Showing posts with label S. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S. Show all posts

Symmetallism

Symmetallism is a type of monetary system in which a standard monetary unit is equivalent to a fixed number of ounces of gold, coupled with a fixed number of ounces of silver. The standard monetary unit becomes equivalent to a bundle of two precious metals, combined in a fixed, unchanging proportion. As an illustration, the dollar might be set equivalent to 0.0242 ounces of gold, plus 0.3878 ounces of silver. The term symmetallism seems to have been coined by Alfred Marshall, a prominent economist around the turn of the century who proposed a symmetallic system as an answer to world monetary woes. Symmetallic systems were not without precedent, however, because the ancient kingdom of Lydia
is credited with striking the first coins from a metal called electrum, which was a mixture of gold and silver found in a natural state.
During the last half of the nineteenth century, the world’s major trading partners engaged in a monetary tug of war between a bimetallic system, based upon gold and silver, and a monometallic system relying strictly upon gold. England favored a gold standard, which eventually displaced a bimetallic standard that France and the United States had championed without success. The bimetallic system, like the symmetallic system, made use of two metals, but it set a fixed value for each metal in terms of the other metal. Under a bimetallic system a government might officially set the value of 15 ounces of silver as equal to 1 ounce of gold, and would stand ready to exchange gold for silver at this ratio. Because officially fixed values often varied from freely fluctuating market values, the bimetallic system worked less successfully in practice than in theory. In contrast to the bimetallic system, the symmetallic system does not fix a ratio of value between two metals, but fixes the value of a composite unit composed of a fixed quantity of each of two metals. A monometallic system circumvents the complications of two metals and fixes the value of a monetary unit in terms of a fixed weight of a single metal. Under the post–World War II monometallic gold standard, the United States officially fixed the price of an ounce of gold at $35.
The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a spreading wave of mild deflation in the face of the strict discipline of a worldwide gold standard, in which the world gold supply did not keep pace with the monetary needs of an expanding world economy. Alfred Marshall held out the symmetallic system as a means of avoiding the awkwardness of the bimetallic standard, while adding to the world’s stock of monetary metals, and venting deflationary pressures. He also argued that the value of a composite quantity of gold and silver would fluctuate less than the values of gold and silver separately. He advanced his proposal to the Gold and Silver Commission in the United Kingdom in 1888.
Marshall’s proposal apparently made little impression on policy makers at the time, but academic economists found it a fruitful idea that could be expanded. They saw no reason why the number of commodities in the composite standard had to be limited to two, or why the commodities had to be precious metals. They extrapolated Marshall’s concept into schemes that included all the commodities in the wholesale price index as part of the composite monetary commodity. These kinds of extensions of Marshall’s idea surfaced in the 1980s as anti-inflation policies stood at the top of research agendas in economics.
See also:
References:
Friedman, Milton. 1992. Monetary Mischief.
Marshall, Alfred. 1987. Remedies for Fluctuations of General Prices. Contemporary Review, 51 (March): 355–375.
McCallum, Bennet, T. 1989. Monetary Economics.

Swiss Franc

Over the years Switzerland developed a legendary reputation for financial probity, helping to lift the Swiss franc above the crowd of national currencies and become a symbol of strength and monetary soundness. Internationally, it is a favored currency for hoarding money, partly because Swiss banking secrecy laws protect the anonymity of depositors in Swiss banks. International pressure has steadily eroded away some of the protection of anonymity afforded to depositors in Swiss banks, particularly for depositors engaged in criminal conduct.
In 1848 Switzerland adopted the French monetary system, preferring a coherent application of the decimal system. Switzerland had first tasted the French system during the Napoleonic era when France conquered Switzerland and turned it into the Helvetian Republic.
In 1860 Switzerland debased its subsidiary silver coins to prevent the exportation of its silver coinage. In 1865 Switzerland was one of the countries attending a conference in Paris that led to the formation of the Latin Monetary Union. Switzerland argued for the adoption of the gold standard and conversion of silver coinage into subsidiary coinage. The union agreement, however, provided for a bimetallic standard based on gold and silver. Switzerland, along with France, Italy, and Belgium, agreed to mint gold pieces only of 100, 50, 20, 10, and 5 francs. The union members agreed to mint a fully weighted 5-franc silver piece, but lower denomination silver coins became subsidiary coinage with reduced weight. Under the union agreement, coins from each country circulated freely in other union countries. After Germany adopted the gold standard in 1871 the Latin Monetary Union broke down, and the member countries adopted the gold standard.
During World War I the Swiss suspended the gold standard and the Swiss franc appreciated relative to the currencies of the belligerents, and even relative to the U.S. dollar. Following World War I Switzerland returned to the gold standard at its prewar parity and maintained parity through the 1920s and well into the 1930s.
During the Great Depression period Switzerland, along with France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Poland, organized a “gold bloc” that sought to withstand the pressures for devaluation. Switzerland devalued the Swiss franc long after the United States and Britain had devalued their currencies, and only after France had devalued the French franc in September 1936. The French franc and the Swiss franc were devalued by 30 percent.
During World War II the Swiss franc remained firm, but not as firm as during World War I. In July 1945 the Swiss franc traded at a 3 percent premium over the U.S. dollar. During the post–World War II era the Swiss franc remained strong relative to the dollar and Swiss authorities had to take steps to discourage demand for Swiss francs. Under the Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates, slightly over four Swiss francs were needed to purchase a U.S. dollar. After a system of floating exchange rates replaced the fixed exchange rate system in the 1970s the value of the Swiss franc rose relative to the dollar. In the late 1990s about 1.5 Swiss francs were needed to purchase a U.S. dollar.
Switzerland is home to the world’s largest gold market, and Swiss residents have always enjoyed unfettered freedom to hold gold, unlike citizens in the United States where the government outlawed the domestic ownership of gold in the decades immediately preceding and following World War II. Bank notes in Switzerland are backed by a minimum of 40 percent gold reserves, suggesting that gold is still important in Switzerland, even though none of the world’s major trading partners—including Switzerland—is now on a gold standard.
See also:
References:
Chown, John F. 1994. A History of Money.
Cowitt, Philip P. 1989. World Currency Yearbook.
Einzig, Paul. 1970. The History of Foreign Exchange. 2d ed.

