ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES

An adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) provides for varying interest rates over the life of the mortgage. It forces the borrower to shoulder some of the risks that fixed-rate loans place on the lender. Key to the rationale for ARMs is the almost one-to-one relationship between short-term interest rates and inflation rates. Over the life of a 30-year, fixedrate mortgage, inflation ranks among the biggest enemies that a lender faces. Increases in the inflation rate reduce the real (inflation-adjusted) rate of interest that a mortgage pays to a lender. Higher inflation reduces the real purchasing power of each monthly payment while pushing up the real operating cost of a lender. If the inflation rate happens to rise above a mortgage interest rate, the lender ends up earning a negative real interest rate.

The high inflation rates of the 1970s taught lenders the damage that inflation can wreak on the interest income earned from mortgages. Lenders began demanding higher interest rates on 30-year mortgages as insurance against a wave of inflation wiping out the profits and capital of mortgage holders. Adjustable-rate mortgages developed as a way to get home buyers into houses without paying the high interest rates attached to 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages.

Under an ARM, the mortgage interest rate at any given time is linked or indexed to a short-term interest rate. Two short-term, benchmark interest rates commonly used for setting ARM interest rates are the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the one-year, constant maturity treasury bond rate. The interest rate on an ARM is adjusted periodically to reflect changes in a benchmark interest rate. The home buyer benefits because short-term interest rates are usually lower than long-term interest rates, since short-term rates have less inflation risk. The disadvantage to the home buyer lies in the risk that short-term interest rates go up, probably because of rising inflation or anti-inflation policies. If short-term interest rates go up, the monthly payments on ARMs go up. With ARMs, the burden of accelerated inflation is born by the borrower instead of the lender. In turn for bearing the risk of accelerated future inflation, the home buyer stands a chance getting by with lower interest rates. If inflation never drives up short-term interest rates over the life of the loan, the home buyer comes out ahead.

Adjustable-rate mortgages come in several varieties. In some mortgages, the monthly payment can change every month, depending on the benchmark interest rate. Other mortgages allow changes in monthly payments as infrequently as every five years. The time frame between rate changes is called the “adjustment period.” A mortgage with a one-year adjustment period is called a one-year ARM.

Many ARMs put a cap on the amount that a mortgage interest rate can change from one adjustment period to the next. This provision protects home buyers from large jumps in interest rates and monthly payments. Other contracts put a limit on the amount that monthly payments can increase from one adjustment period to the next. If interest rate adjustments call for a 10 percent increase in monthly payments, but the contract only allows monthly payments to go up 5 percent, then the unpaid interest will be added to the balance of the mortgage. By law, nearly all ARMs have a cap on how high interest rates can go over the life of a mortgage.

One version of the ARM allows the home buyer to pay an initial interest rate well below the benchmark interest rate used for setting an ARM interest rate. The home buyer enjoys the low interest rate, often called a teaser rate, for an initial period, such as a year. Then the interest rate is adjusted upward according to the indexing formula tied to the benchmark interest rate. If shortterm interest rates happen to be rising at the same time that a homeowner is transitioning from the teaser rate to the fully indexed, benchmark rate, then the home owner may experience “payment shock.” The large increase in monthly payment may leave a home owner unable to make a house payment. The practice of offering teaser rates contributed to the severity of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. 

See also: U.S. Financial Crisis of 2008–2009

Mexican peso crisis of 1994

The sharp depreciation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 marked one of the swiftest macroeconomic reversals in the history of developing economies and currency crises. President Ernesto Zedillo had barely been in office three weeks when, on December 19, 1994, his administration asked the Banco de Mexico to undertake roughly 15 percent devaluation of the peso, adjusting the pegged exchange rate from 3.45 pesos per dollar to 4.00 pesos per dollar (Sharma, 2001). It was a modest devaluation, but it undercut the confidence of foreign investors and touched off a wild speculative run against the peso. On December 22, 1994, the Banco of Mexico, unable to defend the peso against stampeding, panic-stricken foreign investors, allowed the peso to float. The peso immediately sank another 15 percent (Sharma, 2001). By February 16, 1995, the peso had depreciated 42 percent against the U.S. dollar (Torres, February 1995). The peso reached its nadir at 7.65 pesos per U.S. dollar (Sharma, 2001).

The outgoing President Carlos Salinas and the soon-to-be President Zedillo met on November 20, 1994, to discuss the currency situation. The Friday before, Mexico had lost $1.7 billion in a run on the peso. The two leaders agreed that devaluation on the order of 10 percent was needed, but the outgoing officials refused to devalue the currency on their watch (Wessel, July 1995).

