the favored medium of exchange in the Ivory Coast
Under a gold bullion standard, countries hold reserves of gold in the form of bars rather than coins, removing gold from monetary circulation in the form of coinage. Instead each country establishes an official price of a fixed weight of gold in terms of its own currency. The United States was on a gold bullion standard from the 1930s until 1971, and the official United States price of gold was $35 per ounce, committing the United States Treasury to selling gold at that price.
The gold bullion standard was a means of stretching existing supplies of gold, which were not sufficient to support the international monetary system at prevailing price levels. The famous British economist David Ricardo had first suggested the idea after the Napoleonic Wars.
Under a gold bullion standard, private citizens can only hold gold for industrial purposes, such as dentistry or jewelry manufacture. Monetary gold is owned by the government and is used solely to settle international transactions. Countries without substantial gold reserves can function on a gold exchange standard, while countries with significant gold reserves remain on a gold bullion standard.
The world began to move toward a gold bullion standard after World War I, when the world’s trading partners sought to return to a version of a gold standard. With the complete breakdown of the gold exchange standard in the 1930s, the world moved toward a gold bullion standard. The gold bullion standard allowed countries to manage domestic currency supplies somewhat independently of international gold flows, giving governments more flexibility to meet the crisis of depression.
At the end of World War II the world’s trading partners established the Bretton Woods system, putting most nations on a gold bullion standard. The United States emerged from World War II owning most of the noncommunist world’s gold. Under the Bretton Woods system, the United States defined the value of the dollar in a fixed weight of gold. The United States agreed to buy and sell gold at a rate of $35 per ounce, and most other nations set the value of their own unit of money equal to a certain value in U.S. dollars.
The post–World War II gold exchange standard came to an end in 1971 when the United States stopped converting dollars into gold. By 1971 foreign central banks held more dollars than the United States could redeem in gold without substantially devaluing the dollar.
Gold, the most enduring, highly valued, and universally accepted monetary metal, is a chemical element represented by the symbol “Au” on the periodic table. A lustrous yellow metal, soft and malleable, gold does not tarnish or corrode, and is found in nature in a relatively pure form. From earliest times up to the present, the search for gold in nature has remained a never-ending quest. Man’s earliest chemical researches were inspired by a desire to find a means of converting other metals into gold.
Because it did occur in pure form, gold was one of the first metals that drew man’s attention, but it was too soft to be a practical metal for making weapons and farming tools. As a metallic medium for artistic work, however, gold had no rivals and elaborate artistic productions in gold rank among the most prized relics of antiquity.
Gold’s role as a monetary metal probably has its roots in the perception, widespread in ancient cultures, that gold was a divine substance. That gold suffered no deterioration with time and that its color resembled the color of the sun may have encouraged the belief that gold was a sacred substance. Gold adornments were a necessary part of religious temples, further underlining the connection between gold and the gods.
The ancient Egyptians held gold to be sacred to Ra, the sun god, and vast quantities of gold went into the tombs of the divine pharaohs. A religion of ancient India taught that gold was the sacred semen of Agni, the fire god, and Agni’s priests accepted gold as a gift for priestly services. The Incas of South America saw gold and silver as the sweat of the sun and the moon, and these precious metals adorned the walls of their religious temples. After the Spaniards took the Indians’ gold and silver the natives substituted foil paper, and threw gold and silver-colored confetti into the air. The Maya of the Yucatan threw gold, silver, and jade sacrifices into their gods’ cenotes. (The cenotes were deep pools of water formed when a limestone surface collapsed.)
The legend of El Dorado propelled Spain into one of the greatest searches in history, ending with the exploration and conquest of much of the Americas. El Dorado was the name of an Indian who ruled a town near Bogota, Colombia. According to legend, El Dorado celebrated festivals by plastering his body with gold dust, and plunging himself into Lake Guatavita at the end of the festival to wash off the gold, and make the gold a gift to the gods. His subjects also threw gold and other valuables into the lake. The legend of El Dorado grew, and the Spanish, Portuguese, and German explorers went in search of the golden Eldorado, a city in a land fabulously rich in gold. El Dorado himself was never found, but Eldorado came to mean a land of gold populated by several cities rich in gold. The English explorer Sir Walter Raleigh went in search of one of these cities.
Because gold was always in demand as a religious donation or sacrifice, it had an unlimited demand and was always valued. It was an excellent store of value because it did not tarnish or corrode, and it was divisible into units of any size, making it useful for exchanges of varying magnitudes, and making change. The high value of gold per unit of weight made gold more transportable than other commodities that might serve as money. For these reasons, gold became the basis for the most famous commodity standard in history, the gold standard, a monetary standard that dominated the world monetary system from the 1880s until 1914.