Swiss Banks

Swiss banks enjoy a worldwide reputation for protecting the identity of depositors. This important characteristic helped Switzerland grow to one of the world’s major banking centers in the twentieth century. Another factor contributing to the growth of Swiss banking is Switzerland’s position of neutrality. On 20 May 1815 the Vienna Congress established the permanent neutrality of Switzerland among the European powers—a position the superpowers of the world honored through two great wars in the twentieth century.
Switzerland was not a pioneer in early European banking. Geneva was the first of the Swiss cities to become a banking center. By 1709 Geneva boasted of a dozen bankers who left a name in Swiss financial history, and Louis XIV floated loans in Geneva to finance his wars. Geneva bankers kept close ties with France and remained involved in financing French public debt until the end of the nineteenth century.
Basel developed a significant banking industry only in the nineteenth century. In 1862 the Basel Register listed 20 banks, 9 of which were exclusively devoted to banking.
Financial activity of various sorts appeared in Zurich during the sixteenth century. In 1679 an injunction from the city council prohibited a reduction of interest rates from 5 percent to 4 percent. Merchant bankers, who accepted deposits for investment in securities, appeared in the middle of the eighteenth century. Zurich waited until 1786 to see the formation of a bank in the broad sense. In 1805 the official register of Zurich reported two banks devoted exclusively to banking.
By the eve of World War I Switzerland ranked as one of the international financial centers. Six large banks, Swiss Credit Bank, Swiss Bank Corporation, Union Bank of Switzerland, Trade Bank of Basel, Federal Bank, and Swiss People’s Bank, controlled a system of branches throughout Switzerland. These banks floated international loans for European governments and railroad and other industrial concerns in the United States. After World War I, inflation in the currencies of the former belligerents made Switzerland more attractive as a safe haven.
In the post–World War II era three of the big banking houses remained in business, the Swiss Credit Bank, the Swiss Bank Corporation, and the Union Bank of Switzerland. There was also a large network of smaller banks, rural loan associations, and branches of foreign banks. In 1968 Switzerland had a population of 6 million people and 4,337 banking offices, which added up to one banking office for every 1,400 individuals.
In the 1930s Switzerland enacted laws that strengthened the anonymity protection of depositors in Swiss banks. During that time some countries prohibited citizens from holding assets abroad on pain of criminal penalties, and even sent agents into Switzerland to track down assets owed by their own citizens. On the other hand, some people wanted to keep deposits in Switzerland in case they had to make a hasty departure from their homeland for political or racial reasons. Swiss banks began opening the so-called numbered accounts, which substantially reduced the number of bank employees who knew the name of a depositor. Also, the Swiss government claimed no right to pry into bank accounts either to collect information on its own citizens or the citizens of foreign countries. Governments around the world have lodged complaints against Swiss banks for holding deposits of foreigners evading taxes. Switzerland recently has yielded to pressure to open up information on deposits when criminal activity and tax evasion are involved.
In 1997 it came to light that Switzerland, thought to have been a neutral country in World War II, acted as a banking center for Nazi Germany, and that Swiss commercial banks had accepted three times as much gold in deposits from Nazi Germany’s central bank as was originally thought. Jewish groups launched a class-action lawsuit in an effort to force Swiss banks to compensate Holocaust victims, emphasizing that Swiss banks held on to dormant accounts of Holocaust victims and laundered millions of dollars in gold stolen from Jews. On 12 August 1998 representatives of Holocaust survivors and Swiss banks announced a $1.25 billion reparation settlement to compensate Holocaust survivors and their heirs.

References:
Bauer, Hans. 1998. Swiss Banking: An Analytical History.
Cowitt, Philip P. 1989. World Currency Yearbook.
Fehrenbach, T. R. 1966. The Swiss Banks.
Ikle, Max. 1972. Switzerland: an International Banking and Finance Center.
New York Times. 1998. Settling Switzerland’s Debts. 16 August, at 1.

Sweden’s Paper Standard of World War I

During World War I Sweden sought to weaken the link between gold and domestic currency in an effort to tame inflationary forces. Sweden’s policy was unprecedented, considering that the gold standard usually receives strongest support from those quarters where inflation is most feared. The nineteenth century had seen several countries abandon a silver standard to avoid currency depreciation, reacting to the depreciation of silver relative to gold, which was a stronger metal monetarily and clearly the preferred bulwark against inflation.
Sweden had adopted the gold standard in 1873. A gold standard country must stand ready to buy and sell gold at an official price in its own currency. A country’s commitment to sell gold at an official price in its own currency puts a strict limit on the volume of paper money issued, acting as a guard against the issuance of inflationary levels of paper money. When a country suspends gold payments, as often happens during times of fiscal stress, such as wars, the country expects to see its currency depreciate, and domestic prices go up.
The other side of the gold standard is the commitment to buy gold at an official price, a commitment that Sweden suspended in February 1916. During World War I Sweden supplied war materials and supplies to the belligerents and often received gold in payment. Foreign currencies sold at a discount relative to the Swedish krone, and gold would have sunk in value relative to the krone if the Swedish central bank had not been committed to buy gold at the official price. The influx of gold and foreign currencies would not have created difficulties if Sweden’s opportunities for importing foreign goods had increased proportionately with its accelerating opportunities for export. Wartime conditions, however, favored exports over imports.
Sweden found itself faced with a swelling domestic money supply, fueled by gold inflows, and a shrinking supply of goods for domestic consumption as exports rose relative to imports. The Swedish central bank saw itself having to buy large quantities of gold that paid no interest. Also gold was sinking in price worldwide, which acted to drag down the values of gold-standard currencies, such as the Swedish krone. These difficulties converged to push Sweden into unhinging itself from the gold standard.
Freed from an obligation to buy gold at an official price and to mint all gold brought to the mint, Sweden continued to import gold, but at reduced prices, and to augment the domestic money supply. Between the first quarter of 1916 and the last quarter of 1917 the circulation of paper money increased 62 percent and prices climbed 65 percent.
Although nullifying the gold standard did not spare Sweden from a bout of inflation, it restrained the levels that inflation reached. In the Stockholm foreign exchange market, the Swedish krone rose in value relative to the U.S. dollar, the Swiss franc, and the British pound. The krone rose about 10 to 25 percent above the value it commanded when it was on a strict gold standard, and Swedish coins were worth 10 to 25 percent more than the value of their gold content.
The Swedish experience of World War I was a reminder that precious metals do not offer fail-safe protection against inflation, as Europe discovered after the influx of gold and silver from the New World.
See also:
References:
Cassel, Gustav. 1922. Money and Foreign Exchange after 1914.
Lester, Richard A. 1939. Monetary Experiments.