The peso crisis caught many observers and investors by surprise. Mexico had become the darling of Wall Street. Mexico’s economic policy seemed to have all the right ingredients. It emphasized privatization and deregulation of state-owned enterprises, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, and a pegged exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar. The ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in January 1994 opened Mexico’s economy to the largest consumer market in the world. Between 1989 and 1994, Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 3.9 percent (Sharma, 2001). Mexico’s inflation rate, which raged as high as 160 percent in 1987, sank to single-digit territory in 1993 (Sharma, 2001). Government indebtedness as a percent of GDP shrank from 15 percent in 1987 to 1 percent in 1992 and 1993 (Sharma, 2001). Between 1987 and 1994, government spending as a percent of GDP shriveled from 44 percent to 24.6 per cent (Sharma, 2001). In February 1994, Mexico’s foreign exchange reserves stood at $28 billion, well above the $6.3 billion level held in 1989 (Sharma, 2001). With the dawn of NAFTA, Wall Street saw no limits to Mexico’s potential.

In hindsight, one economic statistic signaled trouble. Mexico’s current account deficit steadily climbed from $6 billion in 1989 to $20 billion by the end of 1993 (Sharma, 2001). Mexico’s imports were growing much faster than its exports. Current account deficits reflect either a high level of government deficit spending, high levels of private investment spending relative to savings, or some combination. In 1994, government deficit spending in Mexico was minimal, and the high level of private investment spending seemed to reflect Mexico’s bright future under NAFTA. Foreign portfolio investments in Mexican stocks and short-term bonds made possible the high level of investment spending. It also left Mexico vulnerable to a sudden outflow of foreign capital.

In 1994, foreign investors began to get jittery over the size of Mexico’s current account deficit. Mexico tamed inflation, but did not eradicate it. Under a pegged exchange rate, inflation increases the prices of domestic goods, but does not affect the price of imported foreign goods unless the peg is adjusted. Mexico failed to adjust the pegged exchange rate to compensate for domestic inflation, encouraging Mexico’s consumers to purchase more imported goods at the expense of domestically produced goods. As long as foreigners exhibited a strong appetite for Mexican stocks and bonds, the Mexican government felt no pressure to devalue its currency. The peso appeared to be in high demand at the current exchange rate.

In 1994, the strong foreign demand for portfolio investments in Mexico began to diminish over worries about Mexico’s rising current account deficit. Rising current account deficits often lead to a devaluation of a currency. If a currency depreciates 25 percent, foreign investors immediately see the value of their investment depreciate by 25 percent.

Part of the attraction of Mexican stocks and bonds had to do with low interest rates in the United States. Throughout 1993, the U.S. federal funds rate remained at 3 percent. In 1994, the Federal Reserve System started raising the federal funds rate, pushing it up to 5.5 percent by November 1994 (Sharma, 2001). As interest rates rose in the United States, investors became less willing to chase higher interest rates in developing countries and emerging markets. When the Mexican government announced a devaluation of the peso in December 1994, foreign investors decided it was time to get out of Mexico.

After the peso crisis, Mexico’s economy sank into steep recession. Inflation soared as devaluation lifted the prices of imported goods. In the United States, President Bill Clinton put together a nearly $50 billion rescue package (Greenwald and Carney, 1995). Without the rescue package, the Mexican government would have defaulted on a large amount of dollar-denominated government bonds. (In 1994, the Mexican government had started issuing dollar-denomniated bonds to ease investor fears about devaluation of the peso.) The rescue package helped calm markets and limited the damage inflicted on other Latin American countries.

See also: East Asian Financial Crisis, Currency Crises

Current account

The current account summarizes transactions that fall within the categories of imports or exports of good and services, income earned abroad, domestically generated income belonging to foreigners, and unilateral transfers. The common denominator behind all these transactions is the involvement of an inflow or outflow of currency. Unilateral transfers include foreign aid and gifts of money from residents of one country to family members living in another country. Cross-country investments, such as buying and selling foreign stocks and bonds, also involve currency inflows and outflows, but are summarized in another account called the capital account. A third account, the official reserves transactions account, summarizes central bank transactions that involve an inflow or outflow of currency and that change official reserve holdings. A Federal Reserve purchase of gold with dollars is an example of the type of transaction covered by the official reserves transactions account. These three accounts make up the balance of payments.

The current account balance is considered a significant indicator of the economic and monetary health of a country. It is among the handful of indicators that the Economist magazine reports for major countries of the world. The Economist reports the current account balance both in absolute numbers and as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

On the current account, transactions that involve an outflow of currency are a debit item, and transactions that involve an inflow of currency are a credit item. Exports of goods and services are a credit and imports are a debit. The foreign expenditures of a U.S. family visiting Greece count as an export on the U.S. current account. The interest income that a resident earns on a foreign bond counts as a credit. The interest income that a domestic bond pays to a foreign owner is a debit. Money residents send to family members living abroad counts as a debit. If the money value of the debits outweighs the money value of the credits, then the outflow of currency outruns the inflow of currency, and a country has a current account deficit. If the credits exceed the debits, the country has a current account surplus.

Persistent current account deficits is often regarded as an indication that a currency is overvalued and therefore faces a heightened risk of future depreciation. The largest component in the current account balance is net exports (exports minus imports). A current account deficit is nearly always an indication that imports exceed exports. As the value of a country’s currency goes up in foreign exchange markets, foreign imports into that country become less costly while exports from that country become costlier in foreign markets. An excess of imports over exports suggests that a domestic currency is too strong and likely to weaken in the future. A current account deficit indicates that the currency outflow on the current account exceeds the inflow. If the excess outflow of currency from a current account deficit is not offset by an excess inflow on a capital account surplus, a currency will depreciate unless a government is able and willing to take action. Governments usually hold sufficient official reserves to defend domestic currencies against speculative attacks, but not against long-term downward trends driven by market forces.

Currencies can remain strong in foreign exchange markets for extended periods of time in situations where a large current account deficit is offset by a large capital account surplus. A capital account surplus indicates that the inflow of foreign capital exceeds the outflow of domestic capital to foreign countries. A net inflow of capital equates to a net inflow of currency. Countries with persistent current account deficits often maintain elevated interest rates. The high interest rates encourage the inflow of foreign capital, offsetting the tendency of a current account deficit to undermine the value of a currency.

Even with strong capital inflows, a current account deficit is regarded as a risk factor in foreign exchange markets. The components in the current account are not tightly linked to the volatility and varying psychology of financial markets whereas capital flows are tightly linked to conditions in financial markets. Capital flows are much more sensitive than exports and imports to changes in expectations, and can therefore be more volatile. A net capital inflow can quickly change to net capital outflow, leading to almost certain currency depreciation and crashing financial markets for a country with a current account deficit. Currency speculators are always closely watching countries using elevated interest rates to sustain current account deficits offset by capital account surpluses. If these speculators see signs that elevated interest rates are pushing a country with a current account deficit into recession, they will dump the currency of that country. The value of the currency will crash in foreign exchange markets, domestic financial markets will crash, and the country will likely undergo a full-blown economic collapse.

For several years, the United States has been able sustain current account deficits with little difficultly. That is because the United States holds a reputation as a safe haven for foreign capital. United States’ investments are considered among the safest in the world. Over the last 30 years, however, the Japanese yen has gained strength relative to the dollar, reflecting the fact that Japan usually has current account surpluses and the United States usually has current account deficits.

See also: Balance of Payments, Currency Crises, Foreign Exchange Markets

East asian financial crisis

 n 1997, a financial crisis threw the East Asian economies into a financial chaos that threatened to derail the East Asian economic miracle and engulf the global financial system. In the 1990s, East Asia had become the scene of a new group of economic miracles. From the mid1990s until the outbreak of financial crisis, East Asian countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia posted real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in the 8 percent range or higher (International Monetary Fund, 1997).

Until the East Asian financial crisis, currency crises were often the domain of countries suffering from high inflation, slow growth, large government budget deficits, low savings, and political instability. Unlike the usual candidates for currency crises, the East Asian countries had what economists call “sound macroeconomic fundamentals.” They had high savings rates, low public debts, fast growth and low inflation—the very qualities that win the confidence of foreign investors.

One crack in the foundation involved the structure of corporate finance. Enterprises had relied too heavily on debt financing as opposed to stock issuance. Enterprises do not face bankruptcy when the value of company stock plunges, but they do face bankruptcy when they cannot pay debts. An equally important vulnerability stemmed from the balance sheets of East Asian banks. These banks borrowed foreign capital on a short-term basis to underwrite long-term loans. The short-term nature of the foreign capital inflows left these banks open to a sudden and unexpected reversal from a foreign capital inflow to a foreign capital outflow. A sudden reversal of foreign capital flows made these banks and enterprises illiquid. Much of the foreign debt was denominated in dollars. When the exchange rates of local currencies fell, the real value of foreign debt in local currencies skyrocketed.