Sweden’s First Paper Standard

Between 1745 and 1776 Europe had its first experience with an inconvertible paper standard. Sweden had been the first European country to introduce bank notes early in the seventeenth century, but by the mid-eighteenth century England and France had both made use of bank notes, and France had furnished Europe with its first example of a paper money debacle. Neither England nor France had officially adopted a paper standard when the Swedish government put Sweden on an inconvertible paper standard.
In the eighteenth century Sweden had a parliamentary government, in which two parties vied for power. One party, the “Hats,” identified with the exporting industries, the military, the nobility, and the monarchy, and generally favored policies of foreign expansion and increased influence abroad. By 1720 Sweden had lost its Baltic empire, much to the chagrin of the Hats, who wanted to maintain Sweden as a player in European politics. The other party, the “Caps,” represented agricultural interests, and what might be called the commoners. The Caps’ preference for policies of pacifism earned them the nickname Nightcaps, shortened to Caps, because they supposedly wanted to sleep while the great powers of Europe passed Sweden by.
Before the adoption of a paper standard, Sweden, home to vast copper reserves, had functioned on a copper standard. Copper, worth less than gold and silver per unit of weight, was bulky and awkward to transport in large monetary values, and Sweden turned to bank notes as a convenience. In the mid-seventeenth century Sweden saw its first suspension of bank note convertibility and bank panic. Bank notes fell into disfavor at first, but the Swedish public found bank notes much more convenient than copper coinage, and bank notes returned to circulation by popular demand rather than government policy.
The Hats held the upper hand in Parliament from 1739 until 1765 and pursued a policy of inflationary war finance, a policy opposed by the Caps. Between 1741 and 1743 the financial strain of war with Russia prompted the Swedish government to look for salvation in the printing press. Because copper was bulky, the sheer cost of transporting copper enabled the government to vastly increase bank notes without triggering an export of copper coins. With copper reserves held intact, the convertibility of bank notes into copper was not immediately threatened.
The issuance of bank notes continued, partly for subsidies to manufacturers, and by 1745 the Swedish authorities imposed an inconvertible paper standard. Unlike the suspensions of payments in the seventeenth century, the public did not panic, but inflation rose to the forefront of economic problems. The Swedish currency depreciated on foreign exchange markets, making foreign goods much more expensive in Sweden and Swedish exports cheaper in foreign markets.
The inflationary policy irritated the Caps, who wasted no time kicking the monetary rudder in the opposite direction when they returned to power in 1765. The Caps imposed a deflationary policy. As Swedish currency appreciated in foreign exchange markets, foreign imports became cheaper in Sweden, but Sweden’s export industries had to slash prices to remain competitive in foreign markets. Prices in export industries fell faster than wages and raw material prices, plunging the export industries into a depression.
Political opposition to the Caps’ monetary policy mounted as economic distress defused throughout Sweden and the Caps fell from power in 1769. The Caps’ experience with disinflation policies inspired a political drama that history would see replayed again whenever democratic governments imposed deflationary policies. Unemployment, bankruptcies, and virtually every other form of economic discomfort invariably accompanies disinflation and deflationary policies, and often democratic governments find it difficult to pursue these policies for extended time periods.
The Hats regained power and reverted to inflationary policies before the Caps returned briefly to power in 1771 through 1772. The political sphere began to mirror the turbulence in the economic sphere, and in March 1772 a bloodless coup d’etat engineered by the Hats displaced Sweden’s parliamentary government with a constitutional monarchy. Sweden’s parliament survived, shorn of much of its power, and the parties of the Hats and Caps disappeared. In 1776 Sweden established a silver standard, completely breaking with the copper standard and putting an end to inconvertible bank notes.
Sweden’s eighteenth-century episode of monetary disorder demonstrates how a society, exhausted with war, may find inflationary policies attractive, and how these policies are associated historically with political instability.
See also:
References:
Chown, John F. 1994. A History of Money.
Heckscher, Eli F. 1954. An Economic History of Sweden.
Samuelsson, Kurt. 1968. From Great Power to Welfare State.

Sweden’s Copper Standard

Like most European countries, Sweden emerged from the medieval period on a silver standard. In 1625, however, Sweden monetized copper and switched to a
bimetallic standard based on copper and silver. As often happened under bimetallic systems, one metal currency drove out the other metal currency, and in Sweden’s case copper currency displaced the silver currency in domestic circulation, putting Sweden on a copper standard. Sweden’s copper standard remained technically in effect until 1776, but its operational importance ended in 1745 when Sweden introduced an inconvertible paper standard.
Sweden turned to a copper standard not because of any perceived commercial advantage, but because copper mining was an important industry in Sweden, and the Swedish government sought to increase the demand for copper. Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden from 1611 to 1632, felt that drawing copper into use as circulating money would reduce the supply of copper in world markets and lead to an increase in copper prices. Spain, then the foremost power in Europe, had furnished a recent precedent for the monetization of copper when it debased its own silver coinage with a copper alloy. Vellon was the name given to Spain’s debased silver coinage, which in the first half of the seventeenth century became virtually all copper in content. Spain’s de facto copper standard supplied the first stimulus to the copper industry, causing the Swedish government to look to the copper industry, which it controlled, as its main source of revenue.
Because the purpose of the copper standard was to create a domestic demand for copper, it would have served no purpose to reduce the copper weight of the copper coinage relative to face value. Therefore, the copper coins were full-valued coins, with the face value of the coins close in value to the bullion value of the copper. Because copper per unit of weight was equal to about one-one-hundredth the value of silver, copper coins on average had to be about 100 times the size of silver coins, and the sheer size of the copper coins seems to have been the major drawback of Sweden’s copper standard. In 1644 the Swedish government issued probably the heaviest coins in history, 10-daler copper plates weighing over 43 pounds each. In 1720 a Danish diplomat wrote home somewhat humorously about Sweden’s copper coinage:
A daler is the size of a quarto page … many carry their money around on their backs, others on their heads, and larger sums are pulled on a horsecart. Four riksdaler would be a terrible punishment for me if I had to carry them a hundred steps; may none here become a thief. I shall take one of these dalers back to you unless it is too heavy for me; I am now hiding it under my bed.
(Heckscher, 1954)
The transportation of any sizable sum of copper coins required the use of wagons, and problems associated with the transportation of the tax revenue came to the attention of the highest councils in Sweden’s government.
The copper standard failed to increase world prices of copper, apparently because Sweden increased domestic copper production to meet the increased demand for copper as coinage. Nevertheless, Sweden’s copper standard did lead to Europe’s first peacetime flirtation with paper money. Copper mines discovered that it was easier to pay miners in copper bills, representing ownership of copper, rather that the bulky copper itself. In 1661 Sweden saw its first bank notes based upon the copper coinage. These bank notes, the first in Europe, were an immediate success, being much more convenient than the bulky copper coinage. In 1656 Johan Palmstruch had received royal permission to form a bank and five years later his bank started issuing bank notes. Paper money experiments, however, seem to be especially vulnerable to the pitfalls of success. Palmstruch’s bank overissued bank notes, the public staged a run on the bank, and the bank failed. The failed bank,
however, was purchased and reorganized as the Riksbank, now the oldest central bank in Europe.
Despite the fear inspired by the collapse of Sweden’s first note-issuing bank, in 1745 Sweden suspended its copper standard and issued irredeemable bank notes. Monetary disorder marked Sweden’s paper-money experiment until 1776 when Sweden returned to a pure silver standard.
See also:
References:
Heckscher, Eli F. 1954. An Economic History of Sweden.
Samuelsson, Kurt. 1969. From Great Power to Welfare State.
Weatherford, Jack. 1997. The History of Money.

Suspension of Payments in War of 1812 (United States)