The East Asian countries practiced an economic policy that pegged the value of their local currencies to a basket of currencies in which the U.S. dollar played a highly dominate role. The rate at which a local currency could be converted into dollars remained almost constant. This policy shared in making East Asia an attractive haven for foreign capital, but it also was the undoing of these economies. In the late 1990s, the value of the U. S dollar went up, probably because of strong global demand for U.S. financial assets. As the value of the dollar climbed, the values of currencies linked to the dollar, such as the East Asian currencies, also climbed. The appreciation of a country’s currency leaves the exports of that country more expensive in foreign markets. It also makes foreign imports into that country less costly. Falling exports and rising imports left the East Asian economies with current account deficits that needed to be financed by an inflow of foreign capital. East Asian companies began to feel the pain as sales fell off in foreign markets, and domestic sales faced greater completion from imports. In addition, East Asian central banks raised interest rates to increase the attraction for foreign capital. The policy of keeping the local currency exchange rates pegged to the dollar required that current account deficits be financed by foreign capital inflows. Otherwise, the value of the local currency relative to the dollar would sink.

The economic and financial situation in Thailand sparked the crisis. Many currency traders believed that the baht, Thailand’s currency, traded too high, higher than the central bank of Thailand could support.

Thailand’s economy was already suffering from double-digit interest rates and depressed stock prices. Currency traders launched billions of dollars of sell contracts on the baht. Fears of currency depreciation excited a broad outflow of foreign capital, putting more pressure on foreign exchange reserves. In a single day, the central bank spent $500 million dollars of its dollar reserves to keep the baht from falling below its pegged level (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999, 441). In 1997, Thailand’s central bank let the baht float, free to depreciate, which it did.

The depreciation of the baht triggered foreign capital outflows from other East Asian economies. By the end of 1997, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea had watched local currencies depreciate about 40 percent relative to the U.S. dollar (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999, 36). 

See also: Currency Crises

Foreign debt crises

 Economies and governments can accumulate debt to external creditors, meaning creditors from other parts of the world. External financing for productive investments can expand opportunities for economic development and accelerate economic growth. Just as households and businesses can sink too deeply into debt, countries and individual economies can accumulate debt to the point that external debt obligations cannot be met. Measures of indebtedness compare the amount of debt with income. A household with a moderate amount of debt can double its debt if its income doubles and remain only moderately in debt. If a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) doubles, it can double its external debt without increasing its debt burden. A country that is able to meet its external debt obligations is said to be able to “service” its debt.

Analysis of an individual country’s debt to the rest of the world takes on a macroeconomic perspective because it involves converting one currency into another currency. In addition to an individual borrower’s ability to repay, in the case of foreign borrowing there are aggregate credit conditions that must be met by the whole economy. Exceeding aggregate credit limitations can lead to sharp adjustments in domestic interest rates or exchange rates. Often a foreign debt is denominated in a foreign currency. In that case, a country must be able earn enough foreign currency in exports and capital inflows to service the debt. If a country’s debt is denominated in its own currency, it still needs to service its debt without upsetting exchange rates. A country can in effect default on its external or foreign debt by suspending convertibility of its domestic currency into foreign currencies. If a country is unable to earn sufficient foreign currency from exports and capital inflows to service its foreign debt, it can increase capital inflows by increasing domestic interest rates. These higher interest rates will be a burden on the economy and can force an economy into recession.

The debt that a sovereign government owes to external creditors is called “sovereign debt.” When a government defaults on obligations to external creditors, it is called a “sovereign debt crisis.” Russia, Ecuador, and Argentina furnish examples of outright debt default. Ukraine, Pakistan, and Uruguay avoided outright default through debt restructuring. Mexico, Brazil, and Turkey averted default with the help of large-scale support from the International Monetary Fund. Some debtor governments are more cooperative than others in resolving default situations. Uncooperative governments can harm the ability of private domestic corporations to access international debt markets. Risk of foreign debt default or restructuring appears to be lowest when total external debt as a percent of GDP is less than 49.7 percent, short-term debt as a percent of foreign currency holdings is less than 130 percent, public external debt is less than 214 percent of fiscal revenue, and the exchange rate not over appreciated above 48 percent (Manasse and Roubini, 2005, p. 40).

Economists have developed indicators to measure a degree of a country’s indebtedness. For poor, debt-laden countries, some type of debt restructuring is likely to occur when net present value of debt exceeds 200 percent of exports. For other, nonindustrial countries, it appears that the risk of debt exposure starts to rise when external debt as a percent of GDP rises above 40 percent (Daseking, December 2002). Countries can sustain higher debt ratios if exports are growing rapidly, or if exports represent a large proportion of GDP, or if a large share of external debt is denominated in domestic currency.

The United States is a debtor nation, but its debt ratios are well below the threshold levels that signal a possible foreign debt crisis. Given the role of the U.S. dollar as a world currency, it is not clear if the same debt–ratio threshold levels apply to the United States. The rise of foreign debt in the United States is worrisome to some observers. Easy access to foreign credit sometimes allows countries to delay painful but inevitable reforms.

Currency crises

A currency crisis occurs when the value of a currency crashes in foreign exchange markets, when holders of a currency stampede to sell it in foreign exchange markets out of fear that the currency is headed for lower values in the future. Foreign exchange markets determine the rate or price at which one currency can be purchased with another currency. An exchange rate of $1 per 10 Mexican pesos tells how many pesos it takes to purchase a dollar and how many dollars it takes to purchase a peso. While exchange rates are subject to market forces, certain groups have vested interests in exchange rate stability. One such group would be U.S. investors who have purchased Mexican peso bonds issued by the Mexican government. Bondholders who purchased Mexican bonds with dollars when the exchange rate stood at 10 pesos per $1 will experience a windfall loss if the Mexican peso depreciates to 20 pesos per $1. When they sell the Mexican bonds and convert the pesos back into dollars, they will receive roughly half as many dollars as they originally invested. Therefore, if holders of Mexican bonds expect the peso to depreciate in the future, they will try to sell their Mexican bonds for pesos, and convert the pesos back into dollars before the depreciation occurs. If large numbers of investors try to sell pesos for dollars all at once, the value of the peso in the foreign exchange market will crash.

Speculators may trigger a currency crisis if they think a currency is vulnerable to a sudden crash. If speculators think the peso may deprecate in the future, they will borrow pesos and sell them for dollars. If speculators borrow pesos to buy dollars when the exchange rate is 10 pesos per $1, then they can repay their loans and reap a profit if the peso depreciates to 20 pesos per $1. Speculative attacks can turn mere expectations that a currency will depreciate into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The common denominator behind all currency crises is a current account deficit. A current account deficit most likely indicates that outflows of domestic currency from imports exceed inflows of domestic currency from exports. As long as outflows of domestic currency approximately balance inflows of domestic currency, the foreign exchange rate tends to remain stable. If the outflow of currency outruns the inflow of currency on the current account, then foreign investors must either be willing to hold financial assets denominated in the domestic currency, or the central bank responsible for the domestic currency must buy back the excess outflow with its holdings of other foreign currencies. Central bank holdings of other foreign currencies are called foreign exchange reserves. The more foreign exchange reserves a central bank holds, the less likely a domestic currency will suffer a currency crisis. A current account deficit and the associated excess outflow of currency lead to currency depreciation if the central bank does not buy back the excess currency outflow and if foreign investors do not find financial assets denominated in the domestic currency attractive. If, for instance, Mexico has a currency account deficit and the Banco de Mexico does not hold sufficient reserves of U.S. dollars to buy back the excess outflow of pesos, then excess supply of pesos will build up in foreign exchange markets and one of two possibilities are left. One possibility is that foreign investors will purchase the excess supply of pesos and use the pesos to purchase bonds and other investments in Mexico. If foreign investors are afraid of investing in Mexico, or find Mexican interest rates too low, then there will be pesos in foreign exchange markets that nobody wants, and the Mexican peso will depreciate.

Countries that run persistent current account deficits tend to run out of foreign exchange reserves. Speculators are prone to launch speculative attacks on countries with current account deficits and low foreign exchange reserves. If the attack is successful, the currency crashes.

A current account deficit usually indicates a large government budget deficit, but it can indicate a high level of domestic investment spending relative to domestic savings. Either way, the country is importing foreign capital. A currency crisis usually occurs when a country that has been experiencing a foreign capital inflow suddenly starts experiencing a foreign capital outflow, perhaps because foreign investors have lost confidence. 

See also: East Asian Financial Crisis, Current Account, Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994

Argentine currency and debt crisis

Between 2001 and 2002, Argentina underwent an episode of currency devaluation and debt default that rocked international financial markets and offered fresh evidence of the varied economic trends that can lead to crises. The Argentine crisis has been the topic of wide discussion, partly because it was born of circumstances not normally regarded as fertile ground for currency crises. In the 1990s, Argentina boasted of one of Latin America’s fastest growing economies and one of its staunches devotees to the gospel of free market reform. Part of the credit for economic prosperity seemed to lie with a successful monetary reform that ended the hyperinflation of the 1980s. This monetary reform established a currency board that fixed the value of the Argentine peso at one peso to a U.S. dollar. One Argentine peso, exchangeable into dollars at any time, equaled one U.S. dollar. Argentine inflation subsided to low single-digit levels, output grew at a fast clip, and the economy seemed resilient to external shocks.