The British attack on Washington in 1814 unnerved the public’s confidence in a banking system that had overextended itself in the issuance of bank notes. Banks in the Washington area suspended payments on their obligations to redeem bank notes, touching off a round of payment suspensions that spread to every region except New England.
In the early banking system individual banks issued their own bank notes, which they were obliged to redeem in gold and silver coin (specie). Bank customers received bank notes instead of a checking account and checkbook, and each bank held reserves of coin to redeem bank notes, just as a modern bank holds vault cash and other reserves to redeem checking accounts. A suspension of payments meant that banks no longer redeemed their bank notes with specie, putting the United States on an inconvertible paper standard. An inconvertible paper standard is a monetary system based on paper money that cannot be converted into precious metal at an official rate.
The War of 1812 contributed only part of the pressure on the banking system that preceded the crisis. From 1799 until 1811 the First Bank of the United States oversaw the banking system and made sure that individual banks could redeem their bank notes in coin. In 1811 the First Bank lost its charter from the United States government, substantially removing what regulation there was of state-chartered banks. From 1811 to 1815 the number of banks increased from 88 to 208, and the value of bank notes in circulation rose from $23 million to $110 million. The capitalization of the banking system only doubled during the same time, and most states allowed banks to issue bank notes without regard to capital or reserves. The circulation of bank notes had outgrown the supply of gold and silver, leaving the banking system floating on a thin film of public confidence. After the suspension of payments these bank notes circulated at discounted values, usually between 10 and 20 percent, but some notes from Kentucky banks were discounted 75 percent.
The United States government encountered difficulty financing the war because its bonds not only sold at a discount, but it received payment in depreciated bank notes. In addition to interest-bearing bonds, the Treasury issued $5 noninterest-bearing notes that were not legal tender but were acceptable as payment of taxes.
Congress soon regretted its decision not to renew the First Bank’s charter, and in 1816 granted a charter for the Second Bank of the United States. The bank opened for business on 17 January 1817 and by February had negotiated agreements with state banks in major cities to resume redemption of bank notes in of gold and silver coins.
The suspension of payments put the United States on an inconvertible paper standard for over two years, a rather short time considering that England from 1797 until 1821 was on an inconvertible paper standard. Just as England avoided the excesses of the paper money of French Revolution, the United States during the War of 1812 avoided the excesses of paper money that arose during the American Revolution. Today, virtually all countries are on an inconvertible paper standard.
See also:
References:
Chown, John F. 1994. A History of Money.
Hepburn, A. Barton. 1924. A History of the Currency of the United States.
Meyers, Margaret, G. 1970. A Financial History of the United States.
Timberlake, Richard H. 1978. The Origins of Central Banking in the United States.

Sugar Standard of the West Indies

From the mid-seventeenth century sugar became the reigning monetary standard on the Leeward Islands, and to a lessor extent on Barbados and Jamaica. Jamaica, because of its importance as a naval base as well as a favorite of the buccaneers, was always furnished with a plentiful supply of coins, but nevertheless made use of sugar money. Barbados and the Leeward Islands perennially wrestled with coinage shortages, forcing the expedient of commodity money. Before sugar rose to the forefront, tobacco met the need for a medium of exchange and unit of account in the West Indies.
A Barbados law of 1645 concerning family prayers provided that “whomsoever shall swear or curse, if a master or freeman he shall forfeit for every offense 4 pounds of sugar; if a servant, 2 pounds of sugar” (Einzig, 1966). Fees and wages were also measured and sometime paid in Muscovado or brown sugar at rates established by an act of the legislature. A rate of 10 shillings per 100 pounds of sugar prevailed for a while as the monetary standard of Barbados.
Sugar displaced tobacco a bit later on the Leeward Islands. Laws enacted in 1644 and 1688 declared that a fine of a 1,000 pounds of good tobacco in a roll awaited anyone found guilty of commerce with the heathen or Sabbath breaking by “unlawful gaming, immoderate and uncivil drinking—or any other prophane and illicious Labours of the Week-days, as digging, hoeing, baking, crabbing, shooting and such like indecent actions” (Einzig, 1966).
The Leeward Islands turned to sugar as the monetary commodity after midcentury. In 1668 Montserrat paid an “able preaching Orthodox Minister” a salary of “fourteen thousand pounds of sugar or the value thereof in Tobacco, Cotton Wool, or indigo.” The going rate for sanctifying a marriage was 100 pounds of sugar or “the value thereof in Tobacco, Cotton Wool or Indigo.” For about 30 years the sugar standard on the islands maintained a stable parity for sugar, equating “five score pound of good dry merchantable Muscavado Sugar” to 12 shillings and 6 pence.
By the beginning of the eighteenth century metallic currency had made inroads into the Leeward Islands’ monetary system. An act of 1700 provided that coinage could be substituted for commodities in payment of debts at a rate of:
  • 12 shillings and 6 pence for 100 pounds of muscavado sugar
  • 2 shillings for one pound of indigo
  • 9 pence for one pound of cotton wool
  • 1 1/2 pence for one pound of tobacco or ginger
  • (Einzig, 1966)
Sugar played a modest monetary role in the eighteenth century. On 24 August 1753 the assembly of Nevis considered, but failed to enact, legislation making sugar and other commodities legal tender for debts in an attempt to ease a shortage of metallic currency. In 1751 Jamaica, which did not have a coin shortage, enacted legislation making sugar legal tender “where both parties agree for payment in sugar and other produce of this kind.” In 1756 up to two-thirds of a tax obligation in Antigua could be paid in
sugar. In 1784 St. Christopher enacted revenue legislation stating that, “And whereas it may be burdensome and oppressive to the inhabitants of this Island to pay the amount in specie, be it enacted that the payment of the taxes aforesaid may be in cash, sugar, or rum at the option of the person or persons liable to pay the same” (Einzig, 1966).
By the end of the eighteenth century coins had edged out commodity money in the West Indies.
See also:
References:
Einzig, Paul. 1966. Primitive Money.
Nettels, Curtis P. 1934. The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720.
Quiggin, A. Hingston. 1949. A Survey of Primitive Money.

Suffolk System

The Suffolk System was the first effort to regulate private banking in the United States. Although banking regulation later became a government activity, the Suffolk System was born of a private initiative that saw a need to regulate country banks.
The Suffolk Bank of Boston first established the Suffolk System in 1819 and in 1824 six other Boston banks joined the system. The Suffolk System required country banks around Boston to deposit reserve balances totaling $5,000 in one or more of the seven Boston banks participating in the system. These reserve balances acted as a guarantee that country banks could always redeem their bank notes in specie.
In the pre–Civil War United States individual banks issued their own bank notes, rather than the current practice of issuing checkbooks or debit cards to accompany checking accounts. In today’s United States economy, only the Federal Reserve System can issue bank notes. Under the banking system in which individual banks issued their own bank notes, financially sound banks could always redeem their bank notes in gold and silver coinage; therefore their bank notes circulated at face value, and were accepted in trade as equivalent to gold and silver coinage or other bank notes. Bankers, however, often fell prey to the temptation to issue more bank notes than was reasonable, considering the bank’s gold and silver coin reserves. This left the public holding bank notes that they could not be confident would be redeemed in gold and silver coin. These bank notes circulated below par and anyone accepting one of these bank notes in trade risked taking a loss. Banks that often had to take bank notes as deposits were particularly vulnerable to sustaining a loss from bank notes issued by overextended banks.
The Suffolk System was designed to protect the public and Boston banks from country banks that issued more bank notes than they could be counted on to redeem in gold and silver coin. The Suffolk banks always accepted at par the bank notes of country banks that maintained reserves in the Suffolk System.
In the course of trade bank notes issued by country banks flowed into the hands of the Suffolk banks. The Suffolk banks then immediately presented these bank notes to the issuing banks for redemption, as a way of keeping the issuing banks honest. The Suffolk banks, however, treated the banks that kept reserves within the Suffolk System with a certain amount of consideration, allowing these banks to redeem their bank notes at a steady pace over time. Country banks refusing to keep reserves in the Suffolk System often found themselves suddenly presented with a large volume of their bank notes for immediate redemption, putting an intolerable strain on reserves of gold and silver coin. Without a legal sanction, the Suffolk System was able to coerce the country banks to participate in the Suffolk System.
By 1825 virtually all New England bank notes could be converted at face value in the bank notes of any other bank, or in gold and silver coin, due in no small part to the discipline enforced by the Suffolk System. From 1825 to 1860 New England boasted of the advantages of a uniform currency, a rare accomplishment at that stage of the history of paper money in America. The practice of centralizing reserves in a few banks made itself felt in the development of modern central banks such as the Federal Reserve System.
See also:
References:
Calomiris, Charles W., and Charles M. Kahn. 1996. The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning from the Suffolk System. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28, no. 4 (November): 766–797.
Davis, Lance E., J. R. T. Hughes and D. M. McDougall. 1969. American Economic History.
Myers, Margaret G. 1970. A Financial History of the United States.