The genesis of the crisis goes back to 1998 when many of Argentina’s trading partners saw their currencies depreciate, perhaps because of fallout to the East Asian Crisis and the retreat of foreign capital. The strong demand for U.S. financial assets keep the U.S. dollar strong, which kept all currencies pegged to the dollar, including the Argentine peso, strong. The strong Argentine peso meant that Argentine exports went at higher prices in foreign markets, while Argentine imports saw falling prices. In summery, Argentina-produced goods grew costlier compared to goods produced by Argentina’s major trading partners. Cheaper imports allowed Argentina to live beyond its means, while its exports were over-priced in foreign markets. To restore balance, Argentina needed to either devalue its currency as its trading partners had done, or undergo domestic deflation. Argentina did experience some deflation, which is a characteristic that distinguishes the Argentine crises from other crises. More often these types of crises occur after government deficits, financed by monetary growth, lead to inflation.

Government’s budget deficits were modest, but were large enough to force a growing reliance on foreign debt financing. A small financial sector may share the blame for a dependence on foreign capital to finance both private sector and public sector spending. The vulnerability of the system arose from the large share of loans and mortgages denominated in dollars while the income generated to service these debts came in the form of pesos. Once deflationary forces surfaced, output shrank, unemployment spiked, government deficits rose, and the government proceeded to pile up foreign debt. In December 2001, the government of Argentina defaulted on its public debt.

After more than three years of recession, in January 2002, the Argentine government, running out of credit, devalued the peso relative to the dollar. At the time, 70 percent of all Argentine bank deposits and 79 percent of all loans were denominated in dollars (Economist, March 8, 2003). To avoid throwing many debtors into bankruptcy, the loans were redenominated into pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar, and the bank deposits were redenominated into pesos at the rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar. (Economist, March 8, 2003). The peso deposits quickly dropped in value as the peso plummeted to about four pesos per dollar. The action de-dollarized the Argentine economy.

Devaluating the peso reduced the cost of Argentine exports in the world economy, making it possible for Argentina to earn foreign exchange and recover from deep recession. Foreign exchange is necessary to repay foreign debts.

By 2005, the Argentine economy exhibited a strong expansion, helped in part by a worldwide commodity boom, and the government reported budget surpluses. The government offered the holders of defaulted bonds new bonds in a choice of four different currencies. The value of the new bonds equaled about 30 percent of the value of the defaulted bonds (Economist, January 15, 2005). Creditors fumed at the rough treatment and predicted that Argentina would meet with difficulty trying to regain the confidence of foreign investors. 

See also: Currency Crises, Foreign Debt Crises

Yen

The yen is the money of account for Japan, comparable to the dollar for the United States. By the 1990s the Japanese yen had become a major international currency, sharing the stage with the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the ECU as determinants of international monetary values.
The Shinka Jorei (New Currency Regulations) of 1871 established the yen as the monetary unit in Japan. The Japanese derived the word yen from the Chinese word yuan, which meant “round thing,” a reference to the U.S. and Mexican dollars that dominated East Asian trade at the time. The act set the yen equal to 0.05 ounces of gold, making the official Japanese price of an ounce of gold equal to 20 yen. At the time the official United States price of an ounce of gold was $20.67. The yen was intended to be equivalent to the Mexican dollar, the standard unit in Asian trade at the time. The yen began life as a decimalized currency; one-one-hundredth of a yen was called a sen, and one-tenth of a sen was called a rin.
Officially, Japan was on a bimetallic monetary system, but in practice the yen was on a silver standard. In 1877 a civil rebellion forced the government to issue inconvertible paper money to finance military expenditures. Inflation erupted and in 1882 the government established the Bank of Japan, partly to replace inconvertible paper money with bank notes convertible into silver. Following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895, Japanese received in gold a large war reparation payment from China, providing a gold reserve sufficient for Japan to establish a gold standard. In 1887 a new currency law gave the Bank of Japan a monopoly on the privilege to issue bank notes, and put the yen on the gold standard.
At the beginning of World War I most developed countries, including Japan, abandoned the gold standard and prohibited the export of gold. Following World War I Japan, beset by economic turmoil, stumbled in its efforts to return to the gold standard. In 1930, on the eve of the Great Depression, Japan returned to the gold standard, only to have to abandon it again in 1931. The depression dealt a serious blow to the gold standard worldwide, and Japan turned to tight government regulation of its currency, which continued through World War II.
A wave of inflation engulfed Japan following World War II and the occupation authorities instituted a currency reform that withdrew old yen notes and issued new yen notes. In 1949 the exchange rate between the yen and the dollar was set at 360 yen per dollar. Under the Bretton Woods system, exchange rates were fixed at official rates, and the ratio of yen to dollars remained at 360 until 1971. Large trade surpluses enabled Japan to bolster its gold and foreign exchange reserves, paving the way for lifting all restrictions on foreign exchange transactions.

When a system of floating international exchange rates displaced the fixed-rate Bretton Woods system in 1973, the yen began an upward career of currency appreciation. In 1970 it had taken 360 yen to purchase a dollar. By 1973 it took only 272 yen, and by the end of the decade it took only 219 yen to purchase a dollar. As the yen grew stronger, it took more dollars to purchase a yen, but despite that Japanese goods constituted a major competitive threat to U.S. industries. In 1984 the world’s major trading partners agreed to intervene collectively in foreign exchange markets to appreciate the yen even further. Whereas it took 239 yen to purchase a dollar in 1985, by 1988 that number had fallen to 128 yen, a substantial increase in the value of the yen.
In the 1980s Japan took further steps to deregulate its financial system and to allow foreign firms to participate in Japan’s financial markets. Japanese banks had become among the largest and most powerful in the world, and the yen emerged as a major international currency. By 1998 economic depression in Japan put downward pressure on the yen, and the yen traded at around 140 yen per dollar.

See also:

References:
Davies, Glyn. 1994. A History of Money.
Ohkawa, Kazushi, Miyorhei Shinohara and Larry Meissner, eds. 1979. Patterns of Japanese Economic Development: A Quantitative Appraisal. 

Yeltsin’s Monetary Reform in Russia

Russia opened the 1990s in monetary chaos, manifested by soaring inflation, and a currency, the ruble, that had long been shielded from the free-market forces of foreign exchange markets. In foreign exchange markets, currencies are bought and sold with other currencies, as when Japanese yen are purchased with United States dollars.
Under economic reforms, prices, unfettered from state controls, took off, creating a ruble shortage that left some workers unpaid for months. Wages and pensions rose, and the Russian government cranked up the printing presses on a round-the-clock basis. For the month of July 1992 alone, the government printed up more rubles than the Soviet Union government had printed up in its last 30 years. To expedite the process, the government increased the largest denomination of the printed ruble from the 200-ruble note to the 1,000-ruble note. Coins also became available in higher denominations. Inflation reached its peak in 1992 when monthly inflation rates ran 15 percent, and prices increased 200 percent over the year.
In 1993 the government begin to step on the monetary brakes, but in ways that threw the country into deeper confusion. In July the government invalidated all rubles issued before 1993, and gave people only a few days to convert the old rubles into new rubles. It also put a limit on the number of old rubles that foreigners could convert into new rubles. Citizens could convert up to 35,000 old rubles into new rubles, and if they held additional rubles, these had to be put into savings accounts for six months. By the end of 1997 annual inflation had fallen to the 12 percent range, and the government announced a plan to lop off three zeros from the ruble. Effective 1 January 1998, in what was essentially an accounting reform, 1,000 rubles became 1 ruble, and all prices, balance sheets, debts, etc., were adjusted accordingly.
One legacy of the Soviet regime was tight control over the conversion of rubles into foreign currencies. Tourists were able to convert foreign currencies into rubles at a rate close to a black market rate, but set by the Russian Central Bank. Foreign-owned enterprises earning profits in rubles faced a special difficulty. If a foreign-owned company wanted to send profits home to the parent company, those profits had first to be converted from rubles to the home-country currency at a disadvantageous exchange rate set by the Russian government. To attract foreign investment, and integrate the Russian economy into the world economy, Russia had to make the ruble convertible into foreign currencies at free-market rates.