Stop of the Exchequer (England)

In January 1672 Charles II issued a proclamation that suspended payment on tallies and Exchequer orders to pay, an action that became known as the Stop of the Exchequer. The British treasury is called the Exchequer, because during the Middle Ages transactions with the British treasury took place in a room with tables covered by checkered cloth. The modern term check is a derivative of exchequer.
During the reign of Charles II the Exchequer discounted tallies and Exchequer orders to pay to goldsmith bankers, paying interest rates above 6 percent. Tallies were wooden sticks that represented a debt of the government and Exchequer orders to pay were paper orders that were replacing the wood tallies, which were a holdover from the Middle Ages. The goldsmith bankers paid 6 percent interest on near-money accounts (deposits not readily available on demand, such as modern certificates of deposit) in order to raise funds for discounting tallies and paper orders from the government. Tallies and paper orders were similar to some present-day government bonds that are bought at a discount (an amount less than face value), and can be redeemed at face value at some maturity date in the future. The government pledged to redeem the tallies and paper orders in a rotating order.
When the goldsmith bankers had no more money to loan out, and were no longer able to discount tallies and paper orders, Charles stopped redemption of the tallies and paper orders already held by the goldsmiths. This Stop of the Exchequer initially caused a run on the goldsmith bankers and many were eventually ruined by this action. Later the government honored about half of its debt to the goldsmith bankers.
The Stop of the Exchequer reminded people of the seizure of the mint in 1640 and created more doubt about government involvement in banking. It also cast a shadow on paper money, and postponed the development of an institution such as the Bank of England for another 20 years. The credibility of government money suffered a severe setback from this experience, and in England issuing paper money became the province of banks.
See also:
References:
Davies, Glyn. 1994. A History of Money.
Horsefield, J. K. 1982. Stop of the Exchequer Revisited. Economic History Review, 35, no. 4.

Standard Drawing Rights


Special drawing rights (SDRs) are a form of fiat international monetary reserves that substitute for gold as monetary reserves in the international economy. The SDR also serves as an international monetary unit of account in the accounts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
SDRs were born of a shortage of international gold reserves that arose in the 1960s. Participants at the annual meeting of the IMF in 1967 at Rio de Janeiro drafted an agreement to issue SDRs. Member countries ratified the agreement in 1969, and the first allocations of SDRs came forth in 1970. Each country received allocations of SDRs proportional to its quota of funds contributed to the IMF. The IMF receives its lending resources from the contributions of member countries, which are assigned individual quotas based on such factors as national income and volume of international trade.
Physically, SDRs are bookkeeping entries in accounts with the IMF. Known in some circles as paper gold, SDRs can be created with the stroke of a pen. At first the value of SDRs were fixed in terms of gold. In mid-1974 the gold valuation of SDRs was dropped in favor of a system that defined SDRs in terms of a “basket” of major international currencies. In 1981 the basket was simplified to five currencies, the United States dollar, German mark, French franc, Japanese yen, and British pound. The value of an SDR is based on a weighted average of the values of major international currencies. Every five years the IMF adjusts the weights, which determines the significance of each currency that enters into the value of an SDR. The IMF last adjusted the weights in 1995.
Individual countries may draw upon SDR accounts to settle international payments that could normally be settled with gold reserves or foreign exchange reserves. SDRs do not play a role in private international transactions, but, by international agreement, are accepted in intergovernmental transactions on a par with gold and foreign exchange. For example, the United States could buy French francs from France’s central bank by paying for them by drawing upon its SDR account at the IMF. The United States might use the French francs to buy goods and services from France or buy U.S. dollars in foreign exchange markets, propping up the value of the dollar.
The value of SDRs fluctuates on a daily basis, reflecting the daily fluctuations in the values of currencies in foreign exchange markets. The daily values of SDRs are reported in the foreign exchange tables in publications such as the Wall Street Journal. In time SDRs should replace gold and the United States dollar as the principal international monetary reserve. Already the IMF uses SDRs rather than a specific national currency as a unit of account in financial reports. Some countries define domestic currencies in terms of SDRs.
See also:
References:
Daniels, John D., and Lee H. Radebaugh. 1998. International Business. 8th ed.
Daniels, John D., and David Vanhoose. 1999. International Monetary and Financial Monetary Economics.
Snider, Delbert. 1975. Introduction to International Economics. 6th ed.

Specie Circular (United States)


On 11 July 1936 President Andrew Jackson issued an executive order, called the Specie Circular, requiring payment in specie (gold and silver coins) for all government lands sold to the public. The government no longer accepted bank notes in sales of government land. The Specie Circular actually came from the pen of Senator Thomas Hart Benton, who unsuccessfully advanced a Senate resolution with the same intent. Jackson and Benton were both “hard currency” advocates, and Benton had supported Jackon’s veto of the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States. As the bank war raged in the Senate, Benton thundered:, “Gold and silver is the best currency for a republic, … it suits the men of property and the working people best; and if I was going to establish a working man’s party, it would be on the basis of hard money; a hard money party against a paper party” (Schlesinger, 1945).
With the demise of the Second Bank, banking regulation was strictly in the hands of state governments. The proliferation of banks and the multiplication of bank notes fed a wave of inflation and a speculative frenzy in land. Banks in the East made loans on the condition that bank note proceeds were use to pay for land in the West, maximizing the chance that the bank notes would not find their way back to the lending bank for redemption. By accepting the bank notes in payment for land the government—in effect guaranteeing that bank notes could be redeemed in land—was underwriting the banking system. Benton roared in the Senate: “I did not join in putting down the Bank of the United States, to put up a wilderness of local banks…. I did not strike Caesar to make Anthony master of Rome” (Schlesinger, 1945).
The speculative frenzy hit the skids in 1837 and Jackson’s Specie Circular may belong with the immediate agents that brought down an overextended banking system. By increasing the demand for specie in payment for land, the government forced banks, which now found it more difficult to maintain specie reserves, to contract bank note circulation.
See also:
References:
Atack, Jeremy, and Peter Passell. 1994. A New Economic View of American History.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. 1945. The Age of Jackson.

Spartan Iron Currency

In about 600 b.c. Lycurgus, the famous Spartan lawgiver, put into Sparta’s constitution a provision that banned the circulation and possession of gold, silver, or other precious metals as a means of transacting business and replaced these forms of money with an iron currency, variously reported as being in the form of disc or bars. This provision was part of a plan of social reform intended to spare Sparta the evil consequences of wealth concentrated in the hands of a few citizens. According to Plutarch, Lycurgus, after effecting a land reform that spread out the ownership of that wealth, set to work reforming the currency. In Plutarch’s Lives of Noble Grecians and Romans (1952) we read that Lycurgus:
Not content with this [land reform], he resolved to make a division of their moveables too, that there might be no odious distinction or inequality left amongst them; but finding that it would be very dangerous to go about it openly, he took another course, and defeated their avarice by the following stratagem: he commanded that all gold and silver coin should be called in, and only a sort of money made of iron should be current, a great weight and quantity of which was very little worth; so that to lay up twenty or thirty pounds there was required a pretty large closet, and, to remove it, nothing less than a yoke of oxen. With the diffusion of this money, at once a number of vices were banished from Lacedaemon; for who would rob another of such a coin? Who would unjustly detain or take by force, or accept as a bribe, a thing that it was not easy to hide, nor a credit to have, or of any use to cut in pieces? For when it was just red hot, they quenched it in vinegar, and by that means spoilt it, and made it almost incapable of being worked.
Part of the motivation for the reformation of Sparta’s currency may have been the discouragement of trade with foreigners, because there is no record of exchange rates between Sparta’s iron currency and the coinage of other cities of the same era. It is unlikely, but possible, that Sparta was attempting to compensate for a shortage of domestic supplies of gold and silver, possessing no gold or silver mines of its own. Societies sometimes develop substitute monies when the growth of commercial activity is restricted by a shortage of money. The whole tenor of these reforms, however, seems to have been intended to limit the growth of commercial activity rather than promote it.
Lycurgus’s reforms sound a familiar refrain in the ancient literature on money, variations of the biblical warning that “the love of money is the root of all evil.” The use of money first spread in the seaport cities, such as Athens, where traders and sailors of all religions and creeds met at the crossroads of international trade. Exposure to foreign creeds, morals, and traditions often weakened the hold of domestic religions on the citizens of the seaport towns. Traders from all over the world, away from home, pockets full of money, made a ready market for all sorts of vices that thrived in these cities. The inland cities such as Sparta, dependent on agriculture rather than foreign trade, sought to protect themselves from the moral chaos that they saw as a direct result of the introduction of money and the massive inequality of wealth in the seaport cities.
History, however, was on the side of the societies that made use of money, and Sparta nearly disappeared as Athens grew to a world-class city.
See also:
References:
Burns A. R. 1927. Money and Monetary Policy in Early Times.
Einzig, Paul. 1966. Primitive Money.
Plutarch. 1952. Lives of Noble Grecians and Romans. 

Spanish Inflation of the Seventeenth Century


The seventeenth century almost from beginning to end saw Spain debase its silver coinage with copper and mint vast quantities of copper coins, causing inflation and shortages, punctuated with fits of deflationary policies and solemn promises of currency reform. Ironically, Spain struggled for nearly a century with debasement and inflation after exploiting vast gold and silver discoveries during the sixteenth century. The percent of Spain’s domestic coinage made of copper rose to 92 percent, hardly believable in light of the influx of gold and silver from the New World in the sixteenth century.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Spain’s government budget was bloated after years of financing wars and the royal pomp necessary for a great world power. Spain’s revenues from gold and silver mines in the New World began trailing off, and the Spanish crown turned to minting copper coins to pay for heavy government expenditures. Spain’s dependence on foreign treasure had perhaps already sapped vitality from domestic industries, rendering inflationary policies tempting in an economy that could not generate sufficient tax revenue to finance its government.
During the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the government’s unbridled coinage of copper coins spawned a wave of inflation that drew public protest. The face value far exceeded the intrinsic value of copper coins and the crown was reaping the difference as a profit for minting the coins. By 1627 widespread inflation aggravated public anger over wheat and livestock shortages, pressuring the government to switch to a deflationary monetary policy. The nominal values of the copper coins were cut in half without compensating the holders of the devalued copper coins. The government began a practice of making solemn promises not to tamper with the currency—promises only meant to be broken.
In 1634 the government resumed a policy of inflationary finance. To save the expense of supplying copper to the mints, the government restamped the existing copper coins, raising the face value. Coins were called in several times and restamped, often doubling or tripling nominal values. Between 1627 and 1641 copper coins were inflated three times and deflated four times. In 1641 inflation reached a peak and silver was selling at a premium of 190 percent. In 1642 the government undertook a brutal deflationary devaluation, reducing the face value of copper coins by 70 to 80 percent.
In 1651 the government, again short of money for military outlays, called in copper coins of one denomination and restamped them, quadrupling their face values. In 1652 the government returned to a deflationary monetary policy and devalued copper coins. This time the government compensated holders of devalued copper coins with interest-bearing bonds.
Counterfeiting contributed significantly to the depreciation of copper currency. After 1660 counterfeiting was punishable with the death penalty, and burning at the stake awaited those participating in the importation of counterfeit coins.
Monetary disorder reached a climatic crisis in 1680 with silver selling at a premium of 275 percent. The government issued a decree devaluing copper currency by half, equivalent to one-fourth its 1664 value. Prices plummeted 45 percent in a few months, forcing a harsh readjustment. The government began reducing the supply of copper coins, and had ceased minting copper by 1693. Monetary stability returned to Spain and lasted throughout the first half of the eighteenth century.
Nearly a century of monetary disorder ravaged the Spanish economy. The woolen industry in Toledo and the cargo ships sailing between Spain and the Indies shrank by three-fourths and some industrialized areas lost half their populations. Monetary chaos stifled private initiative, contributing to Spain’s economic deterioration.

See also:
Copper,Great Debasement,Inflation and Deflation
References:
Hamilton, Earl J. 1947. War and Prices in Spain: 1651–1800.
Paarlberg, Don. 1993. An Analysis and History of Inflation.
Vives, Jaime Vicens. 1969. An Economic History of Spain.

Spanish Inconvertible Paper Standard


Spain stood aloof from the classical gold standard that brought monetary order to the world from the 1870s until 1914. In 1883 Spain abandoned convertibility of bank notes into precious metal and never returned to a metallic standard, even in the aftermath of World War I when most of the world’s trading partners adopted a gold exchange standard.
In 1868 Spain adopted a bimetallic standard along the lines of the Latin Monetary Union. Like the union Spain fixed the official ratio of silver to gold at 15.5 to 1. In 1874 the government conferred upon the Bank of Spain a monopoly on the issuance of bank notes. The value of silver fell as the world turned to the gold standard, raising the free market ratio of silver to gold to 18 to 1 by 1876. Gresham’s law set to work in Spain. Because gold could buy more silver abroad than in Spain, gold flowed out and silver displaced gold as domestic currency. Gold currency decreased from 1,131 million pesetas (the monetary unit of Spain) in 1874 to 736 million in 1883. Gold reserves in the Bank of Spain increased substantially until 1881, and then dropped precipitously in 1883.
The suspension of convertibility in 1883 may have been triggered by an international financial crisis, including a stock market crash in France and a deteriorating balance of trade for Spain. When Spain’s gold reserves dropped to 60 percent of their 1881 level the government suspended convertibility.
Despite abandonment of the gold standard Spain’s prices remained relatively stable; mildly deflationary during the world depression of the 1880s and early 1890s, and rising gently in the two decades before World War I. From 1883 until 1913 the Spanish wholesale price index (1913 = 100) rose from 89.5 to 100, an annual average increase substantially below 1 percent. The exchange rate of pesetas to British pounds rose significantly during the Spanish-American War, when the government ran large budget deficits, but returned to presuspension levels by the eve of World War I. Over the same time span the money supply grew at an average annual rate of 2 percent.
Spain eluded the severe monetary disorder many countries witnessed during experiments with inconvertible paper money. During the heyday of the classical gold standard Spain maintained monetary stability with inconvertible paper, providing lessons that are relevant today. Despite inconvertible paper money Spain’s government engaged in only modest deficit spending, excepting the brief episode of the Spanish-American War. Spain invariably ran a trade surplus, exporting more goods and services than importing, and the Bank of Spain accumulated gold reserves, leading speculators to expect a return to convertibility. Spain’s experience proved that monetary stability could be maintained without the much-vaunted gold standard.
Nevertheless, Spain paid a toll for not adopting the gold standard. The Bank of Spain kept interest rates in Spain above international levels, a necessary expedient to attract capital from countries considered safer because of the gold standard. Even with high interest rates Spain saw a reduction in foreign capital inflows. The higher interest rates also acted to retard domestic investment in Spain, further reducing indigenous economic growth.
Spain’s experience from 1883 to 1914 was unique because it occurred when the gold standard was heralded as the guardian of monetary stability. During the twentieth century Spain has shared many of the difficulties of other countries on inconvertible paper standards. In the 1970s Spain’s economy sank into the doldrums of stagflation, largely because the Bank of Spain issued bank notes to finance government deficits. In the 1980s Spain reformed its public finance and monetary policy, and now Spain enjoys one of the best records for monetary stability in Europe.
See also:
References:
Bordo, Michael D., and Forrest Capie, ed. 1993. Monetary Regimes in Transition.
Martin-Acena, P. 1990. The Spanish Money Supply, 1874–1935. Journal of European Economic History, 19, no. 1.

Solon


Solon

(ca. 630–560 b.c.)

Solon was a sixth-century Athenian lawgiver and poet who, according to a literary tradition, changed the Athenian monetary standard in an effort to extend relief to debtors. Subsequent research has cast doubt on the populist nature of Solon’s monetary reforms, but the thrust of his reforms nevertheless eased the burden on debtors. He redeemed land that had been forfeited for indebtedness and freed citizens enslaved because of debt. His laws forbade loans that subjected the borrower to enslavement in case of default. In the life of Solon in Plutarch’s Lives of Noble Grecians and Romans (1952) can be found the following passage, referring to Solon’s monetary reforms:
Though some as Androtion, affirm that the debts were not canceled but the interest only lessened, which sufficiently pleased the people; so that they named this benefit the Seisacthea, together with the enlarging their measure, raising the value of money; for he made a pound, which before passed for seventy-three drachmas, go for a hundred; so that, though the number of pieces in the payment was equal, the value was less; which proved a considerable benefit to those that were to discharge great debts, and no loss to the creditors.
Solon lived before the Greeks began writing history and ancient authors writing after the event disagreed on the nature of Solon’s reforms. Aristotle’s treatment of the same subject suggested that Solon’s reforms raised rather than lowered the value of the drachma.
The literary and archeological evidence suggests that Solon began the coinage of silver money in Athens. Before Solon there is no evidence of Athenian coinage. It also suggests that before Solon two monetary standards dominated trade in the Greek world, the Euboic standard, and the Aeginetan standard, derived from the older Phoenician silver standard. Solon, himself of the merchant class, preferred the Euboic standard as the standard in use by most of Athen’s trading partners. It seems that Solon urged the Athenians to adopt a standard that made Athenian coins most acceptable to trading partners. During the sixth century the Euboic standard spread rapidly and superseded the Aeginetan standard in most areas.
One of the far-reaching provisions of Solon’s reforms provided that fines be remitted in currency rather than cattle or sheep as existing Athenian law provided, marking a turning point in the transition from livestock money to coinage. In 454 b.c. Rome sent three commissioners to Athens to study Athenian law. The 12 tables of Roman law drawn up in 456 b.c. did not mention penalties paid in cattle as in former times, but provided for payment in copper coins.
The history of Solon’s monetary reforms, regardless of their true nature, opens a theme that is often replayed in monetary history—the secret war between debtors and creditors that invariably surfaces when monetary policies are up for discussion and revision. Policies that change the value of money, either directly by government decree or indirectly by inflation, always tilt the balance between debtors and creditors. When money loses its value, debtors win and creditors lose because the money they receive in repayment has lost some of its value. The opposite occurs when money gains in value.
See also:
References:
Freeman, Kathleen. 1976. The Work and Life of Solon.
Milne, J. G. 1931. Greek Coinage.
Plutarch. 1952. Lives of Noble Grecians and Romans. Trans. Dryden.

Social Dividend Money of Maryland


More than half of the first paper money issued by the colony of Maryland flowed into the economy as a social dividend, equivalent to a gift to each inhabitant over 15 years of age. Historically, the major sources of paper money have been banks that issued it on the strength of promissory notes, and governments that issued it to finance government expenditures. Often governments have issued paper money during wartime when demands upon government spending are particularly heavy. Maryland’s first experiment with paper money was unique for that era because its colonial government issued paper money solely for the purpose of stimulating the private economy, without feeling pressure to finance a portion of the public sector’s budget.
Like other American colonies Maryland struggled against a shortage of currency that kept the colonial economy on a tight leash, limiting trade to what could be transacted with a limited money supply. England made no special provision to supply the colonies with coins and currency, and the colonies had to get by with what could be earned from trade with the rest of the world. To infuse additional coin into the local economy, the Maryland legislature in 1729 granted a 15 percent reduction in import and export duties if they were paid with imported gold or silver.
Maryland shared with Virginia an almost exclusive dependence upon tobacco, either to pay for foreign trade or as the principal medium of exchange in the local economy. In the eighteenth century, however, tobacco production outpaced demand and the price of tobacco on the world market steadily declined, accounting for the depression in Maryland’s economy. Maryland’s first proposal for issuing paper money was part of a scheme for limiting tobacco production in an effort to raise the price of tobacco. In 1731 the Maryland legislature enacted a law that provided for the issuance of 30,000 English pounds of paper money to pay for tobacco that would be taken out of production. For each 6,000 tobacco plants standing during the month of July, the owner was to burn and destroy 150 pounds of tobacco. In return for each 150 pounds of tobacco destroyed the owner received from the colonial government 15 shillings in paper currency. For some reason this plan was never implemented and the paper money never issued.
The Currency Law of 1733 provided for the social dividend money issue. It authorized the issuance of 90,000 English pounds, 48,000 of which were to be distributed as a “bounty of thirty shillings per taxable.” That included all citizens over 15 years of age excepting ministers of the Church of  England, imported male servants, and slaves. The government issued the remaining 42,000 pounds as loans paying 4 percent interest and secured by real estate appraised at twice the value of the loans. The government levied a tax of 1 shilling and 3 pence per hogshead of tobacco exported from Maryland. The proceeds of this tax paid for investment in Bank of England stock, creating a fund for redeeming the paper money, beginning at the end of 15 years. Within 30 years the government planned to retire all the paper money.
The paper money issue helped finance an economic expansion in Maryland. The paper money depreciated in value moderately until 1748 when the government retired the first 30,000 English pounds. After 1748 the value of the paper money stabilized. The colonial government redeemed in shillings the entire issue of the paper money at face value, making Maryland’s paper money experience the most successful in the American colonies.
See also:
References:
Brock, Leslie V. 1975. The Currency of the American Colonies, 1700–1764.
Lester, Richard A. 1939. Monetary Experiments.

Snake


The so-called snake was a coordinated policy among European Community (EC) countries to constrict exchange rate variations between member countries to a narrower band than allowed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was the first stage toward the monetary unification of Europe, a goal that appears now within reach with the introduction of a European currency unit, the euro. The snake system began in March 1972 and remained in operation until January 1979 when the European Monetary System (EMS) replaced the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The EMS and its predecessor, the EMU, were agreements of cooperation in monetary affairs between members of the EC. The EMS took a further step toward monetary unification with the introduction of the European Currency Unit (ECU).
Early in the 1970s the IMF allowed the currencies of member countries to vary within a range of 2 1/4 percent above or below parity with the dollar, or 4 1/2 percent overall. The members of the EMU committed themselves to keeping the variation between European currencies to within 2 1/4 percent of each other and fluctuations in the aggregate of European currencies was kept with the 4 1/2 percent band of parity with the dollar. The European currencies became known as the “snake in the tunnel’ because these currencies moved up and down together relative to other currencies. When the Belgium-Luxembourg monetary union kept its own currency fluctuations within a tighter range, then the “snake in the tunnel” began to reveal a “worm in the snake.” When the fixed exchange-rate regime broke down in 1973, and the dollar floated freely, the European “snake in the tunnel,” became the “snake in the lake.”
The snake terminology survived in the EMS, in which a measure of exchange-rate divergence from other European currencies was treated as a warning sign or signal that intervention may be necessary. This warning sign was called the rattlesnake.
The snake was intended to keep EC currencies fluctuating in step with each other, a preliminary measure to the complete monetary unification of Europe. The transition to a European currency unit, the euro, to be managed by a European central bank, will remove the need for this sort of coordination, as the euro replaces the German mark, French franc, and other European currencies.
See also:
References:
Kenen, Peter B. 1995. Economic and Monetary Union in Europe.
Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso. 1994. The Road to Monetary Union in Europe.

Slave Currency of Ancient Ireland


Although ownership of slaves represented wealth in slave-holding societies and slaves were popular subjects for barter, ancient Ireland made slave girls, called kumals or ancillae, a unit of account for measuring the values of goods and services. A legendary king in ancient Irish literature owned a chessboard, and each chess piece was said to equal 6 kumals in value. Queen Maeve, a figure in an epic poem dating from before the Christian era, boasted of a chariot worth thrice seven bondsmaids. During the fifth century in Ireland, St. Patrick wrote in his Confessions: “You know how much I have paid out to those who were judges in all the regions, which I have often visited; for I think that I have given away to them not less than the price of fifteen humans” (Einzig, 1966). The wording suggests that St. Patrick did not pay in slaves, but was using slaves as a standard of value for reckoning what he did pay. St. Patrick would not have used slaves as a means of payment. Under his guidance the Hiberian Synod decreed that retribution for the murder of a bishop or high prince demanded either crucifixion or payment of seven ancillae. The decree also required that if blood money was paid in specie, one-third must be in silver, a clear indication that ancillae were only a unit of account, and not a tangible means of payment.
Probably the second century a.d. saw the kumal transformed into an abstract unit of account. The laws under King Fegus, king of Uldah, required a blood money payment of “seven kumals of silver” and “seven kumals of land” for the murder of anyone under the king’s protection. These laws clearly show that land and silver were mediums of exchange, and kumals were only a unit of account. These laws were set forth in two legal texts, the Senchus Mor and the Book of Aicill, both of which contained a table legally sanctioning the kumal standard. According to this table:
  • 8 wheat-grains = 1 pinginn of silver
  • 3 pinginns = 1 screpall
  • 3 screpalls = 1 sheep
  • 4 sheep = 1 heifer
  • 6 heifers = 1 cow
  • 3 cows = 1 kumal
The example of slave-girl money in Ireland brings to the forefront four separate functions of money. Money serves as a medium of exchange, a store of wealth, a unit of account or measure of value, and a standard of deferred payment. The slave-girl money evolved into a unit of account only, while the other roles of money were filled by various commodities, land, and precious metals.
The origin of the social acceptance of the use of kumals as a medium of exchange may have stemmed from the prestige conferred by slave ownership. Also, slaves may have been regarded as the rightful spoils of war, and warriors capturing more slaves than they could employ were free to trade them for land, livestock, and goods and services that they needed. Perhaps the spread of Christianity in Ireland and the concept of Christian love helped liberate Ireland from the base practice of actually exchanging human beings in trade, making kumals less acceptable as a medium of exchange, but still sanctioned by tradition as a unit of account.
See also:
References:
Einzig, Paul. 1966. Primitive Money.
Nolan, Patrick. 1926. A Monetary History of Ireland.
Powell, T. G. E. 1985. The Celts. New ed.

Slave Currency


Slaves often served as a form of wealth in primitive societies, making slaves a suitable medium of exchange, particularly for large transactions.
In the modern era Africa provides the most evidence of the use of slaves as money. In the nineteenth century a slave was the unit of account in the Sudan. A standard unit was defined as a slave that met certain measurements. The value of a slave was equivalent to 30 cotton pieces, 6 oxen, or 10 dollars. In the Bagirmi country of equatorial Africa a slave of medium qualities, defined as a standard slave, served as a standard of value for large transactions. The prices of better slaves were some multiple of the standard slave. Wealth took the form of “heads,” and a successful slave raid depreciated the value of the standard, causing the prices of commodities expressed in slaves to rise. In Ghana slave payments were made for large transactions, and slaves served as a standard of value. In Guinea slaves were the favored unit of account in large transactions, and kings charged European ships port dues ranging from 7 to 12 slaves, depending upon the number of masts on each ship. In Nigeria slaves ran a close second to cowries as the prime unit of currency. A report in the late nineteenth century said of the slave: “He has been the cheque book of the country and has been necessary for all large payments. Unfortunately he has a trick of dying while passing from hand to hand” (Einzig, 1966).
The standard of value was defined in terms of a slave of a certain age, and in the course of a transaction each slave was valued in terms of this standard slave. In Nigeria, slaves were the choice medium of exchange for large transactions, and rich men amassed wealth in slaves. In the Congo slaves passed in payment for goods, and met the need for a standard of value. The people of this area practiced cannibalism, and the value of a slave could not drop below the value of the pounds of meat that could be gotten from the slave if the owner ate his money. In seventeenth-century Angola a 20-year-old slave was a standard unit of value.
Some authors pin the blame for African slavery on the absence of a convenient currency. Slaves were mobile and often carried other forms of primitive money that was bulky and difficult to transport. Merchants brought slaves carrying other currencies on trading expeditions, and exchanged the slaves along with the other currencies for merchandise when the opportunity arose.
In early Cambodia slaves ranked with cattle, buffaloes, horses, pigs, and elephants as an acceptable means of paying fines. In early England values were occasionally estimated in slaves, and in Ireland a unit of account of one slave girl lasted well into the Christian era, long after the practice of trading human beings for goods had ended. People in western areas of New Guinea priced calico and other traded goods in terms of slaves.
The use of slave money probably began when warriors took more captives in war than they could personally use, and therefore they traded these captives for goods. From this small beginning the practice of trading human beings evolved into the use of slaves as a type of money.
See also:
References:
Einzig, Paul. 1966. Primitive Money.
Weatherford, Jack. 1997. The History of Money.