A loan from the International Monetary Fund helped the Russian government marshal the foreign exchange reserves needed to establish a convertible ruble. On 1 July 1992 the Russian government established a single exchange rate between the dollar and the ruble at an initial rate of 126.5 rubles per dollar. The responsibility for adjusting the rate fell to the Russian Central Bank, which planned to set a rate based upon twice-weekly currency auctions. After July 1993 the Russian Central Bank pegged the ruble to the dollar in a crawling peg system that avoided wild fluctuations but allowed the ruble to depreciate over time relative to the dollar. In 1996 Russia further broadened the ruble market by allowing foreigners to buy and sell Russian government bonds in secondary markets. Russian government bonds, paying over 100 percent interest at times, constitute a major demand for rubles. Rubles must be purchased first before bonds can be purchased. The astronomical interest rates on Russian bonds were sometimes necessary to maintain a demand for Russian rubles. Despite high Russian interest rates, the ruble steadily declined relative to the dollar, falling to a rate of 6,200 rubles per dollar at the end of 1997. After three zeros were lopped off, the rate became 6.2 rubles per dollar.
In 1998 the Russian government again turned to the printing press to solve Russia’s problems, putting pressure on the ruble in foreign exchange markets. The value of the ruble fell sharply in august, and to help cope with the crisis the government imposed a moratorium on payments on foreign debt, significantly adding to the severity of a global financial crisis. By the end of the year the ruble was trading at around 20 rubles per dollar.

See also:

References:
Hanke, Steve H. 1998. Is the Ruble Next. Forbes (9 March): 64–65.
Wall Street Journal. 1991. “Soviet Printing of Rubles Soared in 11-Month Period.” 24 December, eastern edition, at A8.
1992. “Russia, Facing Inflation, Plans Bigger Banknotes.” 31 January, eastern edition, at A10.
1992. “Russia Plans to Make Ruble Fully Convertible by August 1.” 6 May, eastern edition, at A3
1993. “Chaos in Russia Mounts.” 26 July, eastern edition, at A8.
1997. “Russia’s Overhaul of Ruble Prompts Unease in Nation.” 31 December, eastern edition, at A7. 

Yap Money

The inhabitants of the island of Yap, one of the Caroline Islands in the central Pacific, adopted large, thick stone wheels for money, a primitive medium of exchange that survived into the post–World War II era. The inhabitants called this from of money fei. A study of the operation of this system of currency reveals interesting insights into the nature of money that are relevant for modern monetary systems.
The stone wheels ranged in diameter from a foot to 12 feet and the larger stones were virtually immovable. The hole in the center of the stone wheels varied with the diameter of the stone, and the smaller stones could slide over a pole and be carried. The stones were quarried from Palau, about 260 miles away, and sometimes from as far away as Guam. Stones could serve as fei only if they were made of a fine, white, close-grained limestone.
One of the interesting characteristics of this currency was that the owner did not have to take possession of it. In transactions involving these large stones, a buyer would give ownership of the fei to a seller in return for goods. The seller, however, would not actually take possession of the fei, but would leave it on the premises of the buyer of the goods. A mere acknowledgment that the seller owned the fei was all that was needed to signify its new ownership.

The logic of the Yap monetary system went so far as to acknowledge the wealth of a family on the strength of the ownership of a very large stone that had been lost at sea for several generations. According to tradition, an ancestor of this family had secured this fei and was towing it home on a raft when a storm rose, and the stone ended up at the bottom of the sea. Because all aboard the ship towing the raft testified to the size and quality of the stone, and that it was lost at no fault of the owners, the inhabitants of Yap agreed that the stone belonged to the family that lost it and that its market value remained unimpaired. Therefore the family enjoyed the purchasing power of this stone just as if it lay on their own property. 
Another interesting anecdote related to the Yap monetary system occurred after the German government purchased the Caroline Islands from Spain in 1898. The German government wanted the natives of Yap to improve the roads and make them suitable for more modern vehicles. When the natives rather obviously neglected to improve the roads, the German government was faced with finding a way to fine the natives. Since removing fei was difficult, and the stones had no value outside of the island of Yap, the German government hit on the idea of sending an agent around to paint a black cross on the most valuable stones to signify a claim of the German government. The natives of Yap immediately set to work to improve the roads. After the German government was satisfied that the roads were improved, it sent an agent around to remove the crosses, and a great rejoicing rose up among the natives.
The value of the primitive money on the island of Yap depended upon the faith of its inhabitants. The idea of accepting money on faith must seem ridiculous to modern-day advocates of a gold standard as the necessary backbone of any paper-money system. The acceptance of paper money in our modern economies, shorn of the assurance of the gold standard, requires that people have faith that government will not mismanage the money supply, causing it to lose its value from inflation.

See also:

References:
Angell, Norman. 1929. The Story of Money.
Friedman, Milton. 1992. Monetary Mischief.

Gillilland, Cora Lee C. 1975. The Stone Money of Yap: A Numismatic Survey. Smithsonian Studies in History and Technology. No. 